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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
CIVIC NATION BUILDING AS TOOL FOR CONFLICT 
TRANSFORMATION:  
AN ANALYSIS OF THE AHTISAARI PLAN AND THE INDEPENDENCE 
PROCESS IN KOSOVO 
 
 
by 
 
Natalia Andrea Peral 
 
M.A. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution 
Supervisor: Prof. Fikret Adanır  
 
Keywords: Kosovo, Ahtisaari Plan, Civic Nation, Nation Building, Third Party 
Intervention, Conflict Transformation. 
This study investigates the civic nation building (CNB) process initiated by 
Ahtisaari Plan in Kosovo from a Conflict Resolution perspective. I treat nation building 
efforts of external actors as a form of structural third party intervention in post conflict 
and multi-ethnic divided societies, and I observe whether this process contributes to the 
transformation of the conflict. Special focus is placed on the Decentralization Laws and 
Special Protective Zones Law of Ahtisaari‘s Package and their impact on the 
relationships between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. Concretely, I examine 
whether the mechanisms provided by these laws contributed to transform the interethnic 
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relations based on competing nationalistic projects. For this purpose I study conflict 
transformations at structure, issue, actor and personal level. 
For the analysis of structure and issue level a conflict mapping technique has been 
used in time-series. In-depth structured interviews have been implemented for the 
analysis of actor level and a survey among individual adults in Kosovo (Prishtina, 
Prizren, Mitrovica, Gracanica, and Peja) was conducted for measuring personal level 
transformations. 
This research argues that civic nation building has chances to impact on the 
transformation of the conflict as long as, the third party intervening in the conflict 
considers and addresses different limitations found in the empirical case analyzed here. 
These limitations are: a risk of institutionalizing ethnicity, ‗a left-out dyad problem‘ of 
the intervention, lack of involvement of actors in the macro-micro transfers, lack of 
bottom-up approach.  
Despite the positive relationships found between conflict transformations and 
civic nation building (CNB), whether this kind intervention have been the promoter of 
these changes or not, is a question which remains open and demands further research 
and exploration. 
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ÖZET 
 
UYUġMAZLIK DÖNÜġÜMÜ ARACI OLARAK  
VATANDAġLIK TEMELINDE ULUS ĠNġASI: 
AHTISAARI PLANI'NIN VE KOSOVA BAĞIMSIZLIK SÜRECININ 
ANALIZI 
 
Natalia Andrea Peral 
 
Uyusmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü Programı, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2009 
Tez DanıĢmanı:   Prof. Dr. Fikret Adanır 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Kosova, Ahtisaari Planı, VatandaĢlık Temelinde Ulus, Ulus ĠnĢası, 
Üçüncü Parti Müdahalesi, UyuĢmazlık DönüĢümü. 
 
Bu çalıĢma UyuĢmazlık Çözümü bakıĢ açısından, Kosova‘da Ahtisaari Planı tarafından 
baĢlatılmıĢ vatandaĢlık temelinde ulus inĢası sürecini araĢtırmaktadır. UyuĢmazlık 
sonrasında ve çok etnisiteli bölünmüĢ toplumlarda dıĢ aktörlerin ulus inĢa çabalarını 
yapısal bir üçüncü parti müdahalesi olarak ele almakta ve bu sürecin uyuĢmazlığın 
dönüĢümüne katkı yapıp yapmadığını incelemekteyim. Ademi Merkeziyet Kanunları‘na 
ve Ahtisaari Paket‘inin Özel Koruyucu Bölge Kanunları‘na ve bunların Kosova 
Arnavutları ve Sırpları arasındaki iliĢkiler üzerindeki etkilerine belirgin bir vurgu 
yapılmaktadır. Daha somut olarak anlatmak gerekirse, bu kanunlar tarafından sağlanan 
mekanizmaların rekabet eden milliyetçi projelere dayanan etnisiteler arası iliĢkileri 
dönüĢtürmeye katkı yapıp yapmadığını araĢtırmaktayım. Bu amaçla yapı, sorun, aktör 
ve kiĢiĢel düzeyde dönüĢümleri incelemekteyim.  
Yapı ve sorun düzeyindeki analiz için zaman serisi bazlı bir uyuĢmazlık 
haritalandırması tekniği kullanılmıĢtır. Aktör düzeyinde analiz için derinlemesine 
yapılandırılmıĢ mülakatlar gerçekleĢtirilmiĢ ve kiĢisel düzeydeki dönüĢümleri ölçmek 
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için ise Kosova‘daki (PriĢtina, Prizren, Mitrovica, Gracanica, ve Peja‘da) yetiĢkinlerle 
ferdi anket yapılmıĢtır. 
AraĢtırma, çatıĢmaya müdahale eden üçüncü parti bu ampirik çalıĢmada bulunan 
çeĢitli kısıtlamaları dikkate aldığı sürece, vatandaĢlık temelinde ulus inĢasının 
uyuĢmazlığın dönüĢümüne etki etme Ģansının olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Bu 
kısıtlamalar etnisitenin kurumsallaĢması, müdahaledeki ―unutulmuĢ ikili problemi‖, 
aktörlerin makro-mikro transferlere müdahil olmaması ve aĢağıdan yukarıya yaklaĢımın 
eksikliğidir.  
UyuĢmazlık dönüĢümü ve vatandaĢlık temelinde ulus inĢası arasında pozitif 
iliĢkiler bulunmasına rağmen, böyle bir müdahalenin bu değiĢimleri teĢvik edip 
etmediği tartıĢmaya açık olarak kalıyordur ve ileri düzeyde araĢtırma ve inceleme 
gerektiriyor.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The study of conflict resolution practices and theories applied to multiethnic 
divided societies has developed significantly since the early 1990s when the aftermath 
of the Cold War brought about the claims of national determination in the URSS and 
Yugoslavia.  The Conflict Resolution field focused on explaining these processes, as 
well as the subsequent increase of the level of violence.  Lately, the literature evolved 
towards the understanding of the intervention processes that address conflicts arose 
from these failing or collapsed states, as well as conflicts over competing national 
projects. In this sense, interventions occurred in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, 
Kosovo, East Timor were known in the conflict resolution field as ‗state-building‘ or 
‗nation building‘ processes (see Zartman 1995, Dempsey 2001, Dobbins 2003 and 2004 
Fukuyama 2004 and 2006, Chesterman 2004, Caplan 2005, Bickerton 2005, Chandler 
2006, Zaum 2007). However, state-building and nation building interventions present 
different characteristics that, as it will be discussed here, require more precise 
theoretical understanding than the approach of previous literature. This study therefore, 
introduces civic nation building as third party intervention with the ambition of meeting 
this goal of bringing up new theoretical constructs. The specific case in question to 
which this different theoretical perspective will be applied is the Maarti Ahtisaari 
intervention in Kosovo and the independence process which resulted as a consequence. 
This research focuses on Kosovo since the declaration of the Independence and 
subsequent implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan (AP). This plan expresses a new kind 
of intervention which aims at constructing a state identity. This type of intervention will 
be referred here as ‗nation building processes‘. Nevertheless, as we shall see, this study 
will focus in one peculiar nation building process, a ‗civic‘ one. This new enterprise 
started to be in process of negotiation since three years ago (February 2006) yet, this 
study will focus only from the period in which this intervention started to be effectively 
implemented so the Kosovo declaration of Independence the 17
th
 of February of 2008 
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up to June 2009 which marks the 10 years after the UNMIK establishment in Kosovo 
and the successful deployment of EULEX in North Mitrovica border with Serbia. The 
‗civic nation building‘ under implementation is understood here as aiming at ending the 
roots of a long-lived conflict between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs regarding –
mainly-the competition between two different national projects. 
 
1.1. The Aim of This Study 
The endeavor of this research is to explore the scope and limitations of a ‗civic 
nation building intervention‘ on the successful transformation of a conflict in 
multiethnic divided societies. This ―civic nation building‖ is conceived as a structural 
third party intervention and their contribution to different aspects of conflict 
transformation process (changes in the structure and issues, and changes in decision 
makers and population). By studying the Kosovo‘s conflict I will observe whether there 
is any chance for this kind of interventions to succeed in the goal of transforming the 
very roots of the conflict and therefore guarantee a sustainable peace in the territory. 
Different studies of nation building process have been done in the field of History, 
Political Science and International Relations; however, its dimension as conflict 
resolution (CR) tool has not been yet examined sufficiently in existing literature. 
Therefore, this study aims at providing an analysis of nation building from a CR 
perspective, treating nation building as a form of structural third party intervention in 
multiethnic and post conflict societies. In my research the nation will be defined as 
‗civic nation‘ with the observance of some cultural elements as: symbols and cultural 
and historical background of the different ethnic groups. The focus of the study is not 
only on the process of the intervention, but particularly on its outcome.  
This work is based on theories that discuss the main characteristics of nation-
building processes, particularly those focusing on ‗civic nations‘ with a special ambition 
in differentiating nation-building processes of those generally known as state building 
practices.  As second step, the theoretical discussion incurs on exploring the theories on 
third party interventions aiming at bringing nation-building debate amid this cluster.  
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After establishing conceptual clarifications regarding a different sort of external third 
party interventions, the theoretical frameworks deepen the understanding of conflict 
transformation processes.  The exploration of the impact of civic nation-building 
processes on successful conflict transformation processes is embedded in the arguments 
bridge among this theoretical plethora.  
 Throughout the analysis of the implementation of Ahtisaari plan in Kosovo, the 
reader will observe the structural measures that the process has undertaken, particularly 
regarding decentralization and protection of cultural heritage. The selection of these 
aspects guards a strong relationship with a sensitivity regarding the aforementioned two 
competing national projects. The journey will continue with the exploration of the 
changes that those measures have originated at the macro and the micro level. 
Therefore, the reader will encounter a comparison between former and new structures as 
well as issues; and the observation of decision makers and population‗s perception 
regarding the structural measures implemented by the intervention. 
 From this long journey, the study seeks to draw conclusions on the capacities of 
this kind of intervention for generating macro and micro levels transformations in the 
conflict. Furthermore, at a theoretical level, the findings of this study will reflect the 
possibility of positive relationship between the civic nation building and conflict 
transformation. At a practical level, the findings suggest a course of action for this sort 
of interventions and will show its scope and limits. 
 
1.2. Significance of the Study 
The significance of my study is twofold. Theoretically, this research clarifies 
intermingle conceptualizations such as state building and nation building, providing the 
field of conflict resolution with  clear cut theoretical constructs for the analysis of third 
party interventions. Moreover, it explores the use of two sensitive concepts as ‗civic 
nation building‘ and ‗successful conflict transformation‘ contributing to the literature 
with more operationalized concepts.  Similarly, this research brings about a discussion 
between the transfers of macro level impact on micro level aspects of the conflict as 
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much as its mutual enforcement. The need in the field of conflict resolution for these 
kinds of discussions has remained not properly addressed; this study hopes to contribute 
to generating conclusions in this regard. 
 Empirically, this research‘s humble ambition is to establish some guidance for 
foreign policy and future intervention process in conflicts in multiethnic and divided 
societies. Moreover, this research points out, particularly, the scope and limitations of 
interventions which aim at constructing a common identity among the divides. 
 
1.3. Outline of the Study 
This first chapter of my study provides a general overview to the main arguments 
of my research, its significance and aims as well as a summary of all chapters of this 
study. 
Chapter two discuss the literature related to my research and the different 
theoretical frameworks used to bridge arguments, findings, and conclusions. 
Chapter three introduces the methodology for data collection and analysis 
developed throughout my research. 
Chapter four presents the case of Kosovo and its historical, cultural and political 
background. 
Chapter five develops the analysis of the four dimensions of the successful 
conflict transformation treated here: structure level, issue level, actor level, and personal 
level. 
Chapter six introduces conclusions regarding the findings and discusses the 
pertinence of the theoretical constructs. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
Nation Building, Civic Nation Building Third Party Intervention, Structural 
Intervention, Conflict Transformation 
 
2.1. Nation Building 
The academic debate on nation building began among historians and political 
scientists the discussion on the origin of the nations, and the nature of nationalism. 
Nation building was conceptualized as the process of political self determination of a 
certain ethnic group (Gellner 1983, Smith 1986, Connor 1993, Horowitz 1985). Other 
authors have referred to the process of nation building as ―the determination of the self 
of the nation‖ regardless its ethnic origin (Norman 2006, Kohn 1944, Anderson 1991, 
Breully 1996, Kymlicka 1995). However, in both understandings the idea implicit is 
that nation building process requires a definition both of ‗the Self‘ and of ‗the Other‘. 
Hence, ―[t]he process of becoming ―us‖ is inexorably linked to the creation of the 
―other‖‖ (Reicher 2004 in Cook-Huffman 2009:27, see also Triandafyllidou 1998). 
Nation building is, then, a process of national identity construction which distinguishes 
‗us‘ from ‗them‘, implying the differentiation between an ‗in-group‘ and an ‗out-group‘ 
exists. The self-differentiation involves the decision of who will be ‗among us’ and who 
will be ‗outside‘.  Some authors are of the opinion that such differentiation evolves 
through a process of emphasizing ‗ethnic‘ and cultural elements of the group or through 
the overarching category of ‘civic’ values and institutions by which cultural components 
are therefore denied. Out of this understanding, Kohn (1944) was the first to elaborate 
on the distinction between ‗ethnic' and ‗civic' nations. Nonetheless, he categorically 
lines up the divide between an understanding of positive developments in one (civic 
nation) and negative ones in the other (ethnic nations). Some scholars (Ignatieff 1994, 
Kuzio 2001) have related this distinction with the idea of ‗inclusive' and ‗exclusive' 
nations.  There are also authors (Yack 1996, Kymlicka 1995, Kuzio 2001, Polese 2008, 
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Brown 1999, Nieguth 1999, Kedourie1993, Smith 1986, Kuzio 2002) who do not 
believe in such a distinction between civic and ethnic nations by arguing that all civic 
nations have an ethno-cultural background. 
This study takes from this debate the elements that each perspective has found in 
each type of nation. In the first case, ethnic nations, the ethnic elements as memories, 
heritage, history and culture, language and common descendents give reason to the 
existence of the nation (Smith 1991, Connor 1972, Horowitz 1985). In civic nations, 
civic elements as civic identity, the acceptance of the multiethnic reality, common rights 
and duties, national defense and security, inclusive membership to the territory (Kohn 
1944), civic and political institutions, citizenship (Kymlicka 1995, Norman 2006) are 
the defining elements of the nation. In the third path, authors such as Kylmlicka (1995), 
Kuzio (2002), Polese (2008), Yack  (1996) and Smith (1991) argue  that civic nations 
have acquired ―inherited cultural baggage‖ and that their development was ― contingent 
on their peculiar histories‖ (Yack 1996: 196-197) or are embedded  in an existent or 
imagined past/history (Anderson  1991). In this sense, the debate in the field of history 
and political science between a primordialist perspective of nation –in which nation is 
understood to lie in this cultural or ethnic given background- and 
instrumentalist/modernist perspective –in which nation is understood to be able of being 
constructed- left conflict resolution with a strong legacy, the information that nations 
can in fact be constructed. 
2.1.1. Nation Building as intervention 
The understanding of nation building, as an external intervention able to palliate 
conflict, departs from the abovementioned legacy that other social sciences have 
inherited to conflict resolution. 
Thus, nation building has been used as a tool for intervening in a conflict, 
although some conceptual confusion started to arise in the literature.  For instance, 
nation building was in vogue in the 50/60´s, associated with the development and 
modernization of the newly decolonized countries (Deutsch 1963) (Hippler 2005). 
However, the latest theoretical and practical implementations of the concept added more 
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complexity to the use of nation building as a term to represent any sort of external 
intervention. 
In this sense, nation building is regarded by Robert Rotberg (2004) as a process of 
reconstructing failed states. Rotberg is probably the most noticeable author of the new 
trend on the use of the concept of Nation Building outside of its former historical and 
political connotations on the nationalism debate; and probably the key exponent treating 
nation building as state building. Rotberg‘s concern is deliberately related to the effects 
of what is called ‗the new terror area‘, as clearly states his article ―Nation building in a 
time of Terror”. Therefore, it seems that nation building in times of terror requires 
particular measures related to reconstructing states that are vulnerable to this new 
challenge. 
In similar line of thinking, Fukuyama (2006) treats nation building as a process of 
political construction and makes an attempt to differentiate nation building from state 
building. The author associates state building with restoration of the old political 
structures, and nation building as the formation of new political structures. However, in 
same line that Rotberg, he links this need of political construction with failed states 
without deeply analyzing nation building as a process of state identity formation. In this 
sense, the differentiation between state building and nation building does not obtain the 
clarity we are expecting to find for the concept. 
Similar to Rotberg and Fukuyama, authors such as Dobbins (2001, 2003, 2005), 
Cabe (2002), Jennings (2003), Berger (2006) use the term 'Nation Building' where they 
actually mean 'State Building'.  When Dempsey and Fontaine (2001) describe nation 
building as the most intrusive form of foreign intervention, they are also referring in fact 
to state building processes that, like in Dobbins, posse a strong security component. The 
authors claim that ―[n]ation-building is the massive foreign regulation of the 
policymaking of another country…which entails the replacement or creation of 
governmental institutions and leadership that are liked by intervener… and which 
requires a substantial military presence to impose the nation building plan on the target 
country.‖ (Dempsey and Fontaine 2001:2). James Dobbins and others of Rand 
Cooperation, make instead more emphasis on the democratization process. Therefore, 
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nation-building is regarded as the use of armed force to forge and sustain democracy in 
a post conflict environment. (Dobbins 2001, 2003, 2005) 
Not surprising then, Ignatieff (2003) compares a foreign involvement in nation- 
building with one of ‗empire‘ but of a ‗lite‘ version. Thus, nation building is seen as a 
new kind of imperialism. Therefore, according to the author, the state building measures 
are taking mostly by force. The intervention becomes a total change of state structures 
without any further goal of embracing divided communities under a peculiar state 
identity. 
Nation-building is undoubtly occurring in the field of post-conflict reconstruction. 
Whether it is Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor or Kosovo, we can follow certain 
elements of nation-building in all that interventions, but at the same time we can find 
state-building processes as well. However, nation building and state building do not 
necessarily go together. Simmonsen (2004) Allen (2008), Call and Cousens (2008) and 
Kostic (2007) have also pointed out this need for a differentiate understanding of nation 
building and state building processes. 
Kostic (2007:18-19) considers nation building one sort of measures to be taken by 
an external peacebuilding process. These measures are mainly related to the 
―…imposition of externally constructed national identity onto existing ethnonational 
communities in order to promote legitimacy for the created state institutions among the 
population.‖ The author hypothesizes that ―(t)he result of this process, on the political 
level, is ethnic politicking. On the population level, the consequence is a strengthening 
of ethnonational cohesion and conservation of an existing ethnic conflict with all of its 
inherited incompatibility, and, at the same time, diminishing possibilities for the 
changing of negative stereotypes and societal reparation.‖ 
The author‘s perspective focuses on peace-building as a certain outcome to be 
reached on a particular moment. In other words, nation building is seen as a static 
picture. However, in disagreement with the author, nation building, only to be 
understood looking backwards not forward, and therefore it impacts on the ethnic 
divided society can only be seen  throughout the time by which the conflict is rather 
transformed than resolved. Moreover, as I shall express somewhere in this literature 
 
 
9 
 
 
review, my perspective on nation building does not depart from a negative assumption 
as Kostic does. Kostic (2007) explicitly considers that the identities of ethnic groups are 
threatened by the mere implementation of the intervention. Such a point of departure for 
analyzing the scope and limitation of nation building as an external intervention, results 
to me like putting the horse before the carriage. Therefore, I shall disengage any 
negative assumption of nation building as external intervention in order to widely 
explore its usage. 
2.1.2. Civic Nation Building as a Third Party Intervention in Post-Conflict 
and Ethnically Divided Societies 
As we can observe, the complexity of nation building debate is wide and no clear 
definition or consensus has been reached. However, this study considers that nation 
building should be brought into the debate of conflict resolution field, therefore, as a 
tool of conflict transformation in post conflict and multiethnic and divided societies. 
Thus, for the purpose of analyzing third party intervention of this sort, it becomes 
necessary to start conceptualizing nation building and state building processes 
according to their specificities. In this research, I use the term State Building when I 
refer to the process by which the state structure is created as well as all the activities 
associated with it: institution building, democracy building, security building, and 
capacity building. By Nation Building, on the other hand,  I understand the process of 
building a common identity under which all subjects of a state – built or in process of 
being built - are being gathered.  Here I distinguish, Civic Nation Building when this 
getting-together process rests on the rule of law which offers equal opportunities for all 
people. In other words, civic nation building is a process which attempts to overcome 
ethnic divisions by embracing all possible cultural backgrounds and ethnic roots under 
civic laws which guarantee the equality of them all. In the process of building a civic 
nation it is the mean which makes the difference. 
Having the same implications in mind, Kuzio (2001) distinguishes between nation 
building and nationalizing, and he confers the second conceptualization to those ethnic 
states that deny civil rights to their inhabitants. In civic nations, elements such as civic 
identity, the acceptance of the multiethnic reality, common rights and duties, national 
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defence and security, inclusive membership to the territory (Kohn 1944), civic and 
political institutions and citizenship (Kymlicka 1995, Norman 2006) are the defining 
elements of the nation by which the people are congregated.  
Consequently, I shall understand here that a third party intervention of this sort is 
established with the aim of bringing the past and cultural baggage together and 
reconsidering it under a civic nation engineer that guarantee their existence but not their 
supremacy. The endeavor ends up being a half way combination of what have been 
opposed in the past debate of the literature between a civic and an ethnic nation building 
process, being something closer to what Kymlicka has called a ‗multicultural nation‘. 
However, as this research focuses on the tool per se, I would rather work over this civic 
engineering of the nation that aims at being constructed in this sort of multiethnic and 
divided post conflict society. 
It is therefore, a civic nation in which the past is taken into account and in which 
the engineering of the state is constructed over it, not beneath, not aside. The state 
building process need to rely in a civic nation layer in order to be able to remain as a 
viable solution for post conflict societies. When there is not legitimacy of this state 
building process among people and decision makers, the process in itself is condemned 
to collapse. This is the basic assumption over which a civic nation building process is 
launched. The common identification of the population and decision makers with the 
new identity of the state allows continuity. 
It is the past what should be overcome and transformed in a positive and viable 
way. Therefore, it is not a civic nation building which rejects the past in the name of the 
rational consent among people, but one which while recognizing the past, builds a 
common path over it and with it. I shall follow Yack in here. The author supports 
Renan‘s perspective (Yack 1996:116)  There is a ‗daily plebiscite‘ that recognizes the 
cultural differences as background and there is a cultural legacy without which the daily 
consent would not make sense, since  there would not be a reason to continuously seek 
for agreement with other group of individuals. In this sense, we can say, that in post 
conflict societies the reason to hold together by a daily plebiscite is the memory of a 
past tragedy that nobody wants to repeat again. Post conflict and divided societies may 
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have no other shared memory than the memory of what they do not want to suffer once 
more. 
Civic nation building end up being an engineering in which an ethnic majority and 
an ethnic minority get equal chances of obtaining power, not due its ethnocultural 
background but to the opportunities offered by the new format or civic project. The past 
experience in Kosovo was of competing two ‗national projects‘ in which the 
opportunities of equal participation could get closed for either group. The CNB 
intervention aims at guaranteeing a format in which these sorts of solutions remain 
unnecessary, useless and indeed banned of returning. 
2.2. Third Party Intervention  
 Rubin (1981:5) defines a third party as ―… an individual who is in some way 
external to a dispute between two parties and who interposes (or is interposed) between 
them‖.  This basic definition does not explain who this ‗individual‘ shall be, what 
exactly it means to be ‗external to the dispute‘, how this ‗interposition‘ shall occur, 
when this interposition shall take place (timing) or even why the intervener shall take 
over (motives). However, these concerns, unaddressed by Rubin‘s definition, will 
structure the whole literature debate around third party interventions. In this sense, 
different type of interventions will be suggested in the theoretical discussion and they 
will be further enriched by considerations on criteria of effectiveness and success of 
these interventions. 
  My research will not be much interested on aspects of timing, motives or  in  
criteria for effectiveness, basically, because my study deals with a rather new type of 
intervention- nation building- that needs first to be conceptualized as such. Therefore, 
the limited scope of this analysis leaves us with the understanding of these main 
characteristics of this type of interventions: who intervenes? And how is this 
intervention conducted? Following these objectives, the literature of third party, I shall 
observe, is related to the exploration of the following: a differentiation between 
indigenous and external intervention, and a mapping of the different types of 
interventions considered among the literature as well as a classification of the 
intervention addressed in my research. Stern and Druckman (2000) call for the 
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development of more precise definitions of interventions in international conflicts that 
allow us to further evaluate to which extent they have altered the conflict in any 
particular direction. Therefore, both, the revision of the literature and the conduction of 
this study will ambition to reach such a goal. 
 Regarding the identity of the third actor that takes place in the conflict, the 
literature discusses a vast amount of possibilities that range from individual to 
organization level
1
. Montville (1991) is the first one to differentiate interventions by the 
actor‘s identity. In this sense, he refers to Track I diplomacy to traditional diplomatic 
and official interventions and Track II to unofficial and non-governmental interventions. 
In 1991, Mc Donald and Diamond introduced six more tracks covering actors of a wide 
spectrum of life such us: government, professionals of conflict resolution, business, 
private citizens, research, training and education, activism, religious, funding and public 
opinion and communication sector. Interesting enough, there is not track exclusively 
destined to external actors so it goes implicit that international actors can perfectly 
coordinate the whole multi-track diplomacy or be part of each of the track. With 
Lederach in 1997, it is more openly stated the need for integrating different levels in a 
peacebuilding process and special emphasis is conferred to bottom-up approaches. The 
track III intervention, then, will recall interventions done by grassroots level actors. 
Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999) argue that ―[l]inked to this [introduction of 
track III level], there has been a shift from seeing third party intervention as the primary 
responsibility of external agencies towards appreciating the role of internal third parties 
or indigenous peacemakers.‖  
 My research is particularly interested in observing the dynamics of this 
external/foreign intervention
 2
 , and specifically the scope for its articulation with 
indigenous role.   According to Mac Ginty (2008:148), ―[i]ndigenous [as a term] 
suggests than an activity or norm is locally inspired.‖ The author also differentiates 
between ―indigenous‖ and ―traditional‖ interventions, stressing that ‗indigenous‘- as a 
                                                          
1
 See Bercovitch (1992) for further references on this topic. 
2
 Notice I shall use rather ‗external‘ instead of foreign to avoid any negative connotation 
that the concept  of ‗foreign‘  may posse  while it is refered as  ‗foreign interventions‘. 
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concept- should not have any connotation of traditional methods, despite that an 
indigenous intervention may use traditional tools. The author further refers to the failure 
of indigenous interventions and in a way justifies the need for external interventions. 
Using Mac Ginty definition of indigenous intervention we can consider as external 
intervention all those interventions that are not ―locally inspired‖ but rather externally 
planned or, as Kostic (2007:15) points out, ‗implemented‘ by an external actor.  
 One logical connotation is that processes entirely implemented by external 
actors or mainly following its objectives would sound as imposition and those 
implemented entirely by locals would lead locals to dominate the process. In the case of 
nation building interventions, the dangerous aspect of a local-driven intervention of this 
sort is – as we shall see- that the process tends to be associated with the implementation 
of an ethnic state dominated by the ethnic majority or by those with enough power to 
keep the resources of the state by controlling the process of intervention in its whole.  In 
general terms and not only regarding nation building processes, the doubts around the 
participation of an external actor in a conflict are widely expressed in the literature as 
Hampson (2001) clearly points out. The author divides between those who are 
pessimistic regarding the intervention of an external third party and those who Hampson 
calls ‗interventionist school‘ who believes that the external third parties can indeed 
change the course of a conflict, or at least contribute in some way to end violence. 
 Furthermore, the interaction between locals and external interventions is 
understood to result in a complicated relationship. As Mac Ginty (2008) notices, either 
the local/indigenous intervention loses its ‗indigenous‘ aspect while sponsored by an 
‗international‘ intervention, or the local strata disregards the  measures taken by the 
external intervention as Richmond and Frank ( 2007 :82) point out . However, the need 
of analyzing the possible cooperation between locals and internationals in nation 
building process is still pending of theoretical constructs. In a very recent debate, 
scholars like Chesterman (2004), Bickerton (2005), Caplan (2005), Hansen (2005) , 
Woodward (2005), Narten (2009), have observed this interaction for state-building 
processes, however, nation building process, as conceptualized here, still lack of this 
sort of observations.  
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In other different line of the debate, indigenous and external interveners have been 
discussed by approaching the topic of neutrality. The literature talks about ‗outsider 
neutral‘ or ‗insider partial‘ (Lederach and Wehr 1996) to make reference of the added 
value in the intervention by choosing either type of intervener. Both, an actor absolutely 
external to the main issues of the conflict or an insider able to know the locus of the 
internal dynamics to the conflict, are assumed to posse positive impact for different 
conflict settings.  ‗Outsider neutral‘ are mostly regarded as being a positive role for 
conflict environments in which the distance with the conflict situation and the parties is 
needed to guarantee a due process, the ‗insider partial‘ is referred as being pertinent for 
situations in which there is need for building trust so highly regarding actors of the 
community are considered to intervene in the conflict. This insider is directly linked to 
the conflict and therefore has a firsthand knowledge of the deep roots of the conflict as 
much as an awareness of structural dimension to what he is also part. 
Elgstrom, Bercovitch and Skau (2003) have added another category to the ones 
introduced by Lederach and Wehr, they refer to ‗impartial insiders‘, having in mind 
how the role of external intervention of regional organizations regarding the conflict in 
which they get involved. The authors emphasize the development of trusted-relationship 
with all actors in the conflict.   
 
This differentiation between outsider neutral and insider partial have also serve 
the purpose of classifying types of interventions. However there are also other sources 
for this classification that exceeds this one based on the position of the third party 
towards the conflict. Keashley & Fisher (in Bercovitch eds. 1996) classify the types of 
intervention according to the level of leverage implemented in the  intervention: from 
the lower level of leverage as conciliation, consultation, pure mediation, power 
mediation, arbitration, to the higher level as peacekeeping  which involved the use of 
military power.  Others like Laue and Cormick (as cited in Laue, 1981) classify 
interventions based on the roles taken by interveners as Activist, Advocate, Mediator, 
Researcher and Enforcer. Pruitt and Rubin (1986) focus also in differentiating third 
parties interventions according their role, but they do so presenting different dual -and 
seem exclusive- options such as: formal vs. informal, individual vs. representative, 
invited vs. non-invited, impartial vs. partial, advisory vs. directive, inter-personal vs. 
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intergroup, content-oriented vs. process oriented. Nevertheless, a third party 
intervention can assume all –even contradictory- roles introduced by Pruitt and Rubin, 
and sometimes may need to do so for gaining scope of maneuver in negotiation process 
or other instances in which difficult process need to be implemented. 
 For Dukes (1999: 157) there are interventions which have a total different focus 
and perspective. While some interventions may be concerned with actions at individual 
level, some others are more preoccupied with taken action at the social structure in 
which the individuals are embedded. The first kind of interventions, Dukes refers as 
‗particularist‘, while to the second type of interventions the author refers as 
‗structuralist‘. In more or less same line of argumentation Beriker (2009) identifies 
types of interventions according to their main objectives: one destined to facilitate 
communication among parties (Transformative Intervention) and the other orientated to 
change the structure of the conflict environment (Structural Intervention). In this 
Structural Intervention ―[a]ctors intervenes as a third-party and carries out activities 
which are designed to change the incentive structure of the disputing parties with an 
expectation that they would lead the parties to change their conflict behavior.‖ (Beriker 
2009:72). Micro-level oriented activities (such as: facilitative mediation, interactive 
conflict resolution, conflict resolution training) fall in this category.  While in the 
Transformative Intervention the third party ―…intervenes in order to transform the 
dysfunctional relationship among the conflicting parties with the aim of creating 
common intellectual and value space among the parties.‖ Activities such as  positive 
and negative incentives, peace-building and peace-keeping operations, initiation of 
bilateral agreements, power mediation and military intervention, are assumed to meet 
the objective of  changing the incentive structure In this sense, transformative 
interventions seem to have a ‗particularist‘ approach while structural transformations 
are clearly of the type of structuralist approach. In other words, the particularist or 
transformative type of interventions are mostly addressing micro level aspects of the 
conflict, while the structural type of interventions aims at being a macro level action. 
For analytical purposes, this differentiation accomplishes its goal. However, as West 
(1993:12 cited in Dukes 1999) points out, ―…structures and behavior are 
inseparable…how people act and live are shaped, though in no way dictated or 
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determined, by the larger circumstances in which they find themselves.‖ In same line of 
argumentation, Dukes (1999:159) argues that it is the structure which gives meaning to 
the individual behavior in a conflict but at the same time, ―[p]articularist circumstances 
such as personality and communication do play a considerable role in how these 
disputes emerge, evolve, and terminate.‖ In other words, the consideration of both 
dimensions – particularist and structuralist- while intervening in any conflict is 
inevitable. As Rubenstein points out (1999: 179) , ―[c]onflict resolution efforts that do 
not move to a more strategic structural level have the overall effect, therefore, of 
maintaining the existing system and the conflict it spawns.‖   
 Peacebuilding interventions are mostly regarded as having such a goal of 
addressing structural causes, transforming the conflict and covering all levels of society 
(social, economical, political) as Lederach (1997) clearly describes. However, 
peacebuilding has also become a term all encompassing. As the whole peacebuilding 
intervention is expected to accomplish the goal in a long term process, different sort of 
interventions entitled to contribute to this peace-construction enterprise are mostly 
override and under-analyzed. This situation becomes clear in the empirical observation 
of this theoretical constructs; such is the situation in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq, to mention some. For instance, if we are willing to 
analyze Kosovo peace-building process we would observe that it posses in its core a 
wide range of interventions implemented at the most diverse levels. The interventions 
go from problem solving workshop by Track III actors to Track I level negotiations and 
multi-track state building process. However, there is a theoretical need for approaching 
the understanding of a newly create type of intervention in field like Kosovo and the 
abovementioned examples.  Therefore I shall define here, ‗civic nation building‘ as an 
external and structural intervention, aiming at covering this gap between the empirical 
happenings and the theoretical developments. 
 The debate between structuralist and particularist type of intervention, or in 
other words macro level/micro level interventions has been interpreted by Hampson 
(2001) as a debate between a governance-based approach and a social-psychological 
approach respectively. In this sense, a governance-based approach to interventions is 
one focused on creating participatory governance structures, new social norms, rule of 
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law and democracy. (Hampson 2001:392) The liberal peace theory might be an example 
of this sort. According to the author, the objection to this practice comes to questioning 
the intromission of external parties to domestic affairs of other countries and the idealist 
belief that these sorts of enterprises are an easy task to do. Social-Psychological 
approaches, instead, are attempts to change the attitudes of the parties towards the 
conflict. (Hampson 2001:396). The main objection regarding the impact of this type of 
intervention to the conflict is based on the difficulties to measure the transfer of a 
change in individual level towards a change in the wide social fabric. (Hampson 
2001:397).Hampson, has not been the only one preoccupied about the problem of 
transfer from a micro level intervention to a macro level structure. In fact, the whole 
debate  between more particularist or structural interventions lead us to the debate about  
transfers from a macro level intervention to micro level aspects of the conflict, and vice 
versa, from micro level interventions to macro level dimension of the conflict. In other 
words, there is two different dynamics: one which address  macro-micro transfers and 
therefore we wonder how a structural reform impacts at population and decision makers 
level, or how we can conclude that the changes at micro level were directly related to 
structural interventions; and another one which addresses micro-macro transfers and 
therefore we ask how interventions  among population and decision makers impact in 
the bigger picture of the conflict, in the conflicting relationships, in the roots of the 
conflict, the issues, the general dynamics and eventually the whole social fabric. The 
problem of ‗transfer‘ between both levels is discussed extensively by authors like Fisher 
(1997:345) Estree (2000), Rohuana (1993, 1995) Saunders (1995) and Sorbo (1997) 
among others. However, the impact of macro level measures in micro level aspects of 
the conflict are underestimated or not properly explored. 
 In a sort of logical sequence macro level measures are expected to generate an 
impact in macro level dimension of the conflict. Similarly, micro level interventions are 
expected to address micro aspects of the conflict. However, structural interventions 
should have the ambition to generate some sort of impact on micro level too. This 
option has been implicit denied by those we can called ‗partitionist school‘. For these 
academicians, the only possible thinking is of a macro level one. One in which the basic 
assumptions are an interplay of different structures. As such, these partitionsts assume 
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for example that ethnic identities are immutable, that there is not space for individual 
agency but a security dilemma structure in which all individuals –ethnically identified- 
end up being trapped. These scholars disregard micro level considerations and instead 
defend a structural intervention that do not leave space for other than macro changes 
and macro interventions. This school, propose  the idea of implementing partitioning or  
transfers of populations would eventually lead to an ‗ethnic unmixing‘3 which would 
prevent future violence as the implicit security dilemma between different ethnic groups 
would be over. While authors like Kaufmann (1996, 1998), Pape (1997-98), Downes 
(2004, 2006) believe that ethnic separation are the only solution, authors like Hampson 
(2001), Kumar (1997) Sambanis (2000) , Street (2004), Ball (2007) believe that 
partitioning may actually increase the ‗seeds‘ for conflict mostly due to the indivisible 
nature of this sort of conflict and the wrong assumptions of the partitioning supporters. 
 My research will capture this debate by observing a civic nation building process 
as a very particular structural intervention. This study, therefore, will ambitions at 
contributing the debate between macro level interventions and micro level impacts as a 
result of observing this type of intervention. Furthermore, my study also  discusses 
against the ‗partitionist school‘ by arguing  that a civic nation building process may 
serve the purpose of finding a common ground among diversity, as an alternative to 
partitioning. With this purpose in mind, the present research will explore the scope and 
limitations of this kind of interventions to generate such an impact. 
2.2.1 Civic Nation Building as a structural third party Intervention 
In this research proposal, Civic Nation Building, refers to this third party 
intervention that aims at changing the incentive structure of the disputing parties. It 
does so by issuing a civic framework with the intention of overcoming ethnic divisions 
by embracing all possible cultural backgrounds and ethnic roots under civic laws which 
guarantee equal expression to all them. Therefore, it  becomes a process of building a 
common  civic identity under which all subjects of a state – built or in process of being 
built - are being gathered. 
                                                          
3
 The term has been expressed by  Hampson (2001) 
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Therefore, civic nation building implies necessarily an identity building process, 
however it is a peculiar identity the one which it is aimed to be created. This new 
identity does not pretend to start from zero in the denial of the former and already 
existent ones. It is rather a blend whose point of departure lies in what Montville (1993) 
called ‗a walk through history‘. Here is where, Anderson (1983) ‗imagined 
communities‘ comes at hand to contribute to the understanding of this new sort of civic 
nation building. One in which a third party has taken a role to imagine and create a 
proposal of new identity melding a past in order to make it workable for the future. The 
CNB practices does not  tamper the existing ethnonational identities but rather profit 
from  what each of them can offer and sum them up into the process . 
Although not from a structural perspective, Doyle (2002), Walter (1999), Cousens 
(2001) have addressed the role of external actors in nation building process. However, 
the existing literature does not give account of the impact of these nation building 
practices on the overall transformation of the conflict in which the intervention takes 
place. An exploratory analysis of this sort can shed light on possible causal relationships 
that contribute to future theory-building in this matter.  With this aim in mind the 
present research will explore civic nation building process as structural interventions 
implemented by an external actor. 
2.3. Conflict Transformation 
Conflict Transformation (CT) seems to be a rather new term in conflict resolution 
field. Its conceptual development has created – probably- more debate than theoretical 
paths; indeed it has meant a new conceptual framework for conflict analysis and 
resolution. 
It is more likely that the term was firstly introduced
4
 as a new conceptual 
enterprise by the International Social Science Council‘s interdisciplinary ―Issue Group 
                                                          
4
 At least it is not possible to track back on time other appearance of the term as such. 
However,  some argue that the meaning that conflict transformation have acquiered  can 
be found  since the earlier attempts in the conflict resolution field. This is probably true 
as since time inmemorial human being has wonder about  internal and external 
transformation,  nevertheless the main focus here is the construction of the term and in 
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on Peace‖ in 1984, chaired by Raimo Vayrynem. To this group, followed-up a book and 
a symposium out of which several theoretical developments around the concept of 
conflict transformation have been edited in the book ―New directions in Conflict 
Theory‖ by R.Vayrynem. Since then on, the concept has had as many advocates as 
contestants. In this sense, there are those who consider conflict transformation as a 
different process than conflict resolution (advocates), and those who try to build a 
continuum between conflict resolution and conflict transformation, being the latter a 
process in a later state
5
 of a conflict resolution process (conciliators). However, there is 
not any scholar who openly deny the existence of such conceptualization (detractors) 
 Among the clear exponents of the first group, advocates, are scholars as 
Vayrynem, Rupesinghe, Lederach, Galtung, Miall. In a general stand, all of them would 
agree that a conflict transformation process involves –at least- all of the following: a) a 
long term perspective b) an emphasis on change c) a recognition of the role of history d) 
a concern toward new challenges that derivates either from a new sort of conflict, 
protected one; or new context – 21st century dynamics e) a multilevel perspective able 
to encompass the already mentioned features plus different actors involved in the 
conflict. 
 The long term perspective that conflict transformation assumes is basically 
either referred as an open-ended and dynamic process that allude to a time-consuming 
enterprise that it is ongoing and never ends (Rupensinghe 1995:76, see also Vayrynem 
1991, Galtung 1996, Lederach 1997, Reinman 2001). Galtung understanding of a 
conflict as organic leads him to see conflict transformation as a ―…progressing 
perspective on the life cycle of conflict…‖ (Galtung 1995:51). Then the long-term 
process becomes eternal as for Galtung understanding, the conflict transformation 
suffers similar transformations that human beings suffer during life and after death 
according to a Buddist perspective of eternal re-birth. Therefore, the author main 
                                                                                                                                                                          
its implecations rather than the consideration of  transformative aspects in  the field of 
conflict resolution. 
5
 Purposely I refer to ‗state‘ as condition or mode of being and not as a stage which may 
denote a level, degree or periodical step in the process. 
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concern is how this never-ending rebirth process can turn to be a positive one. Although 
distanced of ‗spiritual interpretations‘ of Galtung, Zartman  and Ramuseen (1997) take 
conflict transformation as a cycle but one which covers all process of addressing a 
conflict, from pre-negotiations to reconciliation. 
 Despite that conflict transformation advocates have expanded the time 
perspective in addressing the conflict, they have doing that due to their main concern: 
change. It is the need of bringing about a change that demands the extension of the 
process analytically, theoretically and – particularly- in the ground. In the words of 
Vayrynem (1991:6), ―[t]he transformation perspective suggests that conflict resolution 
is not only a form of stepwise rational action in which the actors involved try to adjust 
their competing interests to each other. It is also associated with everyday and broader 
historical changes transforming the scope, nature and functions of collective violence.‖ 
Wallensteen is of the same understanding and made emphasis on the objective of this 
change by saying that ―…the parties, the issues, and the expectations are changed so 
that there is no longer a fear of war arising from the relationship.‖ (Wallensteen 
1991:130)  In Clements (1997) understanding this fear can only be removed by 
changing the structural sources of the conflict; a change at multiple dimensions 
addressing the roots of the conflict as Miall (2004) clearly refers to as concern of his 
conflict transformation framework. In words of Reinmann (2001:13) is the statu quo on 
which the conflict arose that needs to be change in a sort of demand for social justice. In 
other words, conflict transformation as process and as a successfully achieve state of the 
conflict, refers to conditions that change to guarantee that peace can be sustained. 
Notice I am not saying even ‗sustainable‘, as there is not peace able to survive by itself 
if all factors and actors are not in the line with this purpose. Therefore, conflict 
transformation encourages the necessary changes at macro and micro levels aiming at 
make them work for the sustainability of the peace. It is a sort of overall systemic 
change, there is not proper transformation if all pieces are not affected, like if real peace 
would not take place until the conflict, the actors, the structure, the entire population 
would be affect be compelled to a life in peace. In words of Nordstrom, conflict 
transformation works to ‗break the habits of war‘ (1995:107), and -we can then say- to 
establish habits of peace. 
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 However, there is one more element needed to make this transformation 
possible, ‗a walk through history‘ that Montville (1993:115) sensitively defines. 
Without the consideration of historical grievances, of the emotional-laden society, the 
accumulated traumas, hatreds, the search for truth and mercy, and the existing open 
wounds, there is no conflict transformation possible. In words of Wallensteen, 
―[t]ransformation, in short, is a generalized learning from historical experience.‖ 
(1991:129). Wallensteen does make a connection between conflict resolution and 
transformation, the latter implies a change that the former does not.  That change is one 
very peculiar that has aroused from a process of acknowledging, recognizing and 
considering the roots and trajectory of the conflict. In the author understanding, conflict 
resolution misses this element, as the conflict may end or be resolved but the 
incompatibilities may also remain despite any agreement or any process oriented to 
solving the problem. 
 Considering what hitherto was expounded, the question that follows is why 
incompatibilities remain despite conflict resolution efforts? To this question advocates 
of conflict transformation answer that it is both the peculiarity of the nowadays 
conflicts
6
- their intractability-, and the challenges of 21
st
 century – such as the new 
actors and changes that the post Cold War period brought about- , what carries the need 
for a new perspective to the way that conflicts are handled. Miall, Ramsbothan, and 
Woodhouse (1999) refer to the salience of the asymmetric conflicts and their multiple 
causalities; Miall (2004) emphasizes the impact of globalization on internal conflicts, 
Vayrynem (1991) and Rupensinghe (1995) observe the complexities of protracted 
conflicts, however the general agreement is that only a transformative perspective can 
properly deal with this peculiarities if the expected outcome is a sustainable peace. It is 
the multidemsional approach implicit in the conflict transformation term what can – in a 
way- guarantee that key aspects would not be forgotten. The aftermath of nowadays 
conflicts, Mitchell states, leaves residues such as traumas, fears, hurts and hatreds that 
continuously poison the conflict dynamics even after of being ‗resolved‘, so necessarily 
conflict transformation  take into account the task of incorporating them (Mitchell 
                                                          
6
 Specially referring to conflicts  with certain impact on the international system 
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2002:19-20). Furthermore, as Lederach (1997) wisely points out, conflict 
transformation does also encompass the consideration of the vast variety of actors and 
time-periods of the conflict. Therefore, the proposal of a holistic, all encompassing and 
multidimensional approach to handling conflict can be considered as another key 
feature the conflict transformation perspective. 
 Among the conciliators, the perspective is sometimes of a continuum (Diamond 
1994) between conflict resolution and conflict transformation practices, being a typical 
resolution activity to identify and resolve the root causes of the conflict while a typical 
transformation activity lies in changing the conditions that create that specific root 
causes of the conflict.  In Diamond perspective approach, transformation is not possible 
without resolution and vice versa. Conflict transformation is not the entire approach to 
conflict as Lederach, Galtung and other advocates have claimed, but a piece of an 
overall process that is also no called resolution in its entirety, but rather peacebuilding 
effort. Of this understanding are scholars such as Kriesberg (1997), Miall, Ramsbothm 
and Woodhouse (1999), and even Mitchell (2002) who mostly regards the emergency of 
conflict transformation as a new theoretical construct as a failure of conflict resolution 
field of protecting its main original aims. 
 Having described the understanding of conflict transformation, it remains only 
one question left: when conflict has finally been transformed? It has been difficult 
among scholars working on conflict transformation to reach a consensus over how to 
answer this question.  Among attempts to build a methodology with this purpose, the 
first author to come up with some operationalization for the concept of Conflict 
Transformation is Vayrynem in 1991. Concerned with the need of a dynamic analysis of 
the conflict, the Vayrynem (1991:4-7) suggests to identify the multiple ways in which 
the conflict may be transformed. The author points out four different dimensions in 
which transformation may occur and that necessarily should be aimed at in any 
intervention to the conflict:  Actor transformations (AT) – are internal transformations 
that refer to internal changes in the conflicting parties, or the appearance and 
recognition of new. Issue transformations (IT) – refer to a reduction in the importance 
and salience of issues around which the conflict develops and to increase that of the 
issues with a common approach. In short IT means to change the agenda of the conflict. 
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Rule transformations (RT) – changes in the norms that actors follow in their 
relationship. Structural transformations (ST) – changes in the external structure of the 
conflict, particularly that one that organizes relationships and distributes power in the 
conflict. 
 By 1995 Rupensinghe came up with a suggestive framework for conflict 
transformation, one which includes the following: 
 Since 1997, Lederach has been working on developing a holistic and all 
encompassing peacebuilding
7
 approach able to take into account all needed –and 
possible- transformation of a conflict. The author emphasis on a multitrack and 
multilevel perspective has been followed to this date by many academicians and 
practitioners. Recently the author has emerged with what he calls ―a nested paradigm‖ 
for peacebuilding efforts. This nested paradigm combines 
 In 2005, Norbert Ropers together with the Berghof Foundation for Peace 
Support (BFPS) published ―The Systemic Approach to Conflict Transformation” in an 
attempt to combine systemic thinking and to enrich the approaches to transforming 
conflict. This enterprise has been followed since then by both the Berghof Research 
Center and the BFPS and the effort was published in 2008 under the title ―A Systemic 
Approach to Conflict Transformation Exploring Strengths and Weaknesses” edited by 
Daniela Körppen, Beatrix Schmelzle and Oliver Wils.  
For the conflict transformation advocates working on systemic perspective, the 
systemic change is the key factor for a transformation to properly happening However, as 
Wils et. al (2006: iv) clearly point out, ―…systemic approaches are relevant not because 
they reflect complexity of systems, but because they make a meaningful contribution to 
reducing this complexity‖. Lederach (1997) has also been in the search for a framework 
that can provide a sustainable answer to a conflictive situation.  It should not be any 
                                                          
7
 It is needed to clarify here that Lederach understanding of conflict transformation is  
equal to a peacebuilding process, for the author there is not conceptual or practical 
different among the two. Therefore, only when referring to Lederach, peacebuilding and 
conflict transformation concepts can be taken as synonym. 
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answer but one destined to continuously transform the relationships at personal, 
relational, structural and cultural level. Lederach‗s integrated framework for peacebuilding 
comes to accomplish this purpose. The sustainability of this systemic change is given, 
then, by the regenerative process of the system itself, an open end system in continuous 
development towards peace rather than violence. 
Loiuse Diamond (ND) has also proposed a system approach to conflict 
transformation however – we can argue- she equates conflict transformation with 
peacebuilding. Her article, System approach to peacebuilding
8
, smartly identifies three 
main criteria without which there is no chance for the sustainability of such a system. 
One criteria is renew-ability, the system needs to be able to self-renewing, so in order to 
endure for the future the ―…structures and patterns need to be generative, not 
destructive.‖ (Diamond ND: 6) the second criteria is responsibility, someone has to take 
the role of creating news patterns and ensuring its continuity. Last but not least, the third 
criterion is fulfillment, meaning basically that the system has to satisfy the needs of all 
parties. The different aspect that the author brings to the systemic debate is the call for 
‗responsibility‘. Most of the peacebuilding and conflict transformation endeavors do not 
have a clear reference to hold someone ‗responsible‘ for the process.   
As I have previously mentioned, the multi-track diplomacy developed by John 
McDonald and Louise Diamond (1996) came to offered a new style of interventions. 
However, this conceptualization‗s main asset is its capacity of adverting the relevance 
of addressing the transformation process in different tracks. The tracks are supposed to 
be complementary and foresee its own difficulties that are correctable by the other 
track.  If combined, both recommendations of Diamond may lead to the question of who 
is responsible of the failures in one track and the reparation of the failures in the other 
one. Maybe, if we would group this tracks in some different type of changes, as the one 
proposed by Vayrynem, we could eventually consider one main responsible for each 
                                                          
8
 The author thanks to Louise Diamond for provinding her with this unpublished 
manuscript. Similar ideas of the manuscript were part of another article that neither the 
author of this thesis nor Diamond could find. Therefore, Louise Diamond decided to 
send this unpublished article which was meant to be part first chapter  of a book entitled 
―Beyond Win-Win”.  
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type of changes aimed.  I found the conflict transformation process conceptualized by 
Miall can eventually meet this goal. 
Miall (2004) follows Vayrynem's (1991) approach and identifies five types of 
transformation: 1) Contextual transformations: changes that occur at society level (i.e. 
culture, governance arrangements, institutions, social roles, norms, rules and codes) as 
at international and regional ones 2) Structural transformations: changes related to the 
set of actors, issues and incompatible goals, conflicting belief or relationships, or to the 
society or state which the conflict is embedded. 3) Issues transformations: changes at 
''the position that parties take on key issues at the heart of the conflict and the way that 
parties redefine or reframe their positions, or reach compromises or resolutions''. 4) 
Actor transformations: ''include decisions by actors to change their goals or alter their 
approach to conflict, such as decisions to seek peace or initiate peace process. 5) 
Personal transformations: ''changes of heart or mind in individual leaders or in small 
groups with decision-making power at critical moments...'' 
 If compared both approaches Vayrynem and Miall, we can state that the latter 
embraces more dynamics in his objective of capturing the whole process of 
transformation. However and regardless the invaluable contribution of Miall to the 
study of conflict transformation, this multilevel perspective requires further 
development and more conceptual refinement if our aim is to evaluate – for instance- 
certain interventions ant their level of conflict transformation achieved. Nevertheless, 
this study will draw upon  four of the dimensions defined by Miall ( structure, issues, 
actor and personal level) and will make an  attempt to operationalize the concept of 
‗conflict transformation‘ and its multilevel perspective in a sense that can serve clear 
purposes of analysis. 
Having said this, I proceed to  operationalize  Successful Conflict Transformation 
as a process by which the following changes take place: 1) Changes at Structure level:  
changes related to the set of actors,  conflicting belief or relationships, or to the society 
or state which the conflict is embedded 2) Changes at Issue level:  changes related to 
overcoming of former issues and incompatible goals issues among parties, changes in 
the position of the parties over main issues under dispute, and the way that parties 
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redefine or reframe their positions, or reach compromises or resolutions.3) Changes at 
Actor level:  decision makers take decisions to change their goals or alter their 
approach to conflict, such as decisions to include other ethnic groups as equal partners 
or decisions of developing joint work at governmental/official level 4) Changes at 
Personal level: changes among individual adults towards the  acceptance of the new 
reality in which different ethnic groups live together, and the  increase of  interaction 
among individuals of different ethnic groups. 
This framework shall be use for the analysis of conflict transformation that my 
research will develop. 
2.3.1. Nation Building and Conflict Transformation 
Hippler (2005) has been the first in considering nation building as a tool for 
conflict transformation. Unfortunately, the author‘s perspective remains 
underdeveloped without providing any clear theoretical conceptualization. Moreover, 
Hippler simply enunciates the relationship without any reference to conflict resolution 
field or any of its categories. The author‘s initial attempt fails to include any specific 
element of conflict transformation debate and to contribute reducing the ambiguity 
around ‗nation building‘ concept.  One specific attempt to relate nation building and 
conflict resolution (CR) was done by Kourteff (2005); however, he suffers from the 
same lack of acknowledgement of CR field as Hippler (2005). The thesis of this author 
mainly focuses on military intervention and democratization process. 
As we can observe, the complexity of nation building debate is wide and no clear 
definition or consensus has been reached. However, this study considers that nation 
building should be brought into the debate of conflict resolution field, therefore, as a 
tool of conflict transformation in post conflict and especially in multiethnic societies. 
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Chapter 3 
HISTORICAL, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO THE 
CIVIC NATION BUILDING PROCESS IN KOSOVO. 
 
The ‗civic nation building process‘, that the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan 
instituted, needs to be understood in the light of its historical, social, and political 
background that gave birth to two national projects for Kosovo. Aiming at meeting this 
purpose, this chapter will be divided in  four subchapters: the first subchapter will 
address the arguments to the Serbian and Albanian nationalistic projects for Kosovo; the second 
subchapter examines the Kosovo question in the light of two different nationalistic 
projects, the Serb and the Albanian one, previous 1989;  the third subchapter looks at 
Kosovo conflict in recent history 1989-1999 and the ‗limbo‘ situation in which Kosovo 
entered after NATO intervention in 1999; the last subchapter continues describing the 
contemporary context in which the ‗civic nation building‘ takes place in Kosovo. 
 3.1. Arguments to the Serbian and Albanian nationalistic projects for 
Kosovo. 
Today‘s Kosovo is a very small country of a nearly 10887 Km2,  with a 
population of about 2 000 000 people, 92% of which are ethnic Albanians, 5% Serbs, 
and the other 3% is distributed among Bosnians, Turks and RAE community (Roma, 
Askali, Egyptian). However, its small size has undergone a turbulent history under 
different emperors starting from Roman, Byzantine, Bulgarian, Serb, and up to the 
Ottoman Empire. 
However, the Kosovo‘s most significant feature has been the presence, clearly 
identified since 1989, of two competing national projects with eventually different 
ethnic connotations. One project recalls for Kosovo as Serbian territory, ‗Greater  
Serbia project‘, and the other brings upon an Albanian option to Kosovo territory which 
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at times can be considered as ‗ Greater Albanian project‘ and in other periods as a 
project of Kosovo‘s self- determination from Serbia implying, mostly, Albanian 
population. 
Both projects are based in competing arguments over key elements of Kosovo 
such as: origin of its population, the Kosovo Battle, the religious-cultural legacy, and 
the legal frameworks that have been implemented in Kosovo, especially since 1974 
Yugoslav Constitution onwards. 
Albanians claims the origin from the Illyrian civilization, as an indigenous people 
to the territory, belonging to the tribe of Dardanias. (Malcom 1998). While Serbian 
perspective evokes the great migrations of Slavs into the territory in 7
th
 century A.C, 
and its ruling during the 12th and 13th century as Serbian Kingdom. ( 
Bieber&Daskalovski 2003). Therefore, while Kosovo Albanians judge Serbs as 
occupiers, Serbs accuses them as falsifiers of history. (Pavkovic in Waller et. al.ed. 
2001) 
The Albanian perspective recalls two dominant theories on Abanian origin: 
Illyrian and Pellazgian theories. According to the Illyrian theory, Albanians are the 
indigenous inhabitants of this territory before the Slavs invaded and occupied it. (Waller 
et.al 2001:8) Piro Misha (in Schwandner-Sievers & Fischer eds. 2002) argues that the 
Illyrian descendent theory is the evidence of Albanian historical continuity in Kosovo. 
The Pelasgian theory suggests the pellasgian origin of Albanians, vogue among 
nationalists as Vasa.
9
 However Illyrian theory gained more support among scholars as 
Piro Misha notices. Further identification, as who were the Albanians at the end of 
nineteen century, is offered by Pashko Vasa in ―The truth on Albania and Albanians‖ 
(1879). Vasa claims that Albania was a name given by Europeans in the 14
th
 or 15
th
 
century to a country of the Schqypetars (Shqyperi) which included all the inhabitants of 
                                                          
9
 For more information, please see extracts of  ―The truth on Albania and Albanian‖ 
(1879) of  Pashko Vasa in Balazs Trencsenyi & Michal Kopecek Eds (2006) Discourse 
of collective identity in central and southeast Europe  (1770-1945): Text and 
Commentaries. Volume I. Late Enlightenment. Emergence of the modern “national 
idea”. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press 
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the territories of Scutari (Shkondra),  Ipek (Pec), Pristina, Wrania, Katchanik, Uskup, 
Perlepe, Monastir, Florina, Kebrena, Calarites, Janina, the Gulf of Preveza.  Following 
the same perspective, these territories were governed by their national chiefs before 
1831 when the Albanians were divided by the Ottomans in four vilayets -Shkoder, 
Janina, Monastir and Kosovo. 
Therefore, from an Albanian perspective, Kosovo signifies the main and last fight 
of Albanians for ―the recovery of the ancient land of the Dardania and thus a re-creation 
of their ancient kingdom.‖ (Waller et al 2001:9). In this sense, the origin of Kosovo 
Question goes back to the London Conference of 1913 when Albania was recognized as 
national state. However, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece were granted half of its 
territories as Serbia, was allowed to keep possession of Kosovo which she had occupied 
during the Balkan Wars. Kosovo, then, started to represent the victimization of 
Albanian people by his neighbors, especially Serbia/Yugoslavia.  As Piro Misha (in 
Schwandner-Sievers & Fischer eds.2002) asserts, the Otttoman Empire was collapsing 
and Albania‘s neighbors were legitimizing their expansionist claims by denying the 
mere existence of Albanian nation. Kosovo Question, for Albanians, embraces these 
feelings of protecting part of their ‗stolen‘ territories.  
From Serbian perspective however, the history is quite different. By origin Serbs 
belong to Slav ethnicity.  Slavs came to the Balkan Peninsula around 600 CE and, as 
Pavlowitch (2002) asserts, the Southern Slavs ―came from an area beyond the 
Carpatians‖. After about a century they settled the area and became named as Croats 
and Serbs. The author also argues that it was Christianity which brought them together. 
The Serbian political history, points out Cox (2002:20) begins with the reign of Stefan 
Nemanja who ruled Raska and Zeta (today southern Serbia and Montenegro) from 1169 
to 1196 and who gave birth to the Nemanjic Dinasty. This reign marked the ―…turning 
point in the development of the Serbian state…‖, according to Cirkovic (2004) who 
further claimes that out of Nemanja‘s death, the ―dynasty of the sacred roots‖ started in 
Serbia, while producing different other saints. Therefore, ―[t]he aura of sanctity that 
surrounded some members as well as the entire dynasty enable the gradual creation of a 
special Serbian tradition as an extension of general Christian traditions, and placed the  
history of the Serbian people within the common history of salvation‖ (Cirkovic  
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2004:35-36). Rastko –known as Saint Sava-, Nemanja‘s younger son, became the head 
of Serbia‘s self-governing Orthodox Church of 1219 (Cox 2002:21).It should be 
mentioned that the seat of the autocephalous Serb Church was in the monastery of Zica, 
far away from today‘s Kosovo.  
Serbia continued to expand until it gained a medieval reputation by the hand of 
King Stephen Dusan who came to power in 1331 in rivalry with the Byzantine Empire 
and took the name of Emperor in 1346 until 1355 when he died in a campaign against 
Byzantium (Pavlovitch 2002). The area of his empire included Macedonia, Northern 
Greece, Montenegro, almost all Albania (Cox 2002:21).  Serbia dominions were not 
integrated however, she kept the existing order in the territories conquered in order to 
legitimize her role, while in fact, these Byzantine territories were never part of Serbia 
(Pavlowitch 2002) as Dusan and the successive historical consciousness of Serbia 
claimed they were. 
Branimir (1999:79) affirms that ―[t]here was no Serbian state at all, and the 
principal mark of Serbian national identity was membership in the Serbian Orthodox 
Church." Banac also points out the relevance of the church in the organization and 
ruling of Serbian people. It was then, ―[w]ith the fall of medieval Serbian state to the 
Ottoman Turks – the processes that commenced in 1389 with the Serbian defeat at the 
Battle of Kosovo and ended in 1459 with the abolition of the vassal Serbs despotate- the 
Serbs lost not only their independence, but also their native landed elites. National 
leadership passed into the hands of the autocephalous Serbian Orthodox patriarche 
(1557- 1766) whose prelates substituted not only for the gentry, but for its tasks in 
national culture and historical memory.‖ (Banac 1995:133)  
Since 1557, Serbian Orthodox Church was the only Serbian institution authorized 
by the Porte. It was then when the Serbian patriarchate of Pec (nowadays Kosovo) was 
established embracing all territories from Slovakia to the Adriatic in same millet 
(Ottoman-held Serbia, Montenegro, Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia 
Hercegovina and some part of western Bulgaria) (Banac in Ozdogan & Saybasili 
1995:134). Nonetheless, this institution did not mean territorial and political control, the 
millet ―...had no territorial exclusivity; various millets could coexist on the same 
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territory. Nevertheless, in the absence of  Serbia as a political entity, the Serbs 
interpreted their millet as  an indicator of their national territory‖ (Branimir 1999: 79).  
Moreover, this millet implied that The Porte gave the civil authority of the former 
Serbian state to the patriarchs of Pec, which not only included Serbs but also non-Serbs 
(Banac in Ozdogan & Saybasili 1995:134). Banac argues that the church contributed to 
spread and to keep alive the consciousness of Serbian state and national traditions.  
However, in 1690 when the church proved not any more loyal to the Ottomans, the 
patriarchy of Pec led migrations to Hungary, by the time the Partriarch of Pec was 
abolished in 1766, the Serb spiritual life was already in development in Sava and the 
Danube. It was during this transition that Serb culture shifted from Bizantine-Slavic 
features to the Central European (Banac in Ozdogan & Saybasili 1995:134). Despite the 
shift, Kosovo remained in the historical consciousness as part of those territories 
coffered by the millet system granted by The Porte. 
As Vickers (1998) states ―[t[he Serbs are convinced that Kosovo was almost 
uninhabited, and that Albanians only arrived in the area in the fifteenth century with the 
conquering Turks, and again in the seventeenth century after the exodus of a great 
number of Serbs‖. It is then, based on this understanding that Serbia recalls their 
historical legacy over Kosovo referring exclusively to the times of her short-lived reign 
and the millet system granted to her during Ottoman times. 
Another line of argumentation in the national consciousness, which each project 
aimed at building upon, rests on the interpretation of the Kosovo Battle. 
 Tsar Lazar ―was the most powerful of the Serbian lords who were not yet subject 
of the Ottoman Empire‖ (Pavlowitch 2002: 9). He worked for the reconciliation with 
Constantinople from which he got the recognition of the Serbian Patriarchate of Pec. On 
the 15
th
 of June of 1389, he died together with Sultan Murad I who attached the strategic 
area of Kosovo and conquered it for the Ottomans. (Pavlowitch 2002: 9-10). This battle 
is known as the Battle of Kosovo Polje.  The nationalist Serbian discourse made up of 
this battle a strong component of the Serbian national identity. However, this battle 
included not only Serbs but also Albanians, Vlacks, and Bulgars in a common cause as 
a ‗Christian coalition‘ against the Ottomans. 
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As Carmichael (2002) points out, the remembrance of the death of Lazar became 
an act of faith for nationalists. Lazar‘s death was seen as a sacrifice for the Christian 
faith (Pavlowitch 2002:10) and as such will last up to now in the memories of Serbian 
people. Slobodan Milošević exploited this myth in his political statement to the Serbs in 
Kosovo in 1989, 500 years after the Battle (Malcom 1998). Even in 1996 he remarked, 
‗every nation has its one love that warms its heart. For Serbia it is Kosovo.‘ (Carmichael 
2002: 63) 
Kosovo Battle is thus, a myth that has defined both national identities of Serbian 
and Albanian populations in Kosovo. As Schopflin (1997:19) points out, the ―[m]yth is 
one of the ways in which collectivities …nations…establish and determine the 
foundations of their own being, their own systems of morality and values‖; ―Myth 
creates an intellectual and cognitive monopoly in that it seeks to establish the sole way 
of ordering the world and defining world-views. For the community to exist as a 
community, this monopoly is vital, and the individual members of that community must 
broadly accept the myth. …It is the content of the myth that is important, not its 
accuracy as a historical account.‖ 
Both population sensitivities towards the Kosovo Question are embedded in this 
sort of constructs. They might be called myths, historical consciousness or legacies but 
they are part of the defining characteristics of the Kosovo Conflict that turn it on a 
protracted conflict with no apparent solution. 
The legal argumentation of both national projects will be addressed in the third 
subchapter (3.3). 
3.2. Serbian and Albanian Nationalistic Projects previous 1989 
3.2.1. Serb Nationalistic Project 
Once the Obrenovic Dynasty was overthrown by the Constitutionalist party in 
1842, the plans for Serbian expansionism started to proliferate among Serbian leaders. 
Ilija Garasanin, Serbia´s minister of interior was the leading figure in this sense. He 
believed in a greater Serbia which could embrace all areas where the Serbs lived while 
having in mind a linguistic nationhood. Nacertanije (1844) was the secret plan created 
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by Garasanin which considered this idea of creating a Serbia which could be a 
continuation of Stefan Dusan´s medieval state10, or the establishment of what it will be 
known in the historical consciousness of the people as the ―Serbian Empire‖. 
Despite this plan, Serbia never again managed to reestablish the dream of an 
Empire which in fact only lasted a bit more than 30 years and, as it was mentioned 
before, there were never really Serbian territories. Nevertheless, the attempts continued, 
as we have seen in the history of Serbia under Milosevic, who led this myth to its last 
consequences. Or as Jankovic (1969:9) points out, ―all bourgeois political parties of 
Serbia [that is, all parties except the minuscule Social Democrats] had a Pan-Serbian or 
a Great Serbia program after 1903...‖ In this sense, it is possible to conclude that the 
national definition of Serbia has been always related to its expansionism.
 
Among the known and shocking expansionists plans there is the one of Vasa 
Cubrilovic. He presented to the royal government of Stojadinovic his first memorandum 
called ―The Expulsion of the Arnauts‖, on the 17th of March of 1937. In such a 
document Cubrilovic exacerbated Garasanin‘s philosophy by expressly declaring the 
need for the expulsion of the Albanian community, of colonizing Albanians by 
expelling them out of their territories without legalizing the usurpations. Even worse, in 
―The Mode of Removal‖ he literally recalls the arson that ―Serbia employed with great 
practical effect after 1878, that is, by secretly burning down Albanian villages and city 
quarter‖ (see Cubrilovic, Vasa 1937). This arson took place particularly in the areas 
between nowadays borders of Kosovo up to the Nish (Islami 1997: 67-69).  Cubrilovic 
presented a second project in which he addressed ―The solution of the minority problem 
of post-war Yugoslavia‖ in which he dealt with the expulsion of non-slavs11. 
                                                          
10
 According to Banac (in Ozdogan & Saybasili 1995)  this plan was suggested to 
Garasinin by Zach, an enthusiast of Slavic reciprocity  who was part of the service of 
Prince Adam Czartoryski´s Polish émigré organization. However, Zach´s idea was 
oriented toward the unification of South Slavs against Habsburg and Russian influence.  
11
 For references see Serbia Colonization and Ethnic Cleansing: Documents and 
Evidence,  published in Pristina in 1993 by  Kosovo Information Center.p74 
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In the same tradition of Cubrilovic, it can be found: Ivo Andric‗s (Nobel Prize of 
Literature of 1961)  project presented to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia 
in 1939 in which he proposes the occupation of Albanian territories, with special 
reference to the assimilation of the ethnic Albanians  in Kosovo.  The Yugoslav-Turkish 
Convention on the deportation of the Albanians in 1938 revisits same understanding to 
the former projects as it does the ―Program for the realization of peace, freedom, 
equality, democracy and prosperity in SAP Kosovo‖ published  in the Official Gazette 
of the Socialist Republic of Serbia the  15
th
  of March of 1990.
12
 
3.2.2. Albanian Nationalistic Project 
The Treaty of San Stefano, as a result of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, 
conferred Albania territories to Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia, and particularly the 
Kosovo territory to Serbia. Montenegro and Serbia became since then contiguous 
territories (Gawrych 2006:38-46). 
The treaty was about to be reviewed in Congress of Berlin in 1878, as Austria-
Hungary and Britain could not tolerate the gains of Russia due to this treaty. The 
League of Prizren was born in this context as a reaction. However, and despite of failing 
in addressing objectives of unification, it succeeded in sowing the bases and the forces 
of the Albanianism. Undoubtedly then, it can be considered the League of Prizren as the 
first articulation of a Great Albania idea.  
Jelavich and Jelavich (1977) categorically affirm that the Albanian leaders did not 
want the Ottoman Empire to dismember. In this sense, they did not seek for an 
independent state but rather to prevent the splitting of their lands among their neighbors, 
like Serbia or Greece. However, Gawrych (2006) clearly mentions the existence of a 
group - led by Abdul Fasheri- whose goals were the unification and autonomy of 
Albanian territories with cultural and national rights. Nevertheless, these demands were 
not supported by most of the Albanians, especially among the more conservative 
                                                          
12
 For further information of this projects, an English translation can be found in  Serbia 
Colonization and Ethnic Cleansing: Documents and Evidence,  published in Prishtina in 
1993 by  Kosovo Information Center. 
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Muslim Gegs from the north ( Jelavich & Jelavich 19977, Gawrich 2006).  By the end 
of 1880, Abdul Frasheri manages to gather control of the League and adopt the program 
for the unification of the four vilayets under the criteria of ethnicity however; it was 
always opposed by the landowners (Jelavich & Jelavich 1977). The divergence among 
the leaders was in two lines: those seeking full independence for Albanian territories; 
those for autonomy under Ottoman Empire. By 1881, the movement of the League of 
Prizren met the Ottoman army and ceased activities since then on. 
However, among its achievement was the elaboration of a common policy for 
unification of Albanian territories of the four vilayets. Also the recovery of  most of the  
territories granted by the Treaty of San Stefano which in fact was  reduced by the Berlin 
Congress of 1878 to smaller size in favor of  Greece and Montenegro  (Jelavich & 
Jelavich1977) . 
In general, Albania nationalistic discourse was more than a secularized 
perspective of nationalism, as we may know from the western European experience. 
The discourse rather equated the role of nationalism to the one enjoyed by religion in 
the Ottoman Empire in which religion was a unifying factor. In this sense, Albanian 
nationalism had the objective of mobilizing their people in the same mystic imprint that 
religion was able to offer. As Jelavich & Jelavich (1977) argue, Albanian nationalists 
needed to replace religion as a grouping category. Albania contained three different 
religions w – Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox – therefore, it was needed another 
element able to unify this differences created since the conquest of Albanian land by the 
Ottomans. That element was found in the establishment of a common language and 
alphabet. 
In this view of a Great Albania project, Kosovo was considered therefore, a key 
element, not only for hosting the League of Prizren but also for expressing the defense 
of what Albanians considered their own and unfairly divided territory. 
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3.3. The Kosovo Question in the Context of Disintegration of Former 
Yugoslavia and the ‘Limbo’ Situation after NATO Intervention 
3.3.1. Kosovo Question and Disintegration of Former Yugoslavia 
Despite nationalistic argumentations, the de facto existence of two ongoing 
nationalistic projects in Kosovo is difficult to track back historically. The present 
research focuses now the period of 1989-1999 in which Kosovo drastically changed its 
political status due to a unilateral decision by Serbian/SRFY government. This period 
represents the strongest political expression of two divergent options offered for 
Kosovo: one as a province under full mandate of Serbia, another as a self-determination 
entity in which the Albanians population has a saying in the destiny of Kosovo. 
The use of divergent legal justifications 
Kosovo and Serbia have been both federal units of former Yugoslavia together 
with other six units. According to the CN of 1974, each federal unit had autonomous 
status and none could interfere in the constitutional order of the other. However, 
because Kosovo and Vojvodina had been linked to Serbia as autonomous provinces, 
Serbia attempted to use this mandate to overturn the federal status of Kosovo 1989, 
following the disintegration of Former Yugoslavia, aiming to prevent Kosovo from 
exercising the right to self-determination after the collapse of the former federal state. 
The public claims for such a move had historical bases, though the hidden claims rested 
on the colonial motives of having control over Kosovo territory as a rich land in mineral 
resources. 
Serbia annulled the right to self determination of Kosovo in 1989 and derogated 
the 1974 Constitution of Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo (SAP Kosovo CN 
of 1974). By this procedure, Serbia instituted her own rule, thus, committing an 
unconstitutional act before the Constitution of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
of 1974 ( SRFY CN of 1974) .The SFRY granted almost equal rights to republics 
(Serbia) and Autonomous Provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo) . According to the SFRY 
CN of 1974, both provinces were part of Serbia however, they both enjoyed special 
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considerations which granted them with a high level range of autonomy over their 
territory and the veto power at the federal decision making level 
In response to Serbian unconstitutional intervention, Albanians reacted by 
declaring independence. The demands for   independence of Kosovo by its people were 
based in the rights they enjoyed since their self determination was recognized by SRFY 
CN of 1974 and therefore expressed in SAP Kosovo CN of 1974. The legitimacy of 
their self-determination is based on three major arguments: 1) equality with the other 
Republics of SRFY, therefore with Serbia 2) Independence in decision making 
processes 3) Territorial Integrity 
 
1. Equality among republics and provinces 
 
One of the debates around the legitimacy of Kosovo‘s independence while 
referring to the SRFY CN of 1974 is the equality between republics and autonomous 
provinces of Former Yugoslavia. The Republics and autonomous provinces are equal at 
federal level as they all have a status of the federal units of former Yugoslavia with 
equal powers. In this sense, if republics and autonomous provinces are equal under 
SRFY CN1974 both have same right of independence, as it was experienced by Croatia, 
Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia & Herzegovina. 
There is some contradiction in this claim, given that nations had right to secession 
and nationalities had not.  Accordingly to SRFY CN of 1974 Albanians have been 
considered a nationality and not a nation in the former Yugoslavia in spite of the fact 
that they were the third largest nation after Serbs and Croats. However, the 1974 CN 
also stipulated that nations and nationalities are fully equal. This contradiction allowed 
Serbia and Kosovo to claim their constitutional rights in the way it suited them most. 
Based on this contradiction, Serbia moved on to revoke the federal status of Kosovo 
(cancelled the paragraphs 300 and 301 of the CN of Kosovo, which guaranteed 
Kosovo‘s independent decision making). 
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Different articles of SRFY CN of 1974 not only refer to cooperative relationships 
between Republics and provinces rather than hierarchical ones (like art 244, 371 among 
others), but also specify equal participation in the decision making process of the 
Federation. We can quote in this sense the art. 244, 295, 321 and 402, as example, all of 
which mention that decisions at the Federal level were done by the consensus between 
republics and provinces. If any of republics or provinces would oppose any decision 
then this one did not get into existence. To summarize, Kosovo had similar legal status 
than other federal units, such is the case of Kosovo‘s veto power at federal level, and 
the fact that no decision could be enacted without Kosovo‘s consent. 
In this regard, the art 321 goes even further in providing provinces with equal 
right to republics in the election member of the presidency of the Federation and 
conferring to the provinces the right to occupy the presidency as any of the other six 
republics. In fact, Kosovo was occupying the presidency of SRFY when Milosevic 
annulled art.300 and 301 of Kosovo CN which granted Kosovo with this equal level to 
the republics. Then it was so clear as today that this act was an unconstitutional act of 
one republic over one province, despite the fact that the province was part of Serbia 
Republic. Changes in the constitutions of any republic or autonomous provinces could 
not occur without their consent. 
Moreover, the art 244 states that the provinces were represented on a par with the 
republics throughout the federal organization, in all federal organs and participated 
equally in the exercise of federal functions. 
2. Independence in decision making  processes 
 
One of other features that should be highlighted is the high level of independence 
of Kosovo in decision-making process. His autonomy and ―self management‖ were 
granted in art 4 of SRFY CN 1974. The same case occurs with respect to judicial 
autonomy (art 371 and 373) and the right to enjoy constitutional courts (art 375 and 
389) in nature and powers identical to the one of the republics. 
Other rights and freedoms were conferred on Kosovo but expressed in its own CN 
of 1974 however, there were also framed in the CN of SRFY of 1974.  Kosovo has his 
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constitutional right to organize his authority. Therefore, as in the republics, Kosovo 
enjoyed parliament, presidency, constitutional and supreme courts, a national bank with 
freedom of utilization of monetary resources and even the right to the use of its flag (art 
292, 300, 339, 372, 390 and 6, CN SAP Kosovo 1974) It should be said that these rights 
are yet enforced by the constitution of the Serbia Republic of 1974 (art 293, 294) 
In sum, Kosovo was free to decide its daily life and destiny while the republican 
agencies of Serbia confined their actions within the territory of Serbia, but not in the 
province. This autonomy was destroyed in 1989 when Serbia unconstitutionally 
transferred these rights to its domain disregarding and violating the SFRY CN of 1974. 
3. Territorial Integrity 
 
There is one essential aspect we should take into consideration before profoundly 
analyzing the territorial integrity of Kosovo prior to 1989. When Kosovo was forced to 
join SFRY in 1945, it did so compromising in a half way. This compromise implied the 
acceptance of SFRY of a fairly independent status for Kosovo and the recognition of his 
Albanian identity, while at the same time the submission of Kosovo to the domain of 
Serbia over Kosovo territory. The solution was finally granted by the SFRY 
Constitution of 1974 in which Kosovo found the recognition of its right to self- 
determination but linked to Serbia. Therefore, it was clearly stated in the SFRY CN of 
1974 and expressly confirmed in the SAP Kosovo CN of 1974 that Kosovo ―associated 
itself with the Socialist Republic of Serbia within the framework of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia
13
. Among the logical implications of this statement is the fact 
that Kosovo only joined itself to Serbia because the SFRY legal structure, therefore 
before the disintegration of this entity in 1992 Kosovo destiny is one different to the 
destiny of Serbia. There is also one more implication, the territorial integrity of Kosovo 
was deliberately emphasized in the art 5 of SRFY CN of 1974 as it stated that each 
province had the sovereign right to  decide on their boundaries which could not be 
altered without province consent conferred by its assembly. This right was also 
                                                          
13
 For further details see Paragraph 2 Introductory  Part of  SAP Kosovo CN 1974 
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recognized in Serbia CN of 1974 (art 292) and SAP Kosovo CN of 1974 (art 3). All 
nationalities among Kosovo territory have peacefully lived under SRFY CN 1974 until 
the day that Milosevic annulled art 300 and 301 of SAP Kosovo CN of 1974 which 
conferred to Kosovo Assembly the maximum authority and autonomy over Kosovo 
territory. This right was strengthen by the  right  of Kosovo to territorial defense – 
referring to military and police-, clearly stated in the art 239 of  SRFY CN of 1974 and 
further confirmed in SAP Kosovo CN of 1974 art 265. 
However, the disputes in battlefield for ten years in a row have had the tragic 
records. In order to maintain its rule over the territory of Kosovo, Serbia exerted 
policies of harsh oppression with the goal of ethnic cleansing of Albanians from the 
territory. On the other side, Albanians pursued a peaceful resistance for almost 8 years 
to then turn to armed resistance in past two years. At the time of the armed conflict the 
Serbian forces, advantageous in army potential, increased the level of oppression to the 
scale of genocide. The tragic toll the 1998-1999 Serbian oppression includes in the 
expulsion of nearly 1,000,000 Albanians (or over half of the local population), the 
killing of over 10,000 Albanians, the rape of countless women, the disappearance of 
thousands and the destruction of nearly 150,000 homes. The international peaceful 
efforts to take conflict from battlefield into a diplomatic table, in the Ramboullet 
Conference in spring 1999 did not give results, given Serbia failed to sign the peaceful 
agreement. The humanitarian intervention of the US and NATO in 1999 put an end and 
since then, Kosovo has effectively been a protectorate of the international community. 
However in the political settlement sense, Kosovo in fact remained in a limbo situation 
to be addressed at later stage when the conditions get ripe. 
3.3.2. From NATO Intervention to Ahtisaari Plan: 6/1999- 2/2006 
The NATO intervention brought the war in Kosovo to an end, and Kosovo entered 
the period of international administration in 1999 under UNSCR 1244. However, the 
final status of Kosovo remained undefined, chiefly due to a lack of consensus in the 
UNSC. During the international administration of UNMIK and KFOR, Kosovo has 
moved on in establishing the institutions of self governance, while the process of power 
transfer from the internationals to the locals was gradually taking place. The goal was to 
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build a multiethnic, democratic and stable society in which all citizens and communities 
would enjoy equal rights and opportunities before the law. However, as in other cases, 
the post-conflict society was rather divided. One of the big challenges was how to 
reconcile the differences, particularly those between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo 
Serbs. Kosovo Albanians opted for independence, while Kosovo Serbs wanted to see 
the province reverted back to Serbia. Consequently, only a minority of the Serbs agreed 
to accept Kosovo as their home, whereas the majority refused to participate in the 
process of integration. 
Different attempts have been undertaken with a view to resolving the conflict 
between the Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians: the Airlie House Conference in July 
2000, the Constitutional Framework of Kosovo in 2001 –referring to ‗Consociational 
democracy‘ –, and the Standards before Status in April 2002, the Seven Points plan for 
Mitrovica in October 2002, the Decentralization policy. None of these attempts touched 
upon the issue of the final status. In October 2005, Ahtisaari was sent as Special Envoy 
of UN Secretary General in order to address the final status issue for the first time since 
NATO intervention in 1999. 
3.4. The Contemporary Context: The Independence and ‘Civic Nation 
Building’ as Provided by Ahtisaari Plan: February 2006- June 2009 
In February 2006, the process of definition of final status started under Ahtisaari‘s 
mediation. There were no more chances to postpone the definition of the destiny of 
Kosovo. The events of March 2004 have shown that Albanians were no ready to 
continuing living in a limbo situation. 
Representatives of Kosovo and Serbia negotiated in an attempt to find common 
ground. After 14 months of unsuccessful negotiations the process was exhausted.  With 
this array of facts, in March of 2007, Ahtisaari proposes to the UNSC the 
―Comprehensive proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement‖ known as ‗Ahtisaari Plan‘, 
referring to the creation of an independent Kosovo under international supervision. At 
the same time, the Serbs were to be granted enhanced minority rights, including five 
more municipalities as well as protective zones for religious sites. However, Serbia 
declined to concur. Supported by an influential section of the international community, 
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Kosovo moved on to declare its independence on February 17, 2008, and after three 
months to adopt a Constitution, designed on the basis of Ahtisaari‘s plan. The 
Constitution follows the concept of civic state and provides for the recognition of rights 
of the individual, together with strong guarantees for the rights of communities and 
particularly Serb community. In short, the Ahtisaari proposal aims at reconciling the 
differences between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs by providing an 
internationally supervised independence for Kosovo, an independence that would 
satisfy the Albanian majority, while promising the Kosovo Serbs a safe and prosperous 
future within the new state. 
The core elements of this proposal include measures to ensure the promotion and 
protection of the rights of communities and their members, with particular focus on 
Kosovo Serbs, through effective decentralization of the administration, as well as the 
preservation and protection of cultural and religious heritage. In addition, the plan 
provides for constitutional, economic and security arrangements, which aim at 
contributing to the development of a multi-ethnic, democratic and prosperous Kosovo. 
An important element of the proposal is the role given to future international civilian 
and military presence in Kosovo, which shall supervise the implementation of the Plan 
and assist the authorities of Kosovo in ensuring peace and stability throughout the 
territory. Concretely, the mandate of KFOR remains unchanged, while the new 
elements of international presence include two components, the international civil 
representative (ICR) and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo 
(EULEX) with the specific aim to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule 
of law area, specifically in the police, judiciary and customs fields. 
Dozens of new laws, enacted according to Ahtisaari‘s Plan, have been adopted by 
the Assembly of Kosovo. This package of 41 laws sets out the civic framework in 
which the different communities in Kosovo will have to live together on a basis of 
equality and strive to build a common Kosovar identity.  The Laws on Decentralization 
and the Law on Special Protective Zones will be under consideration in the following 
analysis. 
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The 17
th
 of February of 2008, the Kosovo Government declared the Independence 
of Kosovo at 15.14hs at a special Parliamentarian Session designed for this objective. 
109 out of 120 parliamentarians were present at the session that unanimously declared 
the independence; no Serb parliamentarian participated of the declaration. By the 
implementation of the so called ‗Ahtisaari Plan‘ the civic nation building process started 
to take place in Kosovo. This process is the one which will be analyzed in my research. 
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Chapter 4: 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1. Scope of the Research 
This study is basically a qualitative and exploratory research which attempts to 
answer the following questions:  considering the civic nation building process as a 
structural third part intervention: does this kind of intervention contribute to transform 
the conflict it aimed to address? Does the civic framework of this nation building 
process have an impact on transformations of the conflict at the structural level, issues 
level, actor and personal levels?  How much of this new civic identity project has been 
accepted by the population? Is there any difference in this sense between decision 
makers and population in general? Which are the scope and limits of this sort of 
intervention? 
By considering civic nation building as a structural third party intervention, I seek 
to denote the kind of intervention which ―…carries out activities which are designed to 
change the incentive structure of the disputing parties with an expectation that they 
would lead the parties to change their conflict behavior.‖ (Beriker 2009) I would like to 
observe, therefore, civic nation building contribution to the transformation of the 
relationships, interests, discourse, and even society which supports the continuation of 
violence. If we understand sustainable peace as a successful conflict transformation 
process (Galtung 1991), by identifying the aspects of the civic nation building which 
impact on conflict transformation, we may be able to infer how civic nation building 
processes impact on a sustainable peace.  
Therefore this research aims at exploring: 
- The impact of civic nation building processes on successful conflict 
transformation. 
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- The instances in which third party structural interventions aiming at 
establishing a civic nation building process can accomplish more fruitful 
outcomes. 
- The impact of this kind of third party intervention in the process of 
transforming the structure where the conflict is embedded, the issues which 
carry conflicting goals among parties, the actor decisions toward the conflict,  
and the people position on the conflict.  
- The scope and limitations of civic nation building as a tool for conflict 
transformation 
 
My research has as independent variable, a ―civic nation building process” which, 
as treated here, refers to this third party intervention that aims at changing the incentive 
structure of the disputing parties. It does so by issuing a civic framework with the 
intention of overcoming ethnic divisions by embracing all possible cultural 
backgrounds and ethnic roots under civic laws which guarantee to all their equal 
expression. Therefore, it builds a common civic identity under which all subjects of a 
state – built or in process of being built - are gathered. 
  My dependent variable is Successful Conflict Transformation, which I 
operationalize as follows
14
: 
1) Changes at Structure level:  changes related to the set of 
actors, conflicting belief or relationships, or to the society or state 
which the conflict is embedded. 
2) Changes at Issue level:  changes related to overcoming of 
former issues and incompatible goals issues among parties, changes 
in the position of the parties over main issues under dispute, and the 
way that parties redefine or reframe their positions, or reach 
compromises or resolutions. 
                                                          
14
 As it has been mentioned in Chapter 2, this conceptualization is an adaptation of 
Miall (2004) definition of Conflict Transformation. 
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3) Changes at Actor level:  change decision makers take 
decisions to change their goals or alter their approach to conflict, 
such as decisions to include other ethnic groups as equal partners or 
decisions of developing joint work at governmental/official level.  
4) Changes at Personal level: changes among individual 
adults towards the acceptance of the new reality in which different 
ethnic groups live together in equal conditions. 
This research therefore implements a macro and micro levels of analysis. Thus, 
the complexity of the research requires observing the following unit of analysis: at the 
macro level, legal, and governmental structures and at micro level: individual decision 
makers and individual adults. 
The variables and indicators of this research are presented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 Variables and Indicators in different level of analysis 
VARIABLES INDICATORS 
Independent 
Varible 
 
 
 
 
Civic Nation 
Building 
Identification with civic state identity 
Perception of  State symbolic identity  
Perception of New State Structures 
Political participation in  state structures & Institutions 
Identification of other ethnic groups as possesors of common set of 
rules and norms beyond the ethnic division 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Structure Level 
1.Changes at the conflicting parties 
2.Changes at conflicting relationship 
3. Changes in the state and society in which the conflict is embedded.  
Issues Level 
 
 
48 
 
 
 
 
 
Successful 
Conflict 
Transformation 
 
1.Former issues are overcome 
2.Position of parties over the issues has changed 
Actor Level 
1. Change in political goals towards those of CNB 
2. Acceptance of CNB 
Perception regarding the Contribution of Kosovo Constitution to the  
improvement of interethnic relations 
Perception regarding Feasibility of the construction of a civic nation  
Perception Obstacles to the construction of a civic nation  
View regarding the process of civic nation building  
View regarding the impact of the existance of ethnonational parties  
Personal Level 
1. Change in political goals towards those of CNB 
2. Acceptance of CNB 
- Familiarity with National Consitution 
- Sense of Belonging delivered towards the National Constitution 
- Regard as benefitial the changes inserted by the CNB process 
-  Sense of belonging  to the state 
- Sense of belonging oriented to a nation identified with state rather 
than ethnic lines 
-Sense of being represented by the state symbols 
- Regard over the independence Declaration 
- Incremental sense of belonging and commonalities regarding other 
ethnic comunities 
4.2. Research Design 
4.2.1. Type of Research & Criteria 
The present research implements a case study methodology. More concretely this 
study will be a Type 2 multiple-case (embedded) design, following Robert Yin‘s (1992) 
terminology. Therefore the Kosovo‘s case is observed in multiple units of analysis, as 
different aspects of nation building are analyzed. Different data collection techniques 
are used according to different levels of analysis; thus there is a triangulation of 
quantitative and qualitative methods at this stage. 
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The main reasons for the selection of a single case were related to the constraint 
of time and resources of my MA thesis. Hence, an analysis of these characteristics, with 
two level of analysis and four different unit of analysis cannot –unfortunately this time-  
be carried out on comparative bases due to the abovementioned limitations.  
The criteria for the selection of my empirical case study are as follows: 
1. A post conflict society with a past of a conflict over territorial and 
identity-based issues. 
2. Third party intervenes with structural reforms that aim at building 
a national identity under which ethnic differences can be overcome. Therefore, 
the third party assumes a role aiming at transforming the conflictive relationship 
among the conflicting parties. 
3. The bridging solution presented by the third party intervening in 
the conflict provides a civic framework under which different ethnic identities 
take expression, resulting in a new civic identity which embraces them all. 
As the Kosovo‘s case the most recent and clearer expression of a third party 
intervention aiming at constructing a new civic identity,  I have selected this case 
hoping  to develop conclusions that can  expound the relationship between Civic Nation 
Building enterprises and a Successful Conflict Transformation on multiethnic and 
divided societies. 
4.2.2. Methodology of Data Collection 
The data are collected through the use of the following: 1) open- ended interviews 
2) Stratified Survey. My data collection of secondary data relies on the systematization 
of information provided by: the early warning reports of UNDP in Kosovo and further 
material of UN, OSCE, EU and related organizations and  newspapers (mostly online).  
 
4.2.2.1. Data Collection for Macro Level Units of Analysis 
The data collection at the macro level reflects three time periods:  
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a)  1989- 1999. The Revocation of Federal Status of Kosovo in 1989 to NATO 
intervention and establishment of UNMIK the 24
th
 of June of 1999. 
b) 1999-2008 .NATO intervention and the establishment of UNMIK in 24
th
 June 
1999 until the 17
th
 of February of 2008 day of the Independence Declaration of Kosovo 
and the implementation phase of the Ahtisaari Plan 
c) 2008- 24
th
 June 2009: Independence Declaration of Kosovo and the 
implementation phase of Ahtisaari Plan up to 24
th
 June 2009 (10 years after the UNMIK 
establishment in Kosovo). 
The data for macro level analysis are collected from the following sources:  
a) Primary Sources 
Original documents: The text of the Laws on Decentralization: (1) the Law on 
Self-Local Government, (2) the  Law on Municipal Boundaries, (3) the Law on Local 
Government Finance, (4) the Law on Education in the municipalities of the Republic of 
Kosovo. The first two laws on decentralization and the Law on Special Protective Zones 
were considered by the proposal of Ahtisaari (S/2007/168/Add.1., XII,1) as the required 
law for starting the implementation process; the so-called ‗Ahtisaari proposal‘ and 
related documents. The text of the Law on Special Protective Zones 
In the light of the Civic Nation Building process, the Laws on Decentralization 
aim at: 1) shaping a sense of common belonging under civic lines 2) guaranteeing equal 
political participation in Kosovo civic life for both communities, 3) protecting and 
guarantee the cultural identity of the ethnic communities .The Law on Special 
Protective Zones on the other hand, functions as a means of protection   of cultural 
identity, security and property of different ethnicities- building civic grounds on which 
all groups would feel respected and protected.  
b) Secondary Sources  
As support to the above referred source: Internet sources, Newspapers, the Early 
warning reports of UNDP in Kosovo and further material of UN, OSCE, EU and related 
organizations. 
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Criteria for collecting data on Structural Changes:  
A conflict mapping technique (Werh 1979) in time-series is implemented to 
acknowledge:  set of actors, conflicting relationships, the society or state in which the 
conflict is embedded (political, economic, societal mechanisms and institutions history 
that influence the distribution and satisfaction of basic needs and interests of people 
(Galtung 1996)). For purposes of rationalizing the information according to time and 
resources available there will be considered only those structures that clearly address 
negatively or positevely one or more ethnic group. 
For all three historical time slots the collected data followed these two specific 
indicators:  
1) Conflicting parties: actors and conflicting relationships 
2) Provisions for the participation of conflicting parties in governing structures 
and electoral process. 
The decision of exploring these structural features amongst others follows these 
assumptions: 
- A conflict which is based on competing nationalistic projects implies that 
there will be some periods of time in which either ethnic group might be 
excluded of political participation; or will not be willing to do so for times in 
which the other ethnic group is succeeding in controlling the governing 
structures. 
Having this assumption in mind I was eager to observe the participation of the 
conflicting parties at the governing structures and electoral process. 
Due to the limited time and resources available further dimensions of structural 
level transformations can not be explored, despite of being equally relevant. For 
instance, an analysis of the socio-economic strata might be very enlightening of the 
general situation in which different ethnic groups interplay. 
 
 
52 
 
 
The variables and indicators considered for the structure level are presented in 
Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Variables & Indicators: Structure Level 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES INDICATORS 
                                         Structure Level 
Independent Varible  
 
 
Civic Nation 
Building 
A. Laws on Decentralization: 
 (1) the Law on Self-Local Government,  
(2) the  Law on Municipal Boundaries,  
(3) the Law on Local Government Finance 
 (4) The Law on Education in the municipalities of the Republic of Kosovo. 
They express: 
1)  a sense of common belonging under civic lines  
2) the guarantee of equal political participation of all ethnic groups 
3) the protection and guarantee of the cultural identity of all ethnic communities 
B. Law on Special Protective Zones: 
Functions as a means of protection   of cultural identity, security and property of 
different ethnicities- 
Dependent Variable  
 
 
Successful 
Conflict 
Transformation 
 
1.Changes at the conflicting parties 
2.Changes at conflicting relationship 
3. Changes regaring the participation of the conflicting parties at the governing 
structures and electoral processes. 
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Criteria for collecting data on Changes at Issue Level:  
With the objective of collecting data on changes occurring at Issue Level I have mapped 
the issues in the three different periods of times aforementioned.
15
 
The position of each conflicting party regarding the issues is also explored. 
4.2.2.2. Data Collection for Micro Level Unit of Analysis 
The data collection for the micro level unit of analysis has been done by two 
different instruments (open-ended interview and stratified survey) aiming at gathering 
specific information on the attitudes and behaviors of the Kosovo decision-makers and 
the Kosovo population in general towards the ongoing civic nation building process. 
Criteria for collecting data on Changes at Actor Level:  
With the purpose of measuring the attitude and behavior of  decision-makers 
towards the civic nation building process that began implementation in Kosovo since 
the Independence declaration, I conducted in Kosovo, Prishtina, 14 interviews with 
decision-makers of a wide ethnic spectrum (10 Albanians, 2 Serbs, 1 Bosnian, 1 Turk), 
during the months September-October 2008. The process was facilitated by a gate-
keeper, following a snow-ball sampling for the selection of the interviewee, of twenty 
actors contacted; only 14 were fully committed to the conduction of the interview. 
The criteria for selection of the interviewers have been: 
1. A decision-maker role at any of the governing structures of 
Kosovo (parliament, government, municipalities) or among leading NGOs 
with certain impact among decision-makers or population 
2. The involvement in past political activities at government level, 
civil society or as citizens of Kosovo.  
3. The identification with one of the possible ethnic identities in 
Kosovo (Albanian, Serbian, Bosnian, Turk, Roma, Askali)  
                                                          
15
 Issues are defined here as ―…points of disagreement that must be resolved.‖(Wehr 
1979 :) 
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Each interview has been conducted in the interviewee‘s work place. Each 
interview was recorded and typed with the consent of the respondent. However, no 
protocol has been signed therefore, the names of the interviewees have been omitted. 
Some interviews were held in English, some in Albanian or Serbian with the assistance 
of official or unofficial translators.  The questions of the interview have been generated 
in English and translated to both languages.  
The objective of these interviews has been to collect the standing of decision-
makers to the conflict in Kosovo since the implementation of Ahtisaari Plan and the 
Declaration of Independence. These questions address particularly whether there is a 
support towards the independence process or not. As the interview was meant to address 
main decision-makers, it has been designed for a short period of time. The interview can 
be answered in 15 minutes; however, there is a variety of style of respondents. 
Interview time varies from 15-45 minutes with two in approximating 1hour 30 minutes. 
The open-ended interviews (Neuman 2006:286) ask the same sorts of questions to 
each actor; except for one question which addresses a particular reference to the ethnic 
group that the interviewee represents. There are two groups of questions referring to: A) 
primary identification B) the attitude/behavior/perception towards the civic nation 
building process. 
The interview started accounting on the primary identification of the interviewee. 
(Group A):  
1. Is the concept of civic nation in Kosovo part of your initial political 
goals? Or has your perspective changed since 1999? 
 (Group B) 
2. The CN has defined Kosovo as civic nation. After 6 months do you think 
that it has contributed to improve the quality of interethnic relations? 
3. Given the demography of Kosovo with nearly 90% of Albanian 
inhabitants and 10% minorities, is it possible to construct a civic nation in Kosovo?  
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4. Which are the main obstacles to the construction of a civic nation in 
Kosovo?  
5. Are you optimistic about integration of Serbs community in Kosovo’s 
institution?  Which one has been your contribution in this respect?  
6. Is it possible a civic nation in a Kosovo in which all parties are still 
ethnically based? How do you consider that this situation is going to change?(see 
Appendix A) 
 
Criteria for collecting data on Changes at Personal Level:  
Aiming at measuring the changes occurred at personal level, a stratified survey 
(by ethnic strata) has been conducted among 247 individual adults in the following 
areas of Kosovo:  Prishtina, Gracanica, Mitrovica, Prizren, and Peja. The criteria for 
choosing these geographical areas have been their ethnic variety and complexity of their 
dynamics. 
The participants of the survey were reached by the help of key actors at the 
following institutions:   Prishtina University, FAMA University, and The Institute of 
History of Kosovo, the Gender Training and Research Center. 
The participants were selected by quota sampling (Neuman 2006:221); the 
individual adults of each quota sampling were selected by a snowball (Neuman 
2006:222) technique provided by key contacts in Kosovo in the abovementioned 
institutions. The ethnic correspondence between Kosovo territory and the survey in 
percentage (%) terms has been protected. Therefore, this research respects the 
correspondence of 92% of Albanians, 5% of Serbs, 3% of other minorities. 
The survey was administered under anonymous and free will bases aiming at 
obtaining a sincere answer from the participants. The instrument has been offered to the 
participants in 3 different languages (Albanian, Serbian, and English). Each participant 
has decided the language in which he wanted to complete the questionnaire. 
The survey aimed at gathering the perception, attitude and behavior of individual 
adults towards the civic nation building process in Kosovo. Consequently, there are 6 
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questions which measure the identification of population with the new Kosovo state 
identity and their appreciation of other ethnic groups; and 11 questions which measure 
their acceptance of the CNB process implemented by the Ahtisaari Plan and their 
appreciation towards other ethnic groups since independence declaration. The 
comparison of the percentage on both set of questions will lead us to establish 
relationships between CNB and SCT. 
The data collection realized with the use of surveys involved 4 stages:  
(1) Data collection in the Republic of Kosovo of  aggregate data of the whole 
region from the statistical offices (  OSCE, UNDP, Ministry of Communities, Statistical 
Office of Kosovo) with the purpose of  estimating ethnic composition and  distribution 
of the whole population 
 (2) Random selection of sub-areas as survey sites among a pool of Albanian, 
Serbian and Turk dominated areas – in this case Serb dominated municipalities 
(Mitrovica North, Gracanica) , Albanian dominated municipalities (Pristina, Peja,) 
mixed municipalities  (Prizren).
16
 
(3) The contact‘s development with key actors, institutions, and community 
leaders with the purpose of gathering information and support for implementing the 
survey.  
(4) The survey of populations using a quota sampling procedure for their ethnic 
identification and a snow-ball procedure has been followed in Serb dominated areas. 
                                                          
16
 However, the systematic geographical stratification has been dismissed from 
consideration in this research, mostly due to resources factor; this sort stratification 
though, is extremely necessary in a large scale survey.  A geographical stratification 
could allow the analysis of another relevant variable for this study such as ‗level of 
proximity to Serbian border‘. This factor is  of primary relevance for the construction of  
‗the other‘ in a nation building process implemented by a third party and  therefore, 
could contribute to analyze dimensions such as the relationship between parties and 
mediators, ‗otherness‘ definition process, hindrance of Serbia into the process. 
However, the limited scope of this research does not allow this enterprise. 
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With the purpose of measuring how much the Ahtisaari plan has affected the 
people‘s identification as Kosovar, two sets of questions, one general and another one 
particular, have been addressed by the survey: 
1
st
 Set of Questions: refer to the identification of primary affiliations. 
2
nd
 Set of Questions: aim at reveal the acceptance of the new institutions created 
by the Ahtisaari Plan. (Please See the Appendix B) 
4.2.3. Methodology of Case Analysis 
In order to answer my research question, the relationship between civic nation 
building and successful conflict transformation, the following systematic steps has been 
undertaken: 
Firstly, I departed having in mind my own conceptualization of ―civic nation 
building process‖ which melds different conceptual elements from a wide spectrum of 
authors of different disciplines. I brought together the elements of civic nation described 
by Smith (1991),  Kymlicka (1995),  Yack (1996) Kuzio (2002) and Polese (2008); the 
understanding of nation building from Simonsen (2004) and the conceptualization of 
Beriker (2009)  on structural intervention. As a result of this conceptual blend, the 
following operational definition emerges: 
Civic Nation Building refers to this third party intervention that aims at changing 
the incentive structure of the disputing parties. It does so by issuing a civic framework 
with the intention of overcoming ethnic divisions by embracing all possible cultural 
backgrounds and ethnic roots under civic laws which guarantee equal expression to all 
them. Therefore, it  becomes a process of building a common  civic identity under which 
all subjects of a state – built or in process of being built - are being gathered.17 
As an empirical manifestation of this concept, I analyzed at macro level the Laws 
on Decentralization and the Law on Cultural Heritage implemented by Ahtisaari Plan 
and at micro level different aspects of Ahtisaari Plan in general. 
                                                          
17
  See  Chapter 2 for the origin of this definition 
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Secondly, I continued analyzing the impact of this nation building process on a 
successful conflict transformation by observing the changes it brings about at the 
structure, issues, actor and personal level according to the definition provided by Miall 
(2004) with some modification I have introduced to further operationalize the concept. 
(See Figure 1:34) 
Consequently, the Kosovo‘s case will be analyzed by the following steps: 
1. Analyze the changes occurred at structure, issues, actor, personal 
levels. 
2. Observe of  the relationship between civic nation building and 
conflict transformation  
3. Expound on the connection between CNB process and Successful 
Conflict Transformation.  
4. Conclude about the scope and limitations of use of CNB as a tool 
for Successful Conflict Transformation. 
 
4.2.3.1. Procedure for the Analysis of the Data on Structure Level 
The analysis of the structural changes follows compares the third period of time with 
the other two previous periods to answer these questions: 
a) What are the new realities that these laws brought about if compared with 
previous historical periods?  
b) Which conflicting parties have been addressed by these laws?  
c) Do these laws offer a context for balance and equal basis relationship among 
conflicting parties?  
d) Have these new legal arrangements been well received by all conflicting parties? 
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4.2.3.2. Procedure for the Data Analysis of Changes at Issue Level: 
The analysis of the changes at issue level follows a comparison of the third period 
of time in relation with the other two previous periods. 
The conclusions regarding the impact of civic nation building on successful 
conflict transformation are drawn by trying to answer these questions: 
a) Which issues that were of the concern of the parties have been addressed by the 
laws explored? 
 b) Have the parties changed their position regarding the key issues of the conflict 
that were addressed by these laws? c) Have the parties showed the will to compromise 
on the issues at stake? 
4.2.3.3. Procedure for the data analysis of Changes at Actor and Personal 
Level  
In order to make comparison possible among the different measures obtained per 
each ethnic group, I develop a norming process (Neuman 2006:205) regarding the value 
of all variables in my questionnaire (survey and interview). Therefore, I establish 
certain operational rules to analyze my interviews and survey. Similar procedure was 
applied in both cases. (See Figure 4 and Figure 5, see also Appendix B): 
Operational Rules: 
1. Each answer is interpreted and assigned a value (+1 or  -1) according to : 
1
st
 set of questions: identification with Kosovo state identity assumes +1,  its 
opposite -1, neutral (no Kosovar, No Serbian, no Albanian ) 0. 
2. I added all the values/answers obtained in all questionnaires per ethnic 
stratification and set of questions.  (T: total answers) 
3. I divided the final number of the total value of all questionnaires (per 
ethnic line) per total amount of surveys available or respondents (R: number of 
respondents). I divided then this sum per total amount of questions asked in each 
set of questions (6 or 11 respectively).(Q: total of questions) 
 
 
60 
 
 
4. I established the percentage that this final number represents regarding 
the amount of question asked, in order to determine the tendency of the value 
acquired. Formula     T .   x  100   
              R x Q       
Figure 4. Variables & Indicators Actor Level 
Variable Indicators 
Independent Variable 
 
 
View of actor regarding civic nation as 
a political goal (Q1) 
-Positive view of CN as a political goal (+1) 
-Negative view of CN as a political goal (-1) 
-No clear position regarding CN as a political goal. (0) 
Dependent Variable  
Perception regarding the Contribution 
of Kosovo Constitution to the improvement of 
interethnic relations (Q2) 
 
Positive Perception (+1) 
Negative Perception (-1) 
Neutral /Uncertain 
Perception regarding Feasibility of the 
construction of a civic nation in Kosovo (Q3) 
 
Positive Perception (+1) 
Negative Perception (-1) 
Neutral /Uncertain (0) 
Perception Obstacles to the 
construction of a civic nation in Kosovo (Q4) 
 
Positive Perception (to be overcome) (+1) 
Negative Perception (no to be overcome) (-1) 
Neutral /Uncertain (0) 
View regarding the process of civic 
nation building in Kosovo (Q5) 
Optimistic (+1) 
Pessimistic (-1) 
Neutral 
View regarding the impact of the 
existence of ethnonational parties on the civic 
nation building process 
(Q6) 
Positive (-1) (a postive vision over parties under ethnic 
lines undermine the mere definition of the multiethnic state of 
Kosovo, therefore assumes negative value) 
Negative (1) 
Neutral (0) 
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Figure 5: Variables & Indicators Personal Level  
VARIABLES INDICATORS 
Independent 
Varible 
 
 
 
 
Civic Nation 
Building 
Identification with state Identity (Q2) (Nation) 
Identification with state structures (Q3) (State) 
Perception of State Structures & Institutions (Q4) 
Political participation in  state structures & Institutions (Q5) 
Identification of other ethnic groups as possesors of common set of rules 
and norms beyond the ethnic division (Q6) 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
 Personal Level 
1. Acceptance of CNB 
- Familiarity with National Consitution (Q7) 
- Sense of Belonging delivered towards the National Constitution (Q8) 
- Regard as benefitial the changes inserted by the CNB process (Q9) 
(Q11) (Q12) 
-  Sense of belonging  to state (Q10) 
-Sense of being represented by the state symbols (Q13) (Q14) (Q15) 
- Regard over the independence Declaration (Q16) 
- changes regarding perception of other minorities (Q17) 
2. Change in political goals towards those of CNB 
Sense of belonging oriented to a nation identified with state rather than 
ethnic lines (General Tendency) 
 
4.3. Limitations to the Methodology 
As final aspects to be addressed by this Chapter I would like to make some 
remarks on the limitations, hoping that further research on the subject proposes lines for 
overcoming them. 
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4.3.1. Limitations to the Methodology for Data Collection 
There are three main points that need clarification. Firstly, I acknowledge the 
conceptual tools implemented here, such as civic nation building and successful conflict 
transformation, have not been tested as such previously by any other research. Despite 
my definition of successful conflict transformation providing some improvement of the 
concept designed by Miall (2004) in terms of operationalization, further refinement is 
needed. A similar dilemma is regards civic nation building as a conceptual tool. The 
resources and time available for this research made impossible to deepen the focus on 
this regard. Instead, I have tried to come up with a workable definition. Future works 
should open up the definition by its constituent parties and work on more precise 
operationalization of each part with a clear reference to the aspects that do not fall into 
such definition. This, especially for the case of successful conflict transformation, 
would contribute to apply the concept to only a precise process that cannot be taken or 
confuse as a process of same sort. Like, the needed differentiation between peace-
building and conflict transformation processes. 
Secondly, the instruments implemented in this research present a specific 
shortcoming regarding to the a) amount of questions asked in the interviews b) the 
language and wording of the questions in the survey and interview questionnaire. The 
process of finding a multicultural balance for the understanding of difficult concepts as 
state, nation, identity, concentrated most of the energies of the questionnaires as they 
have to be similarly understood by at least three different languages. 
4.3.2. Limitations to the Methodology for the Data Analysis 
As the instruments implemented for the data collection needed further 
standardization in terms of the scales used in the survey and of the questions asked in 
the interview, the analysis had to carry on a very unique norming system via the 
assignment of +1 and -1 values. Further developments in the implementation of these 
tools should consider the design of a more standardized criterion for the use of scale 
system in the surveys and for the improvement of the questioner asked to the 
interviewees. 
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Chapter 5 
ANALYSIS 
 
In this chapter I analyze the impact of civic nation building process on the 
successful conflict transformation. For this purpose, I organize the chapter in two main 
sections. The first one refers to the macro level data and interpretation and the second 
one addresses a micro level data and interpretation. 
The macro level analysis is carried on a periodization of three different historical 
moments of the Kosovo‘s conflict: 1) 23th March 1989- 24th March 1999; 2) 24th June 
1999 - 17th February 2008 3) 18
th
 February 2008- 17
th
 May 2009.  Each of these 
periods mark what Druckman (1997) called ‗turning points‘ in the conflict18. During 
these periods, structural and issue level changes are explored. The findings regarding 
the structural level will expound on the conflicting parties and relationships and on the 
participation of the conflicting parties at the governmental structure and elections hold 
in Kosovo. I will conclude with an analysis of the findings and a conclusion about the 
impact of civic nation building process on changes at structural level of the conflict 
transformation process. The findings regarding the issue level changes will refer to the 
issues arose among the conflicting parties in the different three time periods 
aforementioned, and they will conclude over changes occurred at issue level dimension 
of the conflict transformation process.  
The second section is a micro level data analysis and interpretation which consists 
of two sub-parts: the first sub-part is a data presentation of the findings regarding 
changes at the actor level dimension of the conflict transformation process, and the 
second sub-part regarding changes at personal level. The data will be gathered by ethnic 
stratification criterion. This part will conclude with an analysis of the data presented.  
                                                          
18
 For the author, the turning points are the events or processes that mark the passage 
from one stage or another , indicating a progress from the earlier to a later phase. 
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5.1. Macro Level Data Analysis & Interpretation 
5.1.1. Data Analysis & Interpretation of Changes at Structure Level 
This section analyzes the conflicting parties or ‗primary parties‘ as Wehr (1979) 
calls those parties with a direct stake in the outcome of the conflict. It will describe their 
conflicting relationship and dynamics and their participation in the governing structures 
and electoral process. 
5.1.1.1. First Period: 23th of March 1989- 24
th
 of March 1999  
This period goes from the Kosovo‘s status revocation by Serbia the 23rd of March 
of 1999 to the NATO‘s Humanitarian Intervention in the conflict the 24th of March of 
1999. 
Conflicting Parties: Actors and Conflicting Relationships 
The main conflicting parties of this time period are the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia and Serbia (FRY/Serbia), the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and 
the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK). These main parties are noticeably differentiated 
by their ethnic identities which are the result of the two competing nationalistic projects 
in Kosovo during the periods considered in this research. During this period the role of 
Kosovo Serbs is very limited; their relevance is only related to the support they offered 
to the actions of Serbia. Even at the Rambouillet talks their role was irrelevant as the 
power was at the hands of Milloshevic, moreover those who were in delegation lacked 
legitimacy of Kosovo Serbs. (TFF Pressinfo 1999)Nevertheless, they are still 
considered as primary party as they have a direct stake in the outcome of the Kosovo‘s 
conflict. 
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia (SFRY/Serbia) were 
both parties in conflict, although Serbia and Milosevic were de facto the key players for 
this, because although Kosovo was federal part of ex Yugoslavia and autonomous 
province Serbia, it was Serbia which revoked unconstitutionally the status of Kosovo.  
And for this and other reasons that I will proceed to explain, I will refer only as Serbia. 
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The interesting aspect of SRFY lies in the transformations –external to the Kosovo‘s 
conflict- that suffered particularly during this period. By 1989, SRFY was a ‗socialist 
federation‘ led virtually by Serbia, and the situation remained unchanged in this regard 
By 1995, following the independence of the other federal units, it will be known as  
rump-FRY (R-FRY ) as it will remain only with Montenegro and Serbia as its 
constituent units. It will be later on, in 2006 when Montenegro declares its 
independence will remain Serbia. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study, these 
changes remain only as a change of name.  The overall conflict in Kosovo was always a 
conflict between Serbia and the KA, mainly.  The two main competing nationalistic 
projects will refer to the Serbian option for Kosovo and to the Albanian one. Therefore, 
other connotations of the changes suffered for SRFY will be omitted. 
During this period Serbia enjoyed the diplomatic and military advantage conferred 
for being the leader of SRFY and illegitimately used the Yugoslavian state potentials. 
As absurd as may sound, SFRY/FRY weaponry used by Serbia came from contribution 
of all nations it fought against, included Kosovo. 
Among the Albanians actors the two main actors of this period were: the 
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) which 
emerged nearly the end of this period, in 1997.  
LDK is a peaceful movement formed in 1989 by a group of prominent 
intellectuals. Under the Rugova‘s leadership, LDK aims freedom, independence and 
democracy. LDK will become extremely popular and have the chances to play a double 
role in Kosovo, as the movement for independence of Kosovo and as the legitimate 
representative of an underground Kosovo state, as we shall see.   
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was an armed group that emerged publically 
in the Kosovo‘s conflict in a press conference in Switzerland in the summer of 1997 
when they took responsibility for attacks to Serb policemen (Malcom 1998:355). It was 
formed by Albanians in Kosovo and Diaspora. The LPK (Popular Movement of 
Kosovo), an underground party, seem to have played a key role for the formation of 
KLA. (Judah, 2000: 104). The KLA came as reaction to the lack of results of peaceful 
movement of LDK, especially after the Dayton Summit did not recognize Kosovo 
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among the affected states. Some analysts say that KLA was just a product of wartime 
improvisations, seizing the opportunity of weapons flow into Kosovo after the 
economic collapse in Albania. (Waller, Drezov&Gökay 2001) Regarding the truth of 
such conclusion, the fact is that KLA did manage to be seeing internationally as 
expressing and represent the will of an ample spectrum of KA. In this sense, the KLA 
became a double-face actor being both a key negotiator at the Rambouillet talks under 
the Hashim Thaqi‘s leadership, removing practically the relevance of Rugova and the 
LDK peaceful movement, and a key factor for the escalation of the Kosovo‘s conflict. 
Conflicting relationships 
The disintegration of former Yugoslavia was supposed to allow its eight federal 
units to decide their future by its own. However, Serbia impeded to Kosovo to take such 
an option and by violating the Constitution of former Yugoslavia (1974) which reads 
that one federal unit could not revoke the federal status of federal unit (Blaustein & 
Flanz 1990)
19
 . In 1987, ―…the League of Communists of Serbia under the leadership of 
Slobodan Milosevic, appealing to Serbian national sentiment, committed itself to 
reasserting Serbian control over Kosovo by means of constitutional changes designed to 
limit the province 's autonomy…‖(Amnesty International 1992: 3) This goal was 
followed by  forceful and unilateral changes in the constitution of Kosovo in March 
1989 despite the opposition from Albanians of Kosovo through the public debate (in 
1988 ) and general strike throughout Kosovo (in February 1989).(Amnesty International 
1992: 3). On 26 February, as the strike continued, the SFRY/Serbia authorities 
introduced state of emergency. ―On 23 March 1989 the provincial assembly of Kosovo 
met under unusual circumstances, with tanks and armored cars parked in front of it. 
Large number of ‗guests‘, both members of security police and Communist Party 
functionaries from Serbia, mingled with delegates inside the building, and according to 
several accounts some of the officials from Serbia took part in voting. Under these 
                                                          
19
 For more information regarding the status of Kosovo according to  Yugoslavia 
Constitution of 1974 see  Kosovo: Law and Politics. Kosovo in Normative Acts before 
and After 1974. Belgrade: Helsinski Commitee for Human Rights, 1998/ 
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conditions the constitutional amendments were passed, although without the two-thirds 
majority normally required for such changes.‖(Malcom 1998: 346)  Serbia took control 
over of Kosovo's police, judiciary, civil defense, foreign relations and policy on official 
appointments as well as the right to make future constitutional changes without the 
consent of the provinces. As Kohl and Libel (1992) say ―Kosovo‘s autonomy was 
reduced to a mere token.‖ 
The two contradictory Albanian responses: building the statehood of Kosovo and 
escalating the conflict. 
 In response to the Serbian occupation and with a goal of achieving freedom and 
the right to self-determination, KA mobilized by the Kosovo‘s intellectuals organized a 
peaceful resistance. On a later stage an armed resistance emerged in the scenario of 
Kosovo imprinting a new stage of the conflict and a new dimension to the political 
struggles between Serbian and Albanian population of Kosovo. The peaceful resistance 
of people of Kosovo was led by Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), as an active 
peaceful movement for freedom, independence and democracy operating in Kosovo and 
Diasporas during 1989-1999.  The political project of LDK was to fulfill the will of 
people for self-determination and an independent state of Kosovo. LDK followed the 
political realities being created in the process of disintegration of former Yugoslavia 
and the reactions of other federal units. In the years 1989-1991, LDK opted for Kosovo 
as federal or nonfederal state of Yugoslavia. (LDK Political Declaration 1991:12) 
However, after the Slovene and Croatian declarations of independence in June 1991, the 
demand for a republic was changed to a demand for independence. In September 1991, 
a self-organized referendum on independence took place. It is said that 87% of voters 
took part, including some minorities, and the vote was 99% in favor. In May 1992 
Kosovo-wide elections were held, using private homes as polling stations, for a new 
republican government and assembly.  (Independence Referendum 1991:19-20) 
Further, in October 11, 1991 it adopted the joint political declaration with all 
Albanian political parties in Yugoslavia to define the question of Albanians of 
Yugoslavia in case of disintegration of the state.  This declaration established three 
options: (1) If external and internal borders of Yugoslavia remain unchanged, then 
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Kosovo must have status of independent state; (2) If internal borders between republics 
are to be changed, the demand of Albanians in Yugoslavia is an Albanian Republic in 
Yugoslavia on the basis of ethnic and other principles that apply for the Serbs, the 
Croats, the Slovenes and other peoples of Yugoslavia; (3) If the external borders of 
Yugoslavia are to be changed, the Albanians in Yugoslavia request that decisions about 
the re-unification of Kosovo and other Albanian territories with Albania are made 
through a plebiscite under international monitoring.(LDK Political Declaration 1991)     
 To accomplish the goal for independence, LDK established two strategic goals: 
1.Internationalization of the question of Kosovo and the Albanians and, 2. Building of 
the statehood of Kosovo. (Tahiti 2001:276-279) 
 While LDK peaceful strategy was providing an option to KA life, the violence 
became a clear component of Kosovo‘s life by 1997. KLA had emerged as a reaction of 
frustration about the failure of LDK to bring about the Kosovo‘s Question into Dayton. 
The Serbian police forces increased their actions but in a terrorist manner challenging 
LDK non-violence strategy, to be absolutely broken by 1998 (Bieber&Daskalovski 
2003:44). During February-March of 1998 Serbia entered the KLA dominated city of 
Drenica in the search of KLA leaders. However, the Serbian actions were mostly 
directed to destroy the whole village and civilians living in there, three villages were 
destroyed, 80 people killed, including 24 women and children (Amnesty International 
2000). According to Bieber&Daskalovski (2003:44) these terrorist-like actions of 
Serbia transformed the KLA in a sort of ‗national liberation army‘. 
 Observing from outside, this period seem to bring about a Kosovar option of 
state supported by its own army; however this combination of LDK and KLA never 
came into being. Rugova never accepted such an option despite the several trial made 
by his closest fellows. (Confidential Source, 10
th
 November 2007).  
 By October of 1998, KLA will be recognized by the international community as 
a political factor and since then on will start to be considered as the real representative 
of the KA. (Bieber&Daskalovski 2003:44) 
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 In early 1998 the US undertook steps for diplomatic solution, through shuttle 
diplomacy, the pre- Rambouillet talks. In the first part of the year, the US envoy 
Christopher Hill talked to Serbian government and LDK representatives and at the 
second part he included KLA interlocutors as well, they will remain unsuccessful. Out 
of these talks the blue print of interim solution was designed which will which 
eventually led to the convening of the Ramboullet Conference on Kosovo. (Tahiri 2001: 
302-314). 
 By 15
th
 January 1999, the escalation of the conflict reached its peaked when the 
Observatory Mission of OSCE finds the body of 45 civilians massacred in Racak. 
(Ignatieff 2001: 35)  
Rambouillet Conference finally takes place in Rambouillet and Paris in the period 
between 6-23 February and 15-18 March 1999. It was the time when the crisis escalated 
in dramatic dimensions in Kosovo with a bloody war threatening to spillover beyond 
Kosovo. The Conference aimed at stopping the war and Serb genocide against the 
Albanians and eventually placing Kosovo under NATO protectorate. 
However, as known, this Conference failed due to the lack of readiness of 
Miloshevic to sign the agreement, which opened the door to international humanitarian 
intervention of NATO the 24
th
 March of 1999. In three months of war of NATO against 
Serbia, finally Serbia agreed to peace expressed by signing the Kumanova agreement 
for full withdrawal of Serb/Yugoslva forces from Kosovo and gave support to the UN 
Security Council resolution 1244. Since this Resolution turned into power Kosovo was 
placed under NATO and UN protectorate and was administered by UNMIK for another 
9 years, until 17
th
 February 2008 when Kosovo assembly declared independence with 
support of United States and other western allies.    
Participation of Conflicting Parties in Governmental Structures & Elections 
The period 1989-1999 is a period in which Kosovo seems to live in two parallel 
realities which overlap and re-enforce; one shaped by Serbia and another one by the 
KA. However, the KA option was not that monolithic. LDK offered the very first 
alternative to Serbian rule however since 1998 KLA will compete with LDK for the 
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funds and support of KA. Both movements will have the methodology of working in 
Kosovo and in Diaspora. Mainly the KA governments of this period will be hold in the 
Diaspora; this is valid for the one laddered by LDK and Rugova, and the one 
commanded by KLA and Thaci.  
Serbia started to have full control over Kosovo administrative and social life since 
the day of the revocation of Kosovo‘s autonomous status. As a first step towards the 
unification of Kosovo with Serbia was the so called ‗Program for the Realization of 
Peace and Prosperity in Kosovo‘, acting in compliance with the ‗Yugoslav Programme 
of Measures to be taken in Kosovo‘. (Malcom 1998:346) By this legal framework 
Serbia decree a walloping amount of measures to bolster the position of Serbs in 
Kosovo and to dismiss the ones enjoyed by Albanians (Malcom 1998: 346).
20
  
This legal framework explicit justified the annulment of Kosovo laws that would 
remain functioning against the program‘s principles, by declaring a threat of Albanian 
separatism. ((Bieber&Daskalovski 2003:38).). As a result, an apartheid-like system was 
installed, where Serbs as minority took a power whereas Albanians as majority (90 
percent of population) were dismissed from institutions of Kosovo. Furthermore, Serbia 
moved on dismissing almost 80 percent of Albanian population from their jobs and this 
campaign involved dismissing doctors, engineers, professors and all other professionals 
from the public sector and letting only Serbs to run the country. (Mertus 1993, Malcom 
1998: 349)                    
Aiming at keeping people quite of reaction against this system, there has been 
implemented oppression, tortures, imprisonment of all dissidents‘ killings, wounding, 
and arrests of Albanians became the rule. (Mertus 1993, Malcom 1998: 344-345, Philips 
1996: 823)  
                                                          
20
 Among these measures (and others which came later) were the creation of new 
municipalities for Serbs, privileges for Serbs and exclusion  and family planning for 
Albanians, restrictions to the possession of private property ; ―..encouraging… to work 
in other parts of Yugoslavia…‖, closing the Albanian newspapers and  the Kosovo 
Academy of Arts and Sciences. (Malcom 1998:346) 
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The situation became worse by 1991/1992, as the Serbia parliament has already 
abolished in 1990 the Kosovo‘s education system, the schools were closed and the 
students and teachers banned of using school if they were not compelling with Serbian 
curricula. (Bieber&Daskalovski 2003:39). The Serbian Parliament  later implement the 
‗Declaration of Human Rights of Members of National Minorities‘ in which basically 
states all citizens as ‗equal‘ and prohibits discrimination for national affiliation (39). 
The appalling aspect is its description of Albanians as above the international standard 
and that, in words of Bieber and Daskalovski (2003:39), it ―…anathematizes Kosovar 
Albanians as uncivilized people.‖  
The discrimation against KA expanded to all sectors of life in society, guaranteed 
by the Serbian police arm and the silent ―…Kosovo Serbs who supported the 
Serbianization of Kosovo based on ideas of Serbian ‗sacred land‘ and ethnic 
superiority.‖ (Bieber&Daskalovski 2003:40) 
 In building statehood of Kosovo, the political movement (LDK) in cooperation 
with existing institutions of Kosovo (of communist period) exercised the legitimate 
right to self-determination adopting the Declaration on Independence adopted by the 
Parliament of Kosovo. ―On July 2, 1990, three days before the Kosovo Assembly was 
dissolved, 114 of the 123 Albanian delegates in the Kosovo Assembly met on the steps 
of the Assembly building, which had been locked. There were enough of them to 
constitute a quorum and they issued a declaration giving the Albanians the status of a 
nation entitled to their own republic.‖ (Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo 2000: 43-44). On September 7 they met again at Kacanik/Kacanik and agreed 
on the proclamation of a constitutional law for a ‗Republic of Kosovo‘, including 
provisions for a new assembly and elected presidency; the Constitution of the Republic 
of Kosovo was then passed by the Parliament of Kosovo. 
  The Constitution of Kosovo of 1990 was mainly declaring Kosovo as an 
Albanian dominated entity but with ample guarantees for minorities. The article 1 of 
this constitution says ―Republic of Kosovo is the democratic state of Albanian nation 
and memebrs of ther nations and of the minorities, Serbs, Muslims, Montenegrins, 
Croats, Turks, Roms and ther who live in Kosovo.‖ Kosovo Constitution (Article 1 
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 Based on the Constitution, Kosovo worked for democratization of political 
system by encouraging political pluralism and supporting the creation of other political 
parties along with LDK which gave birth to the Farmers Party of Kosovo (FPK), 
Parliamentary Party of Kosovo (PPK), Albanian Christian-democratic Party of Kosovo 
(ACDPK), Social-Democratic Party of Kosovo (SDPK) and minority parties such as the 
Party of Democratic Action (PDA) of Muslim minority and the Turkish People‘s Party 
(TPP). (Malcolm 1998: 348) 
In the first multiparty parliamentary and presidential elections in Kosovo in May 
1992, independent governing institutions were established deriving from Constitution of 
Independence the so called ―Kaçanik Constitution‖, of 1990. The electoral system 
provided for mix majority – proportional system with full guarantees for minority 
representation. Hence, the parliament had 120 seats, of which 100 seats through direct 
voting and 20 seats were reserved for minorities. Out of 20 seats, 14 were reserved for 
Serbs and Montenegrins and 6 seats for other minorities. (Kosovo Information Center 
1993: 25-28,)  In this elections except Albanian majority, the minorities also 
participated such as Muslims, Turks, Croats and Roma, whereas Serbs and 
Montenegrins refused to participate. Given that there was not a census in Kosovo since 
1989, the demographic picture vary according to sources: Albanian sources say 
Albanian 90 %, Serbs 7%, and the rest 3%, (Islami 1993: 26) whereas Serbian sources 
say Albanians 82,2 %, Serbs 9.9% and rest 7%. (Mertus 1999: 315)   
The result of this internationally monitored elections, gave the following outcome: 
the Democratic League of Kosovo won the majority of votes and the President of the 
Democratic League of Kosovo, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova was elected President of the 
Republic of Kosovo through direct vote. The Parliament of Kosovo was composed of 
LDK (96 seats), PPK (13), FPK (7), ACDPK (7), SDPK (1), independents (2), Muslims 
(4) and Turks (3). Muslims had 3 reserved seats and one seat they won by direct voting. 
(Kosovo Information Center 1993: 25-28, Independent International Commission On 
Kosovo 2000: 45)   
The legitimate governing institutions established by these elections involved the 
President, Parliament and Government. In the government of Kosovo one of the 
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ministers was from Muslim community, the minister of health.
21
 The institutions 
operated with big difficulties given the Serb occupation. The President acted in Kosovo, 
the Government acted partially in exile (Germany) and partially in Kosovo, while the 
Parliament could not meet in plenary sessions but rather acted through parliamentary 
groups and committees. (Malcolm 1998: 348-349, Tahiri 2001: 278) 
Kosovo‘s independent institutions covered all spheres of life, in particular the 
domain of finance, foreign relations, education, health care, culture, social issues, 
economy and defense and security. Thus, a state institution of finance of Kosovo was 
built with a key role played by the Albanian Diaspora. The schools and University in 
Albanian were opened in private homes. A network of health clinics and other services 
for citizens were established. Economy succeeded to function at trade and small 
business level. As of 1992, structures of defense and security were built in Kosovo. 
(Tahiri 2001: 278) 
Serbia‘s ruling was enabled by force, establishing large number of military and 
police forces and running public organization, under the instructions of government in 
Belgrade.   
―The [KA] boycotted the December 1992 Yugoslav elections on the pretext that 
the ‗Republic of Kosovo‘ was no longer part of Yugoslavia, defying substantial 
international pressure to support reformed-minded [political contestant to Milosevic].‖ 
(Bieber 2003:42) 
This boycott was the chance for KA to empower their decision of being 
independent and to not let this goal to be overlapped by the human right abuses they 
were exposed to. In the years to come, The Kosovo Albanian peaceful resistance for 
independence continued in parallel to Serbian violence which attempted to suppress this 
resistance and make Albanians accept Serbian rule.  
                                                          
21
 Numan Baliq, the leader Party of Democratic Action (PDA) was the Minister of 
Health 
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 The years 1998-1999 will mark the period of war in Kosovo between Serbian 
forces and KLA with bloody developments. At this is time NATO decides to address 
the security situation in Kosovo that was threatening international peace and security. In 
its first statement of 5 March 1998, NATO Council called ―on Belgrade authorities and 
Kosovar Albanian leaders to enter serious dialogue without preconditions to find a 
political mutually accepted solution for Kosovo and also warned that it and the 
international community were legitimately concerned about the situation in Kosovo, 
among others, also because of its impact on the stability of the entire region.‖ (NATO 
1998)  In addition, the Contact Group and UN Security Council addressed the 
increasingly volatile situation in Kosovo.  In three resolutions of the UN Security 
Council, 
1
 Resolution No. 1160/31 March 1998,  Res. No. 1199/23 September 1998 and 
Res. No. 1203/24 October 1998, the situation was characterized as humanitarian 
catastrophe and a threat to international peace.   
 
5.1.1.2. Second Period: 24th of June 1999- 17th February 2008 
This period covers from the deployment of United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) on the 24th of June of 1999 to the Kosovo Independence declaration the 17th 
of February of 2008. 
Conflicting Parties: Actors and Conflicting Relationships 
 
The conflicting parties during this period will suffer transformations that are 
proper of a contextual change to which they necessary have to adapt. This is the period 
in which Serbia will have to accept the limitations established by the UNSCR 1244, a 
period in which one part of KLA will be transformed into the Kosovo Protection Force 
(KPC) ((Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000:107) and in what is 
now known as Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK); LDK will adapt to political party 
structure and start to take role in the Kosovo‘s official political life. New parties will 
emerge to take place in this new reality, and Kosovo Serbs will be more characterized 
as a conflicting party with clear demands and positions - some of which distanced from 
Serbia. 
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FRY/Serbia was politically discredited for its aggression policy. The Kumanovo 
Agreement first and the UNSCR 1244/99 later will represent a boundary that Serbia was 
supposed not to cross without paying consequences at international level.  
Kosovo Serbs (KS) were a sort of silent primary party –always voiced up by 
Serbia- in the conflict before the UNMIK deployment in Kosovo. However, their 
situation changed during this period, the UNMIK took different measures aiming at 
bringing KS in the political scenario. The KS will be rather divided between moderates 
and radicals. The radicals led by Marko Jakshic, oppose any links with Kosovo, while 
moderates organized in Serb National Council (SNC) led by Rada Trajknovic and 
Oliver Ivanovic (who initially was radical and leader of paramilitars -Bridge watchers), 
try occasionally to act independently from Belgrade by looking for opportunities of 
integration into the Kosovo institutions. They took part in elections of 2001 as Coalition 
Povratak and were part of institutions of Kosovo. Meanwhile new parties under more 
liberal ideologies takes part in institutions (in 2004 and 2007) such as the Democratic 
Serbian Party of Kosovo and Metohija (SDSKIM) of Slaviša Petković, the New 
Democracy of Branislav Grbić,  Independent Liberal Party (SLS) of Slobodan Petrovic. 
(Kosovo Assembly Fact Sheet, ND) 
Among KA, this period will bring the proliferation of political parties of the 
inheritors of the political power gained during the abovementioned time-period. None 
of the KA political parties will differentiate much on their political programs but they 
will have strong differences regarding the past as main parties originated from peaceful 
and armed resistance not going well with each other in the past. However, they will all 
have something in common, the claim for a final status for Kosovo which brings its 
independence. 
Two new parties will arise out of the two main warlord of Kosovo. The PDK led 
by Hashim Taçi (former UCK commander) and the AAK led by Ramush Haradinaj 
(former UCK commander)  
LDK remained as largest political party and in grand ruling coalition with AAK 
and PDK.  After the war LDK is considered to be the main successor of the peaceful 
movement for independence with the same name.  
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Other three parties came into Kosovo political life: ORA entered in the scenario 
in 2004 led by Veton Surroi who has been part of almost all negotiation process 
regarding Kosovo since Rambouillet Conference. The ADK party led by Edita Tahiri, 
who has been one of the key leaders of the peaceful movement for independence and a 
negotiator of all pre-war phases including Rambouillet Conference. The AKR party, led 
by a recognized businessman Behxhet Pacoli, is one of the last parties in being created. 
Despite the new KA parties, still the main negotiator for KA side will be the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) which was always led by KA, 
despite of involving some KS in its structure. Before 2001, Kosovo has been under the 
joint transitional government structures of UNMIK and nationals. Since then on there 
have been three governments coming out of three cycles of elections, in 2001, 2004, and 
2007. Government powers were limited as UNMIK hold substantial part of powers 
including reserved powers. Kosovo government will be in a sort of stalemate with 
FRY/Serbia for the status question of Kosovo, and also due to hidrance of Serbia by her 
parallel structures. As reported by OSCE in 2002 and 2003, FRY/Serbia‘s parallel 
structures operated in the northern municipalities of Mitrovica, Leposavic, Zubin Potok 
and Zvecan and the Serb enclaves since the end of war including areas of security, the 
courts, property issues, schools and healthcare. (OSCE 2003: 5) 
The PISG faces also  the refusal of main section of Kosovo Serbs and comes to 
collision with UNMIK over the more transfer of powers.  
UNMIK is mandated by UNSCR1244/99 to lead the protectorate over Kosovo 
and to lead it until the final status resolution comes into being. However, Its mandate is 
hindered by Serbian parallel structures which operate illegally in Kosovo since 1999 
and it is opposed by most KS who f refuse to recognize UNMIK and PISG legitimacy , 
remaining loyal to Serbia. UNMIK time to time is in collision with Kosovo government 
for the issue of governance competencies.  
KFOR is the Kosovo Force implemented by NATO in Kosovo whose mandate is 
to provide global safety and control of borders; however it faces interference from 
Serbia and refusal from some KS.  
 
 
77 
 
 
The NATO intervention the 24
th
 of March of 1999 and the subsequent UNSCR 
1244/99 installed in Kosovo a stalemate which many have called ‗limbo‘ situation. The 
UNSCR 1244/199 settled a sort of game between Serbia and KA regarding the final 
status of Kosovo. The resolution pleased KA stating that Kosovo would enjoy 
substantial autonomy and self-government and promising to determine the Kosovo 
Final status (UNSCR1244/99 art 11). However, at the same time, it reaffirmed the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of FRY/Serbia over Kosovo. It should be noticed 
that the resolution does not refer to Serbia but to FRY which was absolutely 
disintegrated by 2006 with the independence declaration of Montenegro. The UNSCR 
1244/1999 gave arguments to both sides to pretend that options, a Kosovo Albanian 
project and a Serbian national project for Kosovo would be able to happen. This period 
will be periods in which both, KA and Serbia would do their best to succeed in either 
option and therefore the stalemate installed by the NATO intervention will come to 
reign until the KA declare its independence in 2008. 
Regardless of the relations between KA and Serbia, there is the internal situation 
in Kosovo between KA and KS, mostly underestimated by those who treat KS as mere 
instrument of Serbia, or those who simple focus on the capacity of this relationship to 
generate tensions and violence. Albeit, this features, KS are a real actor in the conflict 
despite of being misunderstood, underestimated or forgotten behind the shade of Serbia. 
The 2th of July of 1999, right after the events of harassment and attacks against 
minority groups, SRG made KA and KS to agree on measures to ensure security 
(S/1999/779) 
Until 2004, the situation in Kosovo remains controlled by KFOR and UNMIK, 
despite the several acts of revenge of KA towards KS at the very early days of the post-
war period. However, the relationship was never that easy. The conflicting relationship 
between KA and KS could be best observed in the divided city of Mitrovica, which 
remained a tension zone in all years of UNMIK administration. The clashes between the 
conflicting parties time to time were expressed through violence. Reported events of 
violence took place since the end of war. Hence, in early February 2000 in Mitrovica 
three Serbs were killed and some wounded while in revenge attacks ten Albanians were 
killed. In February 2001, an Albanian youth was killed. The violence did not exclude 
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internationals. In one of the attacks in April 2002, twenty-two UNMIK police officers 
were wounded by Serbian paramilitary known as ‗Bridge Watchers‘. (ICG 2002: 3-6). 
Due to this event, the international staff withdrew from the northern municipalities 
while UNMIK police remained though unable to carry patrolling until May 1, 2002. 
However, the highest point of escalation of violence occurred in March 2004 when from 
both sides there were killed and wounded and where Serbian religious cites suffered a 
large damage. As a consequence of these riots, 19 died, about 900 were injured, around 
700 Serbs, Askali, and Roma homes were destroyed together with Serbian churches and 
monasteries, and 4500 people were displaced (ICG 2004: i) 
March events were initially observed as ethnically motivated but after the 
thorough analyses on root causes the list of other reasons come to be identified such as 
uncertainty over the final status, lack of economic progress and dissatisfaction with 
governance both UNMIK and national one.
 
(Human Rights Watch 2004: 2, 
Congressional Research Service 2005:  7-8) 
Both pretentions over Kosovo, the KA and the Serbian one remained frozen or 
lost in what it became a tedious ‗limbo situation‘ or an eternal stalemate between the 
parties. To move on after the riots of March 2004, and fearing more KA reactions of 
similar sort, UNMIK launched the ‗Standard Before Status‘ policy. This policy 
demanded certain standards – as we shall see- that needed to be accomplished in order 
to advance further any possible talk about final status of Kosovo. UNMIK needed to 
frozen one more time the new uprising of nationalistic pretentions. It is difficult to 
imagine what would have happened if the Status talks would have come at that time or 
before the period they in fact came – 2006. Nevertheless, the scenario in Kosovo was 
one in which the conflicting parties could not leave with either side definition of the 
final status, nor with the lack of it. 
By February 2006, the negotiations over the Kosovo final status came into being 
with the mediation efforts of Marti Ahtisaari as Special envoy of the UNSG. The 
negotiations last for almost 2 years,  in 6 different rounds of negotiations mediated by 
the UN envoy Marti Ahtisary and under the auspices of Contact Group  The 
negotiations however,  have excluded KS from the discussion table and instead, their 
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voice was arose by Serbia who had the absolute command of the Serbia side position . 
(Weller 2008a) 
Participation of conflicting parties in state & government structures 
The UNSCR1244/99 and the Consitutional Framework of Kosovo approved by 
SRSG on 15 May 2001 will place all aspects regarding ethnic communities under the 
exclusive competence of the SRSG who will act as a mechanism for the protection of 
their rights. The Provisional Self-Government Institutions of Kosovo will be the other 
mechanism set with similar purpose. (Reka 2003:162). UNMIK needed to govern the 
territory with the goal of promoting peace, stability and multiethnic cooperation, and 
therefore different instruments were developed with the purpose of ensuring the full 
protection of minorities, special protection to Serb Cultural heritage will also be 
managed by KFOR. In fact, UNMIK was able to control together with KFOR the 
transformation of KLA in both a political party and the new Kosovo Police Corps. 
There was a pending more complicated objective, bringing KS into the Kosovo 
governance structures and electoral process.  The task remained unsuccessful, unlike the 
experience with KLA. Among the major steps taken for the integration of the 
conflicting parties into a joint structure of government are: 1) Establishing Joint Interim 
Administrative Structures (1999-2000); 2) Constitutional Guarantees for Minorities; 3) 
Standards before Status Policy (2002-2004); 4) the Steiner‘s Seven Points plan for 
Mitrovica (October 2002), 5) Decentralization Plan 
1. Joint Interim Administrative Structures (1999-2000) 
UNMIK moved on in establishing joint interim administrative structures by 
setting the formula of inclusive multiethnic environment.  In planning the joint 
governance structures UNMIK consulted key leadership of Albanians, Serbs and also 
other minorities such as Muslims, Turks, Roma and Gorani. As a result, UNMIK 
established the joint governance structures of UNMIK and nationals kown as The Joint 
Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) in May 2000. The JIAS was made up of (1) 
Interim Administrative Council (IAC) which served as substitute to government 
however in advisory role to the SRSG. It was composed of 8 members, 4 nominated by 
the United Nations, 3 representatives of Kosovo Albanians and 1 representative of 
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Kosovo Serbs. The Kosovo Albanian representatives were Ibrahim Rugova (LDK), 
Hashim Thaçi (PDK) and Rexhep Qosja (LBD). The Serb member, Rada Trajkovic, 
represented the Serbian National Council for Kosovo and Metohija (SNC) although not 
supported by Serbs Gracanica and Sevce who chose to boycott and oppose the efforts of 
Trajkovic. (UN Coverage 1999)The SRSG served as the non-voting chairman. The 
Serbs withdraw from this body time to time according to the political developments and 
instructions from Belgrade. Thus, in May 2000 the SNC suspended its participation and 
only after far-reaching concessions -including the rapid implementation of up to 20 
Local Community Offices for the public administration in Serb enclaves- laid down in a 
―Joint UNMIK-SNC Understanding‖ between SRSG Kouchner and Bishop Artemije, 
the Serbs decided to rejoin on 25 June 2000 until the end of its manadate in April 2002 
when democratically elected government took place.
 
 (UNMIK-SNC Understanding 
2000) 
(2) Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC) served as substitute to parliament and 
included 35 members representing different stakeholders such as political parties, 
religious organizations, national minorities and groups representing civil society. Being 
in the role of parliament-like body its mandate was to oversee the IAC. The KTC 
included four Kosovo Serbs, and one representative per each other minorities. 
(UNMIK-JIAS Fact Sheet, ND) (3) Administrative departments (AP) served the role 
of ministries for all sectors of life. The 19 administrative departments (later 20) were 
established during 2000, and each one was co-headed by an UNMIK co-head and a 
national co-head. The positions of co-heads were assigned to political parties and 
minorities according to the following formula: PDK (5), LDK (5) LBD (5), Kosovo 
Serbs (2), Kosovo Turks (1), Kosovo Bosnians (1) and one independent. (UNMIK-JIAS 
Fact Sheet, ND) (4) Municipal boards served the role of municipal assemblies led by 
UNMIK Municipal Administrators, and their composition reflected ethnic groups. 
 2. Constitutional Guarantees for Minorities 
By 2001, the Constitutional Framework of Kosovo was adopted (Constitutional 
Framework 2001: Chapter 4) institutionalized the rights and interests of minorities, and 
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in particular the Serb minority (Article 4.1)
22.  Based on the concept of ‗consociational 
democracy‘ it set out the principles for protection of minorities including their 
‗guaranteed representation‘ in the Assembly and Government of Kosovo. This 
Constitution guarantees twenty parliamentary seats for minorities, 10 seats Serbs (plus 
the seats they may win in elections) and 10 seats for non-Serb minorities. Articles 4.1. 
and 9.1.3.b of the Constitution read: 
Article 9.1.3. B) Twenty (20) of the 120 seats shall be reserved for the 
additional representation of non-Albanian Kosovo Communities as follows:  
(i) Ten (10) seats shall be allocated to parties, coalitions, citizens' 
initiatives and independent candidates having declared themselves 
representing the Kosovo Serb Community.  
(ii) Ten (10) seats shall be allocated to other Communities as 
follows: the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Communities four (4), the 
Bosniak Community three (3), the Turkish Community two (2) and the 
Gorani Community one (1).  
 
The constitution also guarantees two ministerial positions for non-majority 
communities, of which at least one will be from the Serb Community (Article 9.3.5)
23
 
Both conflicting groups participated in national elections of 2001 and the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) and the Assembly of Kosovo. (S/2002/436) 
3. Standards before Status policy  
                                                          
22
 Article 4.1. says ― Communities of inhabitants belonging to the same ethnic or 
religious or linguistic group (Communities) shall have the rights set forth in this Chapter 
in order to preserve, protect and express their ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic 
identities.‖  
23
 Article 9.3.5) At all times, at least two Ministers shall be from Communities other 
than the Community having a majority representation in the Assembly. (a) At least one 
of these Ministers shall be from the Kosovo Serb Community and one from another 
Community. 
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With a goal of building confidence UNMIK adopted the policy of ‗Standards 
before Status‘ (UNMIK press release 2002), with special focus on multi-ethnicity and 
integration. These eight areas are: 1) Functioning democratic institutions, 2) Rule of law 
(police/judiciary), 3) Freedom of movement, 4) Returns and Reintegration, 5) Economy, 
6) Property Rights, 7) Dialogue with Belgrade, and 8) the Kosovo Protection Corps.‖ 
The idea was to postpone the status question until some level of standards is reached 
and the conflict mitigates further among sides. The implementation process took part in 
2003 and 2004, through ―the Standards Implementation Plan.‖ 
 4. Seven Points Plan for Mitrovica  
Despite the efforts to integrate the Serb minority, the situation on the ground 
showed that division lines prevailed through Serb parallel structures and partitioning the 
city of Mitrovica. Serbs represented in the Kosovo institutions used to often boycott 
these institutions. King and Mason (2006:115) assert that Serbs ―…accepted places in 
the new institutions, but frequently not attend, in protest at one or other recent event.‖  
 In October 2002, SRSG Steiner made efforts to secure Serbian integration while 
offering decentralization and promised to make Mitrovica a normal European town. 
(Steiner 2002) However, no significant result was achieved, instead Serb parallel 
structures and tendencies of partitioning strengthened further. These divisions and fears 
of both sides for the uncertain final status as some argue (Congressional Research 
Service 2005: 7-8.) led to the massive revolts of early 2004 which impacted negatively 
on the progress made in interethnic relations, but also brought the conflicting 
relationship to the point of critical fragility.  
5.  Decentralization policy  
 The very first decentralization policy was adopted in 2000 aiming at transferring 
some of the powers to a local level for accommodating the minority interests. UNMIK 
encouraged the PISG to embrace decentralization as a priority and asked the Council of 
Europe to provide guidance for decentralization and reform of local governance. The 
legal framework of local governance provided by Regulation 2000/45 of 11 August 
2000 gave ample powers and responsibilities to municipal level trying to accommodate 
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interethnic relations. It also prohibited discrimination, including ethnic discrimination, 
and required dual language (Albanian and Serbian) in municipal government as well as 
other minority languages which were relevant. The Regulation stipulates that borders of 
municipalities cannot change without the consent of its citizens and without a decision 
by UNMIK, while it encourages cooperation between municipalities. Further, the PISG 
presented the plan for decentralization (Framework for the Reform of Local Self-
Government in Kosovo 2004) based on a civic concept and the concept of subsidiary, 
conducive to the principles of the Council of Europe Charter for Local Governance. The 
PISG succeeded to devise this plan despite controversies and political opposition to the 
idea of decentralization from the Albanian side which insisted that there should be 
central powers established prior to decentralization. In this regard, an advisor of Prime 
Minister of Kosovo, Besnik Tahiri says ―Difficult to decentralize and devolve central 
power in Kosovo, prior to the consolidation of power.‖ (UNDP 2008) They feared that 
decentralization can have negative implications to territorial integrity of Kosovo and its 
final status. This plan provided for pilot projects for new municipalities, some with a 
full range of municipal powers, while others had more limited powers, like Sub-
municipal Units (SMU). It allowed association of different municipalities with similar 
interests within Kosovo, and even outside of Kosovo, in coordination with the SRSG 
and PISG, allowing the cooperation of Serb-dominated municipalities with Belgrade. 
Further, it called for respect of the European standards when the change of boundaries 
are at stake, meaning that consultations with the local communities concerned must take 
place prior to any decision. However, it ruled out any veto power to minorities. 
At the same time, Belgrade provided its decentralization plan based on ethnic 
concept seeking an autonomous region of KS in the northern part of Kosovo (the area 
includes municipalities of Leposavic, Zubin Potok, Zvecan, and northern Mitrovica). 
However,   
UNMIK approved the Prishtina Plan, in August 2004, and asked the PISG to work 
on implementation. In the years 2004 and 2005 the process of decentralization moved 
forward with five pilot municipal units in existing municipalities: Gracanica in Prishtina 
Municipality, Partesh in Gjilan Municipality, Hani i Elezit/General Jankovic in Kacanik 
Municipality, Junik in Decani/Decane Municipality, and Mamusha/Mamusa in Prizren 
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Municipality. Serbs got two pilot municipalities, Gracanica and Partesh, added to five 
existening such as Leposavic, Zubin Potok, Zvecan, Shtrpce, and Novo Brdo. 
 However, the decentralization process could never reach its objective of 
encouraging KS integration. At later stage the issue of decentralization is defined by AP 
and its implementation is responsibility of KG under the supervision of International 
Civilian Office. (ICO Fact Sheet ND) KS remained as ―…virtual prisoners in their own 
enclaves scattered throughout the region and ‗protected‘ by KFOR.‖ (Franks & 
Richmond 2008:88) 
 
5.1.1.3 Third Period: 17
th
 February of 2008 – 24th June of 2009 
This period covers all aspects related to the implementation of Ahtisaari Plan that 
follow the self-declared independence by the KA, up to  24
th
 of  June of 2009 day of 
commemoration of 10 years deployment of UNMIK in Kosovo.  
Conflicting Parties and their relationship 
The declaration of Kosovo Independence on the 17
th
 of February of 2008 will 
bring a new reality for Kosovo and, of course, for the conflicting parties. The Kosovo 
scenario remains dominated by the already existent parties of former period: Serbia, 
KA, KS, and UNMIK. However, there is four new actors that worth being noticed. 
The Kosovo Government will be the inheritor of the former PISG, the 
declaration of Kosovo Independence, set the KG as an autonomous actor into the 
Kosovo political scenario, despite of the ‗supervised‘ independence that according to 
Ahtisaari Plan should be responsibility of International Civilian Representative (ICR). 
The International Civilian Representative (ICR) -and other international actors 
gathered under the International Steering Group for Kosovo - has the responsibility of 
being the final supervisory authority of the Independent Kosovo, as stated by the 
Ahtisaari Plan  (2007: 7) and re-enforced by the Kosovo Constitution (2008: art.146-
147) 
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As part of same supervision also EULEX emerges out of the new provisions of 
the Ahtisaari Plan (AP). EULEX is destined to be the European Union Rule of Law 
Mission in Kosovo and to replace the UNMIK and UN mission by a mission now 
operated by EU. Its mandate is conferred by the Council of the European Union on the 
4
th
 of February of .2008, being its deployment process completed between the 9
th
 of 
December of 2008 and the 9
th
 of April of 2009. 
A multiethnic parliamentarian group called ‘Group +7‖ was created gathering 
Turks, Bosnians and Roma, namely the Kosovo Democratic Party of Turks (KDTP), 
Coalition VAKAT, and Roma party (PREBK). Although this actor has not a direct stake 
over the conflict, this group will be the first to express an adaptation to the context 
brought about by the implementation of Ahtisaari Plan (AP).  The group opened up the 
spectrum of the political scenario to something more than a political competition 
between KA and KS or eventually Serbia. Maybe for first time, Kosovo is assuming 
itself outside the Albanian-Serbian fault line. 
UNMIK will remain as a key actor during this process despite of the fact that it 
was meant to slowly downsize its personnel and function towards it‘s fully replacement 
by EULEX. 
The first tensions among the parties arose right after the Ahtisaari Plan was 
presented by Ban-Ki Moon on the 26
th
 of March of 2007. The negotiations among 
conflicting parties continued until a last round on the 10
th
 of December of 2007. 
However, it was absolutely clear what Ahtisaari declared in his letter to Ban-Ki Moon, 
―the negotiations‘ potential to produce any mutually agreeable agreement on Kosovo‘s 
status has been exhausted‖, therefore the only viable option for Kosovo is 
independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international community‖. 
Since the Ahtisaari Plan came into shape, Serbia rejected it yet welcomed the 
benefits that Kosovo Serbs were to gain thereby (Southeast European Times, 2007). 
Moreover, while the negotiations over the Ahtisaari proposal were still ongoing, Serbia 
made another categorical statement in assertion of its sovereignty over Kosovo: a new 
Serbian constitution in which the sovereignty over Kosovo was stated as a fact (New 
York Times 2006). The situation was no different after the Independence declaration. 
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Since the very first day of independence Serbia started a campaign to hinder the 
Independence: it withdrew ambassadors from countries which were recognizing 
Kosovo, it brought the case before the International Court of Justice, requesting to 
declare Kosovo independence as illegal (see A/C.5/63/15), it boycotted international 
meetings in which Kosovo representatives were invited (New Kosovo Report 2009) and 
persuaded the Secretary General of the UN to issue a program of six points by which 
Kosovo should abide (S/2008/354). One of the last demonstrations of Serbia against the 
KG was seen during the first birthday of the Kosovo Independence, the 17
th
 February 
2009, when Parliamentarians of Serbia arrived to Mitrovica in a special session of the 
parallel Assembly of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo ―adopted a declaration confirming 
Kosovo's constitutional status within Serbia and rejecting all acts regarding 
independence.‖ (SETIMES 2009) The event passed on without much impact among 
Kosovo population, included those KS far from that region. No violence was present at 
that time. No further steps have been taken. 
Serbia never got a direct incentive (neither by the Ahtisaari Plan nor by UN in 
general) by which she could have an optional scenario to the one she has been managing 
over Kosovo. Moreover, Russia‘s refusal to approve the Ahtisaari Plan at the UNSC has 
lessened the chances of involving Serbia in such alternative scenario. Despite, 60 
countries have recognized Kosovo
24
, including most of the EU members, Serbia 
remains counting on Russia to block further steps towards Kosovo independence 
recognition by the Security Council. 
New tensions will arise between UNMIK and KG regarding the new role that 
UNMIK is going to play since the declaration of independence and mostly since the 
adoption of the Constitution of Kosovo on the 15
th
 of June of 2008 - which all KA 
regards as the maximum authority of the newly created Kosovo State. UNMIK, as 
recently stated by Ban Ki-Moon in a report on Kosovo, is still considered by UN as the 
legal responsible for Kosovo under the UNSCR1244 (S/2009/300). However, the 
                                                          
24
 For updated information in this regard, please consult  http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/ 
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situation is even more complicated. Before the deployment of EULEX the 9
th
 of 
December of 2008, Ban Ki-Moon started new negotiations with Serbia over the final 
status of Kosovo that Serbia still regards as unsettled. These negotiations were held over 
some correspondence sent by Ban-ki Moon to both KG and Serbia in which he states a 
sort of new plan for Kosovo that started to be known as ‗Six Point Plan‘.  (S/2008/354) 
This plan in fact overrides the Ahtisaari Plan and touches six key areas over which KG 
and Serbia should agree upon previously to any discussion over the annulment of the 
UNSCR1244/99, which still rules Kosovo. Without such annulment Kosovo cannot yet 
be considered as an independent state by the UNSC and, therefore, in the international 
system.  KG has openly rejected the ‗six point plan‘  which  demands that police, 
customs and courts in the northern areas of Kosovo remain under control of UNMIK 
and not of EULEX –as it should be according to AP-, triggering fears and reactions 
among KA against a possible partitioning scenario if such a thing would happen. As of 
this writing, EULEX has already started to establish border control in northern areas of 
Kosovo (The Kosovo Times 2009) and have anyway succeeded in taking slowly its role 
in the Police, Customs and Justice (S/2009/300 Annex I) 
EULEX situation is a bit paradoxical, while implementing its mission as meant by 
the AP; it has compelled under a position of ‗status neutral‘, in a sort of mid-point 
between the position of KG and the one of UNMIK and Serbia, for Serbia to agree on 
its deployment (BBC News 2008) 
KS and KG relationship, during this period, presents diverse moments in a sort of 
up and downs that intermingle. KS who participated in the institutions of Kosovo both 
before and after the Independence Declaration (ID) seem to be convinced that the 
Ahtisaari Proposal was a suitable means to ensure a peaceful life in Kosovo (Kosovo 
Serb leader and parliamentarian, 2008a and 2008b; Kosovo Serb parliamentarian 2008). 
Still, no KS was present when Kosovo's independence was declared (S/2008/354, I.3., 
1) and all of them have been absent from the Kosovo Parliament for the entire month 
following the ID (ECMI 2008).  Furthermore, on the same day of ID, different act of 
violence has been performed by KS rejecting the new situation in Kosovo. However, 
these events did not last more than few days and have not been repeated again. 
Nevertheless, the rejections are taken a different shape than violent one. On May 2008, 
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Kosovo Serbs participated in the Serbian municipal elections, being the first time that 
Serbia could organize such elections since 1996. As a consequence of this election, it 
was created the ―Assembly of the Community of Municipalities of the Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo and Metohija‖ which will operate as a parallel structure to those 
crafted by Ahtisaari. (OSCE report, 2008). By the 28
th
 of June of 2008, KS convened in 
their own parliament in Mitrovica gathering 45 delegates of 26 municipalities 
establishing the first session of the hitherto mentioned Assembly. They drew a 
declaration by which they clearly reject the Kosovo State, its Constitution and 
reaffirmed that Kosovo is still an integral part of Serbia (B92 2008). Even before this 
declaration, the northern part of Kosovo and particularly Mitrovica north have been 
operating besides the rest of Kosovo by a large amount of Serbian help (S/2009/300). 
But despite many KS still reject KG authority, an increasing number of them are 
continuously applying for Kosovo identity cards, driver‘s licenses and further Kosovo 
documents and contracts with Kosovo companies (S/2009/300:3) and some others have 
opted for a more pragmatic stand abiding to KG institutions in search of solutions to 
their daily life problems (New Kosovo Report 2009a). Furthermore, as it is shown in the 
last Early Warning Report of UNDP, KS have referred to unemployment and poverty as 
the main factors that threaten them, contrary to mentioning any aggravation of 
interethnic relations as it did happen in the previous report of July and October of 2008  
(EWR 2009 /24:5) 
 The ID not only brought about new situations in the relationships amongst the 
main conflicting parties in the Kosovo conflict, it also did so regarding the KFOR 
protecting until then the entire territory of Kosovo. KFOR has served as the security 
guarantee in the territory for the past 10 years, however it has been announced that its 
presence is going to be reduced by 2012, as it reads the NATO announcement of a cut 
down of the force from 15000 to 2200 troops (Balkan Insight 2009) 
Participation of conflicting parties in government structures and electoral processes 
There are some key new elements introduced in the decentralization process with 
the objective of addressing and guaranteeing the equal and secure participation of Serb 
communities into Kosovo state life and in coherence with the ‗multiethnic‘ national 
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identity that Ahtisaari was eager to promote.  We can summarize these elements as 
follows:  the creation of ‗New Municipalities‘, the ‗Enhanced Municipal Competences‘ 
and the ―rights to receive certain assistance from Serbia, within certain clear parameters 
set by the Plan (see S/2007/168/Add.1). The law of Special Protective Zones has 
addressed the same objective. In fact, this law has been a sort of incentive for the 
participation of KS in government structures and electoral processes with a full 
guarantee that this participation will not compromise their identity or their security. 
New municipalities 
Recognizing the concerns of the Kosovo Serb community as legitimate, the 
Ahtisaari Plan called for the creation of six new Kosovo Serbs administered 
municipalities: Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North, Graçanicë/Gracanica; Ranillug/Ranilug; 
Partesh/Parteš; Kllokot/Vërboc – Klokott/Vrbovac, and Novobërdë/Novo Brdo. At 
same time, it establishes one for Turkish dominated area (Mamusha) and another three 
for Albanian dominated area (Mitrovica South, Junik and Hani i Elezit 
(S/2007/168/Add.1, III, 30 and LAW NR.03/L-041, CH1, 5). Additionally, new 
municipalities for non-majority communities can be established in consultation with the 
Government, provided that, with a minimum 5000 citizens, they make up at least 75% 
of the total population. (LAW NR.03/L-041, CH2, 12) 
Enhanced Municipal Competences 
Ahtisaari‘s Plan granted to Kosovo Serbs a high degree of control over their own 
affairs in the territorial areas in which they form the majority. The Law of Self-
Government provides the ‗enhanced municipal competences‘ in the area of health, 
education, cultural affairs and police (LAW NR.03/L-040, CH3, 19-23) as well as the 
possibility of inter-municipal cooperation (LAW NR.03/L-040, CH5, 28). The law 
establishes the right to select the commander of the local police station and recognizes 
the right of the municipalities of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North, Graçanicë/Gracanica, and 
Shtërpcë/Štrpce to organize a secondary health care, including the registration and 
management of the health care institutions.  Similarly, Kosovo Serbs municipalities are 
empowered to regulate themselves their cultural affairs, including the protection and 
promotion of their religious and cultural heritage. This last provision is even valid for 
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those municipalities in which Kosovo Albanian and other communities also have claims 
to the same cultural heritage; as it is the case in the municipalities of Novo Bordo and 
Partesh.  
The education in Serbian language is guaranteed by the Law on Education. 
Indeed, this law grants to ALL MUNICIPALITIES OF KOSOVO the right of education 
in Serbian language, including the right to use textbooks and curricula developed by 
Ministry of Education of Serbia (LAW NR.03/L-068, CH5, 12). Kosovo Serbs are also 
given the right of higher education in Serbian language. In this line, Art. 14 furnish the 
Municipality of North Mitrovica with competences as regards higher education, and 
declare the University of the North Mitrovica as an autonomous public institution of 
higher education, allowing it to be funded from Serbian sources.  
With regard to financing, the Law on municipal finance provides five different 
resources: three different kinds of grants, own revenues, transfers from the state and 
financial assistance from the Republic of Serbia, as well as, municipal borrowings. 
(LAW NR.03/L-049, CH1, 7) 
Legal rights to receive assistance from Serbia 
According to Ahtisaari‘s Plan and the Law of self government, the municipalities 
in Kosovo will be entitled to cooperate with municipalities and institutions in Serbia, 
including the right to receive financial and technical assistance (LAW NR.03/L-040, 
CH5, 30.2).  
Law on Special Protective Zones 
Treating this law on Special Protective Zones as part of Civic Nation Building 
process, is equal to saying that it is expected  of them to work for making possible the 
gathering of two ethnic nations under the same civic umbrella. In this sense, in the 
Ahtisaari Proposal, it was hoped that this law would offer sound guarantees for the 
preservation of the cultural Identity of all ethnic groups in Kosovo. A similar impact is 
expected to be generated by the Law on the Education of Municipalities of the Republic 
of Kosovo (part of the laws on decentralization).  
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The cultural identity of Kosovo Serbs has been also protected and guaranteed 
equally by certain mechanisms of 1) the law on decentralization – Law on education of 
Municipalities (as addressed in previous part),  and 2) the Law on Special  Protective 
Zones 
Most specific concern towards the cultural and religious development of Serb 
Community in Kosovo is shown by the Law on Special Protective Zones. The purpose 
of the law is clearly stated in the its first article, which explicitly reads ―[t]his law shall 
ensure protection of Serbian Orthodox Monasteries, Churches, other religious sites, as 
well as historical and cultural sites of special significance for the Kosovo Serb 
community, as well as other communities in Republic of Kosovo, through the 
establishment of Special Protective Zones.‖ (LAW NR.03/L-039, 1) 
Special Protective Zones are described as ―…an area defined by a map, or by a 
defined area surrounding a monument, building, group of buildings, ensemble, village, 
or historic town center that is safeguarded from any development‖ that might damage its 
manifold relevance. (LAW NR.03/L-039, 2) 
The objectives of this law are, first of all, to provide protection for peaceful 
existence and functioning of the sites; to preserve the monastic way of life of the clergy; 
as well as to preserve the character and appearance of these sites in historical, cultural, 
architectural, archeological, environmental and aesthetic context. The special emphasis 
is given to prevent any adverse development around the sites and to ensure the best 
possible conditions for harmonious and sustainable development of the communities 
around these sites (LAW NR.03/L-039, 3). In case the municipality seeks to develop 
any activity around these zones it must ask for the consent of Serbian Orthodox Church.  
These activities include commercial constructions; edifices taller than the monastery/ 
church/cultural monument to be protected; road/street construction; construction of 
buildings for different purposes; public gatherings, recreation and entertainment; and 
urbanization of agricultural land LAW NR.03/L-039, 6) The article 7 of same law 
classifies  44 areas as Special Protective Zones, with different kind of protection and 
with an extended area which goes between 50 and 100 meter area around their 
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perimeter. By art.8 a special provision with a multireligious view is considered for the 
Historic Center of Prizren. 
During the negotiation process by which this Ahtisaari Plan was shaped, Kosovo 
Albanians displayed a spirit of compromise, especially as regards the links the Kosovo 
Serbian community may develop and keep with Serbia. The process of implementation 
of the laws on decentralization has been rather slow. However, once the Kosovo Serbian 
municipalities had been established, the door was wide open for more initiatives in that 
direction (Kosovo Albanian Minister 2008).  Despite such far-reaching concessions, 
Kosovo Serbs remained unsatisfied – especially in the northern part of Kosovo (CNN 
ONLINE 2008). But there are also Serbs in Kosovo who accept the new reality as 
reasonably fair (Kosovo Serb leader and parliamentarian, 2008a). Moreover, in May of 
this year the KG initiated the process to start organizing the launching of the new 
municipalities and opened job vacancies for the required posts, some KS have showed 
interest in applying for such offers. (S/2009/300:9). Despite some positive steps towards 
the integration of KS, some small scale of violent events by KS opposing Albanian 
homes reconstruction in Mitrovica occurred during April-March. (S/2009/300:11). It 
might be still too early to draw conclusions regarding the integration of KS in the 
governing structures and the electoral process; however the scenario in Kosovo seems 
to start to change towards the incorporation of other dimensions than the mere ethnic 
cliché debate. For instance, a principle of a school in Lipjan who belong to KS 
community is more concerned with asking help for job from the KA led municipality 
than for the fact it is a KA one. (New Kosovo Report 2009a)  
The law on Special protective zones is still on its way to being fully implemented. 
(ICO Matrix 2008) Similar is the case of the laws on decentralization. By the time this 
paper is in process of being written, the Statistic Office of Kosovo (SOK) has not yet 
made available a new official map of Kosovo in which all this modifications can be 
addressed.  However, this law on protection of religious and cultural heritage has meant 
a step further on the compromising attitude of Kosovo Albanian as an exchange of 
setting their final status. Notwithstanding, Kosovo Albanians in general hardly regard 
this concessions to Serbian Orthodox Church as positive (Kurti, Interview, 24
th
 
September 2008) and most of them have disagreed about the establishment of this 
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protected zones (EWR17, 2007:20)  However, at official level, this  concessions are 
seen as the price paid for being granted with Independence (Kosovo Albanian Minister 
2008); or in words of a Kosovo Albanian Parliamentarian (2008b) ―as the exchange 
coin for removing Serbia out of the territory‖. Of similar opinion is a Kosovo Minority 
Parliamentarian (2008). However, of a different understanding is a Kosovo Albanian 
Parliamentarian (2008) who regards this process as one distinctive element of ―faking 
multiethnicity‖. Same parliamentarian insists mentioning that Kosovo Albanian and 
Kosovo Serbs have enjoyed these cultural sites without further problems in the  past  -
previous Milosevic area-. 
 
5.1.1.4 Period Comparison: in search of structural transformations 
Conflicting Parties 
While analyzing the conflicting parties, we observe a transformation on the 
nature, characteristics and number of the parties since 1989 to 2009.  During the first 
period the parties were mostly two emplaced in opposite extremes: KA (LDK peaceful 
movement and resistance) and Serbia (in its toughest shape of an apartheid-like system), 
until later years when KLA appear on the scene of the Kosovo conflict to further 
escalate it. Since NATO intervention and the UNSCR1244/99 there will be a change in 
the nature, the characteristic and the number of the conflicting parties. Parties will 
become more moderate, will be transformed from their nature that will turn to be one of 
political party and they will expand the number of parties inside the divide. There is not 
only going to be Serbia but also KS (represented in government and parliament of 
Kosovo) and political parties (Coalition Povratak, the Democratic Serbian Party of 
Kosovo and Metohija (SDSKIM), the New Democracy, Independent Liberal Party 
(SLS) of Slobodan Petrovic) in one side of the divide. In the other side KA will express 
their demands mostly through PISG and the different political parties that have emerged 
from the heritage of the power distribution of the former period: LDK, PDK (ex KLA) 
AAK (ex KLA). Fewer changes however have been observed during the first 16 months 
of the civic nation building which is developing in Kosovo. The nature of the parties 
does not present much difference than the previous period. Despite some KS seems 
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more cooperative than before, there is no any particular event by which we could have 
associated this change with the CNB under implementation. Similarly regarding the 
Parliamentarian Group +7, even when this group is a novelty for the Kosovo political 
system, there is not any particular event that could support the conclusion that this new 
development have been triggered by the CNB process that  Kosovo is undergoing. 
However, this group represents a signal of hope for different positions to come out of 
differences in a democratic process rather than by being part of one or other side in the 
conflict.  
The CNB did change – as expected- structural characteristics of the parties. For 
instance KA will be mostly regarded and associated with KG. However, this change is 
in coherence with the top-down approach that the CNB process followed in Kosovo. 
Despite the variety of political parties will open up internal differences inside the main 
conflicting party, this difference does not reflect in the conflict, as all KA do regard 
Independence as their main interest. However, some KA groups do oppose not only the 
government but also the AP, and the CNB under implementation, like Vetvendosje. 
 
Conflicting Relationships 
Unfortunately, history has taught Kosovo that change in system comes only 
through violence. Such were there cases during 1989-1999 periods when Serbia took 
power and the case during NATO and UNMIK intervention 1999-2008. Judging for the 
past 16 months of Kosovo Independence, history seems not to repeat itself this time. 
The tensions have hardly came into the surface as acts of violence, and the very few 
moments it happened it did so without further developments or escalations. The 
scenario is anyway tense and there is no guarantee for more violence not to come. 
However, the conflict seems to show its first transformation. From a conflict mostly 
guided by acts of violence to one in which violence has not taken a protagonist role 
anymore. Whether the civic nation building process worked as a palliative of this 
violence or not is a conclusion difficult to be constructed. Notwithstanding, it did not 
incarnate new violent developments in Kosovo. 
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As we shall observe, neither all conflicting relationships have been addressed by 
the CNB under implementation, nor will all relationships present changes regarding the 
previous period under analysis. For instance, the Serbia /KA relationship has suffered 
tremendous transformation along the three period considered, such as: from a violent 
relationship to a stalemate to end up in a sort of diplomatic disagreement with KG 
expressed both internally (towards each party‘s constituencies) and before 
internationals
25
 but not in any sort of direct confrontation against the other party. 
Despite these transformations, the dyad was never directly addressed by the CNB in 
plan of being implemented. The intervention of AP and, logically, the unilateral 
declaration of independence did not offer any incentive to Serbia, who ended up being 
the loser side of the win-lose result. In cases that the AP and its rounds of negotiations 
did offer something to Serbia, they did so only via conferring some privileges and 
concessions to KS. 
As for the relationship between KG and KS no further changes have been present 
in this period if compared with the previous one, which had had already facilitated a 
sort of big transformations for the relationship  PISG-KS. It is in fact the changes in the 
nature of the other party (PISG consolidation as KG) what brings a different value to the 
relationship, as by now KS are dealing with an established government and not with a 
provisional one, and particularly with a government which is strongly seen as 
representing the interests of KA. The relationship still did not turn into a positive and 
fully cooperative one; however some steps among some KS are done in this regard. 
CNB process opened new opportunities to KS some of which has already been used. 
However, these opportunities are more related to the insertion of KS in the socio-
economic structure than to the political one, being the formers of the most interest for 
KS than the latter as seen in the pragmatic stand of KS regarding unemployment and 
poverty, and their need of solving basic problems of daily life. 
                                                          
25
 Such is the case of Serbia seeking legal resorts in UN, ICJ to defend her position 
regarding Kosovo final status and the case of KG searching for further countries 
recognition to defend his own. 
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During the period in which the CNB has been implemented, the relationship 
between KA-KG did not show any sign of open violence as in the previous period. 
Despite there have been some cases of tension and even some separated violent 
reaction, there have not been any violent reaction at big scale. In this sense, it cannot be 
said that the CNB process have impacted positively in the relationship but it can be said 
that at least, it did not impact negatively. 
Furthermore, the new process meant the materialization of two new relationships, 
between KG and UNMIK and between KG- EULEX regarding the procedural aspects 
of the status of Kosovo. However, these relationships came into being more due to the 
unilateral declaration of Independence than for the implementation process of AP and 
consequently the CNB process. Therefore, I will disregard these relationships from my 
analysis. 
Participation in government structures and electoral process 
Another lesson learned in the  Kosovo history of the past 20 years, is that the 
development of parallel structures is always an option available to cope with a reality 
that do not favor one of the main conflicting parties. Hence, that was the case in the 
period 1989-1999 when LDK developed an underground and parallel system besides the 
one of Serbia, and so was the case during 1999-2008 which found an extensive 
hindrance of Serbia in the UNMIK governed structures of Kosovo. 
The CNB designed by AP will come in this 3
rd
 Period under analysis to 
institutionalize and legalize what before was an unofficial and parallel system. By 
distributing areas of exclusive ethnic dominance, the CNB institutionalize the already 
existent ethnic divisions rather than developing a system for de-politicizing ethnicity 
and reducing its salience. 
Further mechanisms to enhance competences of the newly created ethnic 
municipalities, the division of Mitrovica or the protective zones increase spaces of 
segregation rather than of integration of both ethnic communities. The civic concept that 
these laws aimed at creating does not reach the objective of overcoming the ethnic 
salience of the conflict but rather reinforces it.  
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Nevertheless, the relationship between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs has 
been provided with a common legal ground by which Kosovo Serbs insecurities can be 
addressed. Moreover, the mechanisms are not fully implemented and therefore it might 
be too soon to evaluate them. Similarly, there has not been any electoral process since 
the CNB has started its period of implementation so conclusions in this regard cannot be 
made. Maybe the coming elections of November 2009 are a good scenario to evaluate 
this last point. 
 
5.1.2. Data Analysis & Interpretation of Changes at Issue Level 
By comparing hitherto explained time-periods, my study draws conclusions 
regarding changes at issue level. For a change to happen there should be an absence or 
reformulation of those issues that have been relevant among the conflicting parties in 
periods previous to the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan. One dimension, then, 
addresses the level in which the CNB process has effectively  touched upon those 
issues; and another dimension assesses whether these issues are still today as part of the 
Kosovo conflict agenda. There is indeed a third dimension, which refers to those new 
issues brought about by the CNB under implementation. Nevertheless, this third 
dimension is logically not being considered for the evaluation of the scope of the impact 
of the CNB process over the SCT but rather amid its limitations. 
5.1.2.1. First Period: 23th of March 1989- 24th of March 1999 
After an analysis of the historical background to the CNB process, and the above 
developed structural analysis, the following issues can be extracted:  
1. Territorial Control  
The Kosovo‘s Conflict turned into manifest by the revocation of the Kosovo‘s 
federal status on the 23th of March of 1989 by Serbia. Since then on, the issues of 
territorial control and political status of Kosovo have dominated the conflict. At that 
historical time, territorial control was associated with national belonging; the issue 
therefore will take by same imprint. 
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Serbia‘s argument for the occupation of the territory and for revoking its long life 
autonomy can be represented by the Slobodan Milosevic words ―‗Every nation has a 
love which eternally warm its heart‘…‘For Serbia, it is Kosovo‘ ‖ (Malcom 1998:343) 
Different  political reasons have led Milosevic to make an issue out of Kosovo since 
1987, as it has been mentioned already in the Chapter four, each of this political reasons 
were related the need of inspiring nationalistic sentiments in each republic of 
Yugoslavia that would give him support to achieve majority in the federal presidency 
(see Malcom 1998:344). Kosovo was never an exception but the last remaining piece to 
gather absolute control. 
KA position (LDK) was also nationalistic inspired. They did wanted their 
autonomy back, however their arguments were covered by nationalistic air. As we have 
seen, Albanians of Kosovo always have recognized themselves as the inheritors of the 
Dardanians and Illyrian tribes. ―The Albanians claim that they are consequently 
descended from the Illyrians and are the indigenous inhabitants of Kosovo. The 
Albanian language, which belongs to the Indo-European group, has distinctive 
vocabulary, morphology and phonetic rules which have engaged the  
attention of many philologists, of whom several have confidently asserted its descent 
from ancient Illyrian.‖ (Wilkes In Vickers 1998: 1) Therefore, they consider that if 
someone would be controlling the territory it should be Albanians, no Slavs who came 
to the territory in a posterior time. LDK resisted peacefully the controlled launched by 
Serbia and they did so for eventually one day to get back their national (ethnic) self- 
determination in those territories. Thus, any move of Serbia towards Kosovo, has been 
regarded from the viewpoint of KA as the actions that were in line with a project of 
building a ‗Greater Serbia‘ 
When later on KLA entered into the scenario of the Kosovo conflict, the position 
of KA over territorial control will be also defended by violent means.  
2. Political Status of Kosovo 
Absolutely linked with the previous issue, is the issue of the Political Status of 
Kosovo. Most of authors fall in considering both issues indistinctively as if they were of 
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same problem. However, they are not. Before the revocation of the autonomous status 
of Kosovo by Serbia, the territorial control of Kosovo did rely on Serbia, but the status 
of Kosovo was one of an autonomous territory virtually equal to any of the other 6 
republics of Yugoslavia. The developments in Kosovo since 1989 will show that for 
peace to reign in Kosovo both issues, territorial control and political status, must be 
clearly addressed. However, such an option was not offered to Kosovo before the 
Ahtisaari Plan and the consequent CNB process. 
Therefore, there was a disagreement over the control of Kosovo territory but there 
was other one even deeper regarding the understanding on Kosovo political status.  
Serbia has never considered Kosovo as an equal partner in the Yugoslavian 
framework, despite as Malcom (1998:346) mentions; she needed the votes of Kosovo as 
much as she needed the ones of the other republics. The system designed by the 
Constitution of 1974 made the paradox possible, as it has been mentioned already in 
Chapter 4 of this research. Serbia‘s argument regarding the status of Kosovo rested on 
only some articles of that Constitution but not in the whole. KA, however, based their 
position on the overall Constitution which granted them with an autonomous status as 
province of Serbia with similar privileges in Yugoslavia as enjoyed by the other 
republics. Therefore, their demand was oriented to ―… declaring Kosovo ‗an equal and 
independent entity within the framework of the Yugoslavia federation‘.‖(Malcom 
1998:346)   However, their position will change due to the changes that happened 
within Yugoslavia. Seeing that other republics demanded full independence, since 1991, 
KA (LDK) will demand independence for Kosovo. This perspective would express even 
tougher conducive with the worsening of the situation on the territory as the segregation 
and violence against Albanians increases.  Furthermore, by 1992, the option of a 
Kosovo as part of Albanian territory will be politically voiced up, in a joint declaration 
of all Albanian parties of Yugoslavia,  conditioned to changes in the external borders of 
Yugoslavia based on solutions under ethnic lines, or, in case of the partitioning of 
Kosovo. Nevertheless, the remaining position will be one which demands full 
independence for Kosovo.  The position of KLA will be rather similar to the one of 
LDK, despite that its anthem will recall for the unification with Albania (YouTube 
2009). 
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3 .Violation of Human, Political and Civic Rights 
The abuse of Serbia towards the human, political and civic rights of KA was 
articulated under a nationalistic speech which demanded the need of ―‗Serbianizing‘ the 
region‖ (Malcom 1998:352) due to the ―…demographic aggression (ie. high birth- 
rate)…‖ that KA were implanting in Kosovo; and to a sort of ―…‘holy war‘ against the 
Orthodox Slavs‖ (Malcom 1998:351) that was carried on by Bosnians and Kosovar 
Muslims. Guzina (2003:40) also points out that the serbianization policy are also 
―…based on ideas of Serbian ‗sacred land‘ and ethnic superiority‖ that specially regard 
KA as ‗uncivilized people‘ (Guzina 2003:39) 
Regardless the nationalistic justification of Serbia, her actions towards KA 
population since 1989,‖… were uncannily reminiscent of those carried out, or at least 
proposed by extremists such as Cubrilovic, in the 1920s and 1930s.‖ Different measures 
were taken place increasing on daily basis as it has hitherto been mentioned in this 
study.   Even Serbs from the wars fought in Croatia and Bosnia would be sent to 
populate Kosovo in order to create an ethnic ‗balance‘26 (Malcom 1998: 353). 
Nevertheless, Milosevic was able to still claim, "[w]e don't have any kind of conflict 
with the Albanians."(Philiph 1996: 823) The international job of LDK in different 
international forums and institutions contributed to document the human rights abuse in 
Kosovo and conquering certain UN resolutions in this regard
27
. As Philiph (1996:823) 
states, “[d]espite Milosevic's assurances, UN findings describe systematic 
discrimination of ethnic Albanians for which there is an ample body of evidence.‖  
In 1997, the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (CDHRF) counted 35 cases of violent death (5 for police torture); 5,031 cases 
of ill-treatment or torture; 596 arbitrary arrests; 803 persons taken to police stations and 
480 called for "informative talks"; 425 family homes raided. In addition, the 
                                                          
26
 Marks used by Malcom (1998:353) 
27
  For further information see U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 50th Sess., Agenda Item 112(c) 
at 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/50/L.43 (1995); U.N. GAOR 49th Sess., Agenda Item 100(c) at 
1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/49/204 (1995)  
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organization registered over 10,000 other incidents of human rights violations by 
Serbian police or civilians against ethnic Albanians.‖ (IHRFHR 1999: 13)  
In the years 1998-1999 the violence against Albanians escalated further taking 
dramatic dimensions. In his reporting in 1998, UN Secretary General evaluated the 
situation of great concern:  
―I am outraged by reports of mass killings of civilians in Kosovo, which recall 
the atrocities committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following reports concerning the 
killing of 20 Kosovo Albanian internally displaced persons in Gornje Obrinje in the 
central Drenica area on 28 September, a Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission team 
witnessed at least 14 bodies, some severely mutilated. Most were children and women 
at ages ranging from 18 months to 95 years. The Serb authorities denied any 
involvement of the police force in those atrocities. However, further killings of Kosovo 
civilians were reported, including the alleged summary execution of some 12 to 23 
males (accounts vary) in the Golubovac area on 27 September. The Kosovo Diplomatic 
Observer Mission conducted a preliminary investigation in the area and observed pools 
of blood in the dirt, tools presumably used to stab the victims and small-caliber shell 
casings.‖ (UNSG Report S/1998/912) 
 
The abuse did not come only from Serbian side. There have also been reported 
different abuses from KLA forces towards KS population. For instance, Tim Judah 
(2000:155-156) reports on the abuse of KLA to an old nun in one of the Serbian 
Monasteries. KLA actions were also related with taking civilian hostages and murdering 
Serbian policemen and even KA that they considered cooperating with Serbia. (Guzina 
2003: 44). UN Sec. General   reported at that time, 140 to 150 civilians and police 
abducted, the burning and destruction of houses, mass graves of KS, all committed by 
KLA. (UNSG Report S/1998/912) 
However, KLA regarded these actions as actions taking in the dynamic of a war, 
while for Serbia this were actions of further aggressions of Albanians towards Serbs. 
4. Cultural Heritage  
 
If we have to consider the issue of cultural heritage among all others issues, we 
perhaps need to say that this issue has nourished with arguments all the other present 
 
 
102 
 
 
issues in the Kosovo‘s conflict. The cultural heritage of Kosovo was particularly used 
with the purpose inspiring and feeding up nationalistic claims among Serbs and 
Albanians. (Herscher and Riedlmayer 2000, Malcom 1998) (Andrew Herscher, András 
Riedlmayer 2000: 109). 
Moreover, there is also another dimension of this issue, the use of architectural 
heritage to damage the legacy of the other ethnonational group. In this sense, ―[t]he 
primary buildings singled out by Serb forces for destruction in 1998 and 1999 were 
mosques; at least 207 of the approximately 609 mosques in Kosovo sustained damage 
or were destroyed in that period. Other architectural targets of Serb forces were Islamic 
religious schools and libraries, more than 500 kullas (traditional stone mansions, often 
associated with prominent Albanian families), and historic bazaars.‖ (Herscher and 
Riedlmayer 2000:112). Furthermore, each of the damages that the historic architecture 
of Kosovo suffered presented signs of being deliberately destroyed. (Herscher and 
Riedlmayer 2000:112). Abuses of Serb cultural heritage have been done by KA too.  
KFOR later reported that KLA rebels damaged centuries-old murals and paintings in the 
Devic monastery steeling two cars and the entire monastery‘s food (Judah 2000:155-
156) 
The destruction of the cultural heritage then has been used to delete and deny the 
roots of the other ethnic group in the same territory and as such has been regarded by 
each party. Both parties understood that the violation of their cultural heritage was an 
attack of the other side willing to push him back from the territory or to threaten his 
existence. 
5.1.2.2. Second Period: 12
th
 June of 1999- 17
th
 February of 2008 
1. Territorial Control  
After NATO intervention in the Kosovo‘s conflict, the issue of territorial control 
remained frozen by the UNSCR 1244 that came as a corollary and result. By this 
resolution Serbia continued holding the de jure sovereignty, while Kosovo was confined  
to have ‗substantial autonomy‘ and the pool of  NATO forces for Kosovo (KFOR) and  
UNMIK  were destined to have the de facto sovereignty over Kosovo as much as the 
last word in the decision-making structure. 
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KA leaders divided among themselves a sort of weak (in terms of national 
ownership) and internationalized government structures. KS were recognized for first 
time as an actor by the act of kindly inviting them to take part of these new political 
structures. Of course, it was an attempt of the so called ‗international community‘ to 
hold some sort of legitimacy for the UN mission and the fate of Kosovo. Few Serbs, 
though, accept to participate. 
Whereas Serbia kept his structures on the terrain, under the argument-and the 
hope- of eventually one day re-take what he considered his natural domain, Kosovo. 
Since then on, this structures will started to be known as ―Parallel Structures of Serbia‖. 
This situation will add one more dimension to the issue of territorial control, becoming 
since now on a new issue by itself for UNMIK, KFOR and the KA. Likewise, it was a 
new issue for the KS too, who remained trapped by the pressures and privileges offered 
to them via these structures and the new scenario of UNMIK and KFOR as the last 
resort of authority. 
On 2003, Kosovo Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi asked for the transfer of 
authorities reserved for the international administration and called for the establishment 
of a joint body representing both UNMIK and the Kosovo government, which will serve 
this purpose (UNMINK 30, August 2003). UNMIK DPI (2003) However, Rexhepi‘s 
demand succeeded only partially mainly because of two reasons, first because UNMIK 
considered that PISG lacked capacities for certain issues and second because avoid to be 
accused by Serbia as a promoter of independence.  (ICG 2003: 19) 
The de facto territorial control of KFOR and UNMIK over Kosovo became twice 
threatened during this period. One in the aftermath of the war, and early days of 
UNMIK reality in Kosovo, when KA launched revenge attacks against KS for first time 
in the Kosovo history; and another one, during KA riots in 2004. 
After the riots of 2004, the KS enclaves became more visible as KS opted to keep 
their little piece of what they considered still Serbian territory with all Serbian structures 
included. In terms of territorial control, the enclaves became another aspect to call upon 
protection and another challenge for the UNMIK and Kosovo government structures. 
 
 
104 
 
 
 
2. Political Status of Kosovo 
As the issue of territorial control was left frozen, so did the Kosovo‘s political 
status that started to be known as ‗limbo‘ situation among academicians and political 
international and national elites. 
KA kept the claim for independence, while Serbia rejected any idea, project or 
measure of UNMIK which could lead to such understanding on the future political 
status of Kosovo. Therefore, UNMIK and the Contact Group decided to postpone for 
good any decision in this regard. A clear sign of this decision was the ‗Standard before 
Status‘ Plan that Steiner launched in 2005 when he understood the results of an 
unaddressed issue, the riots of 2004. 
By 2007, AP formulate an option for solving the issue of political status of 
Kosovo, however Serbia immediately ―…rejected the plans considering it as a prelude 
to independence while Kosovo Albanians … welcomed them.‖ (New York Times 2007) 
 
3. Violation of Human, Political and Civic Rights  Abuse 
 
The NATO intervention stalled the abuses delivered by Serbia towards Albanian 
population.  There were some revenge attacks from KA towards KS in the early 
aftermath of the war between NATO and Serbia; however it was successfully controlled 
by the newly arrived KFOR. Nevertheless, violence came back to Kosovo on the 
‗March events‘. These riots resulted in human loss and material damages. The official 
report of UNSG blamed Albanian extremists for these events (UNSG Report S/2004/ 348:  
para.2). so did the KS community and Serbia. However, the triggering factor was the 
death of two ethnic Albanian boys drawn to the river near the divided city of Mitrovica, 
and of which local Serbs were blamed. (CRS 2005:  7) 
According to the UNSG Report S/2004/ 348, the tragic balance of this violence 
left 19 persons dead, of whom 11 were KA and eight were KS, with 954 persons 
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injured. Among those injured were 65 international police officers, 58 Kosovo Police 
Service (KPS) officers, and 61 members of the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Among the 
material damage was the cultural and religious heritage of Kosovo including orthodox 
churches and monasteries, houses, and many public buildings. 
Despite the issue of human right abuses affected KA and KS equally and it also 
could be associated with the ethnic roots of the conflict, different sources have mostly 
agreed that they were associated rather with a political reaction to the lack of debate 
over the status. Human Rights Watch (2004: 5) reads, ―[w]hile the March violence in 
Kosovo took almost everyone—local and international—by surprise, it did not suddenly 
appear out of nowhere. Deep dissatisfaction within Kosovo society about the lack of 
progress in resolving the final status of the province, continuing economic stagnation, 
and deepening concerns about Belgrade‘s attempts to consolidate political control in 
some parts of Kosovo left the province ripe for unrest.‖ (HRW 2004: 3, ICG 2004: 2) 
 
4. Cultural Heritage Protection (KFOR) 
 
After the war between NATO and Serbia, KFOR remained patrolling all cultural 
and historical sites of Kosovo. However, by 2004 the March riots managed to continue 
some burning in churches and historical places. Since then on, the issue of protection of 
cultural heritage has become part of the top priority agenda of each initiative entitled to 
bring KA and KS together. That would also be the case, during the designing of the 
Ahtisaari Plan. The riots will give an excuse to Serbia who since then on will strengthen 
further her parallel structure in Kosovo as a mean to protect the life and the cultural 
heritage of KS despite the fact that UNMIK and KFOR had a legal mandate for that. 
As Herscher and Riedlmayer (2000:109) state, ―… Kosovo's Serbian Orthodox 
buildings-both surviving medieval monuments and the products of twentieth century 
church construction programs- have served as proxy for a Serb population to 
substantiate Serbian state sovereignty over Kosovo.‖ This conclusion represents KA 
understanding of the issue of cultural heritage, while for Serbs (Serbia and KS) the 
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position can be summarized in the words of Father German Vucicevic, in an interview 
to South East Europe TV documentary: 
“There are very few historical monuments witnessing Albanian nationhood. On 
the other hand, there are many Serbian monasteries, sanctuaries and monuments that 
speak against their theories and aspirations. So it’s easy to understand why we are their 
target.” (South East Europe TV 2005) 
For Serbs, therefore cultural heritage is also directly link to the pretensions of the 
other side regarding the political status of Kosovo. The burning and the destruction of 
cultural heritage remain then, considered in this period as tool for political aspirations 
and as prove of territorial legacy.  
5.1.2.3 Third Period 17
th
 February 2008 – June 2009 (16 months of CNB 
process) 
1. Territorial Control 
 
The issue of territorial control remained frozen despite the ID and the nascent 
implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan.  UNSC1244/99 still guarantees the de jure 
territorial sovereignty to Serbia and de facto territorial control to UNMIK and KFOR. 
Serbia, remained pro this frozen option, while KA enlisted behind the ID and the 
claim that Kosovo is right now a sovereign state. In this line, KG has demanded 
UNMIK to cease functions in the territory. (Euroactiv 2009)  
At same time, KS are divided in those enlisted in Kosovo government structures 
do support the new reality opened to Kosovo, while most of KS do side with Serbia‘s 
position. The expressions of standing against the construction of Albanian houses in the 
northern part of Kosovo or the re-establishment of the check points in northern border, 
and the reference still to parallel structure of Serbia, are showing this position regarding 
this issue.  
 
 
 
 
 
107 
 
 
2. Political Status of Kosovo 
 
The issue of the political status of Kosovo is discussed during this period under 
absolutely different premises than the previous periods. It will not be any longer an 
issue regarding the status of Kosovo in the structure of Yugoslavia, or one that remain 
frozen.  The CNB process initiated by the ID and further implementation of the 
Ahtisaari Plan generated a different discussion regarding the status of Kosovo. 
From Serbian side the position will be based on keeping UNMIK role in Kosovo 
and therefore keeping frozen the debate regarding this issue until further negotiations 
bring possibilities for different scenario, one which Serbia regard should respect Serbia 
sovereignty over Kosovo. For KA, represented now under KG, the issue of political 
status is closed to further debate since the very same day of the ID. 
UNMIK will propose to keep the status quo brought about by the UNSC1244, 
despite its cooperation with KG structures. The ‗Six points plan‘ launched by Ban-ki 
Moon will materialize this position. Therefore, the debate related to Kosovo political 
status will be discussed now over the role of UNMIK and EULEX in the territory. 
Those supporting the Six Point Plan, (Serbia, KS, and UNMIK) will regard UNMIK as 
the ultimate authority and those against it (KA, KG); will refer to rely on the 
cooperation and role of KG and EULEX in the territory. 
Moreover for Prime Minister Thaci expressed that the ―[t]he logic of this plan 
produces division [and] opens the perspective for continuing destabilization‖ (Euroactiv 
2008:2). While the State Secretary for Kosovo in Belgrade, Oliver Ivanovic remarked 
that the plan is ―…crucial for the survival of Serbs in Kosovo…‖ (Euroactiv 2008:2). 
Both parties, supporting different positions regard stability factors as being under stake.  
3. Violation of Human, Political and Civic Rights 
 
During this period there has not been any relevant act of abuse against human, 
political and civic rights of any ethnic group in Kosovo. There have been however, 
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some violent reactions in the north against the implementation of Ahtisaari Plan. 
Nevertheless, they still are isolated cases. 
 
4. Cultural Heritage Protection 
 
No abuse has been present during this period against any cultural heritage. 
However, there are different expressions in favor and against of its protection as it has 
been set by the Ahtisaari Plan (AP).  Moreover, Serbia has demanded its inclusion in the 
six point plan, disregarding the mechanisms that years ago demanded in the negotiations 
round of the AP design, while KG started the implementation of the mechanisms as 
planned in the AP. Among KA, Vetvendosje have openly criticized the AP mechanisms 
of Cultural Heritage Protection regarding to it as spots of extraterritoriality of Serbia in 
Kosovo. (KosovoKosovo.com 2006)  
  
5.1.2.4 Period Comparison: in search of Changes at Issue level 
While establishing the comparison between periods, and particularly between 
second and third one, the third period explored presents the following changes: 
1. The territorial control issue has remained frozen and main parties have kept 
same position despite the new reality. However, and despite of being a small tendency, 
among KS there has been a change towards the acceptance of KG structures despite 
previous boycotting. Nevertheless, while this may not necessarily represent the 
acceptance of KG territorial control over Kosovo, it does show that KS participating in 
government and parliamentarian structures are more ready to accept it than in second 
period and of course than in first one. The ID and the implementation of Ahtisaari plan 
did not provoke the total retirement of KS from Government and Parliamentarian 
structures. 
2. The changes regarding Political Status issues have been of different nature. The 
issue has been de-frozen - despite of the fact that  this impact is a consequence of ID 
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rather than of the implementation of AP per se - being now a subject closed for KA and 
an open issue for Serbia. The issue of political status, thus, has been channelized in 
diplomatic and legal disagreements between the KG and Serbia. The political status is 
now is being discussed in reference to something else rather than being finally 
addressed, such is the case of the new discussions regarding six point plan, the sue 
before the ICJ or the role of UNMIK and EULEX in the new scenario of Kosovo. In 
spite this channelization has occurred as a direct consequence of the CNB under 
implementation, it has not been its direct product, as the unilateralist ID may have also 
provoke the change in the position of the actors, who now disagree how far the AP can 
be implemented, as the question is open to the acceptance of full replacement of 
UNMIK by EULEX as stated in AP. 
3. The issue of Human, civic and political rights seem to be disappeared. At least 
no further manifestations have occurred. There have not been mutual accusations of 
systematic abuses as in period 1 or period 2 during riots of 2004.   This is probably the 
most relevant change, as the scenario has change from a systematic abuse orchestrated 
by state structures, to mutual acts of violence, to end up now in a relative calm situation. 
The lack of violent reactions in the society can be considered another indicator of 
change, as there has not been any party which resorts violence as a way to express its 
position. 
4. Regarding the issue of cultural heritage protection, no further changes have 
been observed. The parties still regard their cultural and religious heritage as political 
tool. Nevertheless, no further accusations of violation to cultural heritage have been 
present during this period, as it was in previous periods. 
5. No further issues have arisen between parties since the ID and the nascent 
implementation of CNB process. 
 
5.1.3. Data Analysis of Changes at Actor Level  
 This section of my empirical analysis assays the changes occurred at actor level 
in relation with the CNB process introduced in Kosovo and its acceptance. As it has 
 
 
110 
 
 
been already mentioned, this CNB mechanism involves actions such as:  the creation of 
state identity; the conceptualization of a nation by civic elements as national 
constitution, rules and norms implemented on a sense of equality under the law; 
mechanisms by which different ethnonationalities find common expression. If a 
relationship is to be found between the implementation of a CNB and the successful 
transformation of the conflict at actor level, we may observe a positive tendency 
towards the acceptance of the process and towards the state identity of Kosovo rather 
than to ethnonational affiliations. 
 The findings in this regard are expounded in the following parts of this section. 
 
5.1.3.1. General Analysis of Actor Level Data 
 
As the chart shows (see figure 6), the general analysis at actor level presents a 
clear and positive tendency towards the actor identification with the Kosovo‘s state 
identity (71.42%) and a 51.42% positive tendency towards the acceptance of the CNB 
implemented by the AP. In general terms, as both variables presents similar positive 
tendency, we can infer there is a certain relationship between, the civic nation building 
and the successful transformation of the conflict at actor level. 
Figure 6 General Relationship 
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The identification with the Kosovo‘s state identity has been measured by 
indentifying if decision makers in Kosovo regard Kosovo civic nation as their political 
goal, to which 10 over 14 actors have answered positively. For instance, it is interesting 
the sort of sincere answers that Kosovo Albanian decision makers have offered:  
 ―My goal initially was not this. I was young and my goal was national state, an ethnic 
state. But this has evolved and we now work for civic state. We see this as a way that will satisfy 
all, as a concept of a safe development” (KA Parliamentarian) 
 
“There is evolution. Initially it was freedom for Albanians of ex-Yugoslavia. With 
changes we agreed for Kosova as a state, as a society with its border as part of Europe 
as everybody else to be able to go to neighbors, Albania, Serbia, etc.” (KA Party 
Leader, Prishtina, September 2008) 
A Kosovo  Serbs decision maker for instance provided an answered that could not 
have chance to exist in previous years of the conflict when Kosovo society was divided 
between a national project led by Serbs and one led by Albanians: 
 ―We promote civic nation / civic society as party as well. We are civic option 
and promote these ideas as well. This is progressive concept, also shared by Europe 
and world. We will support this concept without doubts. It is also the concept of 
Albanians.  The goal is to live better and that Serbian people feel their perspective.” 
(KS Party Leader & Parliamentarian, Prishtina, September 2008) 
Answers of this sort have been present in the interviews I have held with decision 
makers since AP became a reality. Unfortunately, the difficulties of contacting KS that 
are not part of the official institutions in Kosovo deprive me from the voice of those 
who are most likely to be against of seeing themselves supporting Kosovo state identity. 
Nevertheless, even the existence of these other voices does not deny the presence of 
those others who are definitively taken a different position. However, as we can see 
from the words of this KS leader, it might exist also the tendency among KS to perceive 
this CNB process as a process which has been generated by Albanians and to which 
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they have necessarily to abide. In a very similar tone is the perspective of a Party leader 
from one of the other minorities in Kosovo:  
 “…the concept of civic nation and the concept of protecting communities have created 
possibility that ethnic parties continue its work in the transition period. As far as the party I 
lead, have benefited from this concept, because since 2001 national elections we had our 
representatives in parliament of Kosova, also in 2004 and in this current legislation.” (O. M 
Party Leader, Prishtina, September 2008) 
Despite the goal of a civic nation might be interpreted diversely as a process to 
support, to abide, or to agree upon, the general tendency addresses Kosovo civic nation 
as an option to which most of the decision makers here interviewed have identified 
with. 
Table 1  General Analysis Actor Level showed by question 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE DEPENDENT VARIABLE   
 Q1 Q2 Q3 
Q
4 Q5 Q6 T 
  
(14) 10 6 9 7 6 9 
3
6 
% 
 7
1.42% 
42
.85 
64
.28 
5
0 
42
.85 
64
.28 
5
1.42 
 
A more detailed reading of the interview results give us a general impression that 
at level of decision makers there is no any particular rejection of the civic nation 
building in process of implementation. In general terms the actors have a 42.85% of 
positive perception of the Constitution of Kosovo as contributing to the improvement of 
ethnic relationships; the actors also show an optimistic perception regarding the 
integration of KS in Kosovo structures by a 42.85%, majority also supports the need of 
political parties that go beyond ethnic divides by a 64.28%. Similarly ethnicity has not 
been emphasized by the actors while they were asked if  It is possible to construct a 
civic nation in a Kosovo which presents ethnic division being one ethnicity the majority 
of population; the general tendency is to agree that this project is possible, and they 
does so by a 64.28%. 
 
 
113 
 
 
5.1.3.2. Analysis of actor level by ethnic stratification  
Apart from the general tendency, we encounter differences observing the 
perspective of actors according to their ethnic stratification. 
Table 2 Analysis of Actor Level breakdown by ethnicity 
Independent 
Variable 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
Respondent Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Total 
KS (2) 2 0 1 1 2 2 6 
% 100 0 50 50 100 100 50% 
KA (10) 8 4 6 4 5 8 27 
% 80 40 60 40 50 80 54% 
OM (2) 0 2 2 2 1 -2 5 
% 0 100 100 100 50 -100 50% 
 
For instance, one of the most interesting differences of perception among the 
ethnic group is expressed by both decision-makers of OM group interviewed. While 
OM, presents a neutral (0%) tendency regarding civic nation as their political goals, 
they do express an acceptance of Ahtisaari Plan with a positive tendency of 50%. 
However, they are inclined to hold that political parties under ethnic lines are a positive 
development for the civic nation state they envision in Kosova (Table 1.Q7: coding -1). 
That is to say, that decisions makers from other minorities are keen of the changes 
brought about by Ahtisaari Plan and the CNB that implies but as long as their 
ethnonational identity remain respected and guaranteed by the intervention. 
A leader of one of the other minorities, who also hold a ministerial position in KG 
structures, expresses this relationship as follow: 
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“…ethnic parties are needed for making communities be part of the process of civic 
nation while not undergoing assimilation. Since 1999 and in the Constitutional Framework the 
reserved representation for communities in parliament is guaranteed; this is also guaranteed by 
Constitution of state of Kosova adopted in June this year. This allows for ethnic parties to have 
their reserved place and perspective in politics. In this aspect the concept of civic nation and the 
concept of protecting communities have created possibility that ethnic parties continue its work 
in the transition period.” (O. M Party Leader, Prishtina, September 2008) 
Similarly, the words of a Parliamentarian leader of OM talk about the defense of ethnic 
parties as a mean to maintain own roots but also speaks of a political structure always divided 
between Albanians and Serbs: 
“Minorities must have ethnic parties. If they go to Albanian parties they will be 
“Albanized” and if they go to Serb parties they will be “Serbianized”. Bosnians have their 
Bosnian part and are pro-Kosova. Albanians do not need to have ethnic parties, but democratic 
parties and professionalized parties with a clear profile.” 
Another remarkable finding relates to the position of Serbian decision makers. 
While there is a very clear positive tendency (100%) to be identified with Kosovo state, 
precisely, embracing it among their political goals; there is a much lower positive 
tendency (50%) regarding CNB process under implementation. However, exploring in 
detail the interview, this difference is more related with the difficulties regarding ü the 
implementation of the process than to their rejection to it. In general terms, both leaders 
interviewed have a high level of commitment towards the CNB process in Kosovo.   
The KS Party Leader states for instances:  
“I built my optimism based on results. I judge it from 7 months we are in 
institutions. Given that conditions are grave, and you try to help your community and 
while community do not trust institutions. As situation may change it may help people 
change their perceptions for institutions and for integrations.” 
(KS Party Leader & Parliamentarian, Prishtina, September 2008) 
 
“One of the factors that influence on Serbs is Belgrade. Second factor is 
economy, as most of the people lack means of life, not only Serbs. …  This is best 
possible way to go. To be part of institutions of Kosova is a right way to go. It is interest 
of all of us, Serbs, Albanians and others to live together.” 
(KS Party Leader & Parliamentarian, Prishtina, September 2008) 
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Another KS actor states:  
“Regardless the fact that here majority of population are Albanians I see the perspective 
of coexistence among different communities. This is going to be a long process but at the end we 
will have civic nation, which is a topic of our meeting; a modern civic nation which will not 
make differences among people and I believe we will all work for that. I see this as an ultimate 
goal and cannot see better alternatives than this. “(KS Parliamentarian, Prishtina, September 
2008) 
Similar reference to the difficulties faced by the CNB under implementation is 
reflected  in the answered these Serb actors have offered when asked about  the impact 
of  Kosovo newly created Constitution on the improvement of interethnic relations 
(Table 1.Q2: coding 0). The result has remained neutral with a 0%. This means that one 
of them regard it as positive and another one as negative, and this in fact may be the 
situation at perception level due to the stage in which this CNB is emplaced. It might be 
too early for questions of this sort, or even for the understanding of the actors regarding 
what in fact is going on in the field. Either case, there is a need to also notice that this 
type of generalizations are also risky. In concrete terms, only two Serbs have been able 
to be interviewed. It is proper to mentioned here that another KS decision maker 
contacted did not directly refuse to take part in the interview but postpone the meeting 
in several different opportunities. At the time this interviewed was held a sort of 
political crisis was emplaced in KS leadership, due to which the very same actor that 
was postponing the interview left   his position which was taken over by some other KS 
few days before my field work was finishing. In other words, at this period of time, 
even the situation of those KS participating in KG structures is delicate, but it seems to 
me that the delicate of the situation lies in the search for adaptation to the new reality 
not in its rejection.  Both KS interviewed have remarked this point; following is one of 
the statements: 
“There was an ethnic conflict, and there should be a period when process must take a 
new direction. And there should be level of responsibility from all actors, the Serb community 
and other citizens, to find the common interests and to build the civil society. For the beginning, 
we should resolve more painless issues and with time passing we can then address other issues 
of interethnic relations. So, it is important to find a model or method of interethnic life which 
will lead towards better and better relations in the future. This does not imply that people 
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should love each other, but it implies that people must find interest to live in Kosova”. (KS 
Parliamentarian, Prishtina, September 2008) 
Among Albanians, the situation is a bit clearer. There is a positive and similar 
tendency towards the identification with Kosovo civic nation (80%) and towards the 
acceptance of the process in itself (54%). The positive tendency is therefore, also kept 
among KA. 
Figure 7 Analysis Actor Level stratified by ethnicity 
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One of the main challenges in Kosovo has been always the integration in 
government structures of those ethnic groups who were not in power. Such was the case 
during the period 1989-1999 when Albanians were excluded, while on the other hand 
the risk for KS to be also segregated by Albanians in the period 1999-2008, despite 
UNMIK was operating in Kosovo and mostly KS were no willing to participate in the 
structures of government in Kosovo. The AP was particularly concerned with 
guaranteeing the integration of KS in the socio-political life of an independent Kosovo. 
Thus, if we aim at exploring the impact of CNB on conflict transformation at actor level 
it would be interesting to observe how these actors regard this process of  civic nation 
building in this task of integrating KS in Kosovo government structures and political 
life. When asked if they were optimistic about the integration of Serbs community in 
Kosovo‘s institutions: the answer of KA and OM has been a 50% positive in both cases, 
while KS are 100% optimistic about this integration process. 
In words of a KA leadership: 
 
 
117 
 
 
“Yes. There is already participation of Kosova Serbs. Also Serb politicians take part in 
the Kosova political life even though they may disagree all the time. They are others who don’t 
take part in institutions but who may time to time agree with us and others who don’t know what 
is going here…. Ethnic questions are not anymore so key, it is economy, jobs are our challenge, 
we can help ourselves at most with good economic plan. All these ethnic questions are not 
important anymore.” (KA Party Leader, Prishtina, September 2008) 
“Yes. I mean we have still Serbs which are still not working with us, but rather with 
schools and curricula developed in Belgrade…. I believe that implementations of Ahtisaari 
package will changes things on the ground in education field and we can move better to the 
civic state-building.” (KA Minister, Prishtina, September 2008) 
 KS leadership, however, point out more the difficulties for KS to integrate, 
despite they do support with optimism this new development: 
―Yes. They somehow wish to maintain their economic independence, because they are 
employed, have salaries which are higher than what Kosova institutions can provide; and it 
seems that they are not ready to lose the jobs. ..on us is to be democratic citizens, to show that it 
is possible to live with Kosova institutions and be citizens of Kosova. Therefore through our 
continuous work and through recognition by Albanian majority that we are citizens of Kosova 
we can proof to people of our community that it is possible to live in Kosova.‖ (KS 
Parliamentarian Prishtina, September 2008) 
“A key generator of problems is economy. Everybody wants to go there where is economy 
better. So we need economic stability. If we can achieve this, then problems will be resolved 
more easily” (KS Party Leader & Parliamentarian Prishtina, September 2008) 
The economic concerns are also emphasized by OM Leadership due to the fact 
that the unemployment rate in Kosovo goes beyond 40%. (World Bank fact sheet 2009)  
KA leadership expresses optimism regarding the integration of KS into Kosovo 
institutions and a new Kosovo reality. In this regard, a KG leader declares:    
“I believe that all Serbs will be integrated in the institutions of Kosova. Some of them are 
already integrated, and others still hesitate. But with more work in improving conditions and 
infrastructure it will help real integration of Serbs and other communities.   “ 
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The fact that one part of KS accepts to participate in Kosovo institution raises the 
optimism among KA leadership that with more work and more commitment the number 
of KS willing to be part of Kosovo life will grow with time. However, Serbia 
continuously interferes in the relationship between KA and KS, trying to hold back as 
many KS as possible from accepting Kosovo rule.  
Not only is common to all actors the positive tendency of their optimism towards 
the integration of KS in Kosovo state, but also the constant remark that such an 
integration needs also the consideration of socioeconomic factors. In other words, all 
actors agree that despite whatever benefit the CNB may bring about there is also a 
reality that needs to go hand to hand with the process and that is the improvement of 
socio-economic indicators. 
 
5.1.4. Data Analysis of Changes at Personal Level 
In this section I examine the changes that take place at personal level in relation 
with the CNB process in Kosovo and its acceptance. Concretely, this section gives 
account of the attitudes of   individual adults regarding the new reality created by AP. 
The AP aimed at establishing a state in which different ethnic groups live together 
under an equal state structure and state identity definition. This section will therefore 
explore whether such a changes have taken place among the population of Kosovo. 
If the CNB is able to impact on the transformation of the conflict at personal level 
it is expected the observance of changes among individual adults that reflect the 
acceptance of the new reality in which different ethnic groups live together beyond the 
previous experiences of hates, violence and mistrust among the population. 
 This expectation lies in the assumption that the Kosovo conflict is transformed 
when the competition between two national projects and the division of the society in 
ethnic lines with mutual exclusion is finally overcome. The Ahtisaari Plan brought 
about a proposal for this process of overcoming the conflict. However, it is the support 
of the micro level strata what counts for the change to occur. Without individuals 
supporting and accompanying this CNB there is not possibility for real transformation. 
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The intervention that established the CNB is a top-down approach action that cannot 
succeed in the transformation of the conflict without a bottom-up support. Therefore, 
this section will explore to which degree this support has been conquered. 
Having in mind the search for the possible relationship between CNB and SCT, 
this study will introduce the results of a survey which compares two different set of 
questions, one which measures in which degree the population is identify with the new 
Kosovo state identity; and another one which measures the acceptance, at personal 
level, of the CNB process implemented by the Ahtisaari Plan.  
The following parts will present the findings and the section will finish with an 
overall conclusion. 
 
5.1.4.7 General Analysis : Personal Level 
 
The general analysis of the survey shows that in Kosovo, the general tendency is 
positive regarding the identification with Kosovo state identity  by a 36,75%; while the 
general acceptance and compliance with the Ahtisaari process is a lower (20,46%) 
despite of  keeping a positive trend. Therefore, it seems there is a positive relationship 
between CNB and SCT at personal level. 
Table 3 General Trends: Personal Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Values (239 
cases) 
              
% Total 
Identification  with 
Kosovo State Identity 
36,75
% 87.83 
      
Acceptance 
Ahtisaari Process 
20,46
% 50.72 
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On the overall assay, the degree of acceptance of this kind of intervention remains 
in a positive direction. In order to further analyze this trend it is needed to observe how 
it has reflected in each ethnic groups of Kosovo. With this purpose it follows the 
analysis per ethnic stratification. 
5.1.4.8 Personal Level Analysis stratified by ethnicity  
 
Among Serbs, the tendency goes negatively regarding the identification with the 
state of Kosovo (-36.90), as opposite to those who defined themselves as Albanians and 
show a positive tendency of 30.38%. However, Albanians present an interestingly low 
level compliance (9.48) with the CNB process of Ahtisaari. In spite of the low values of 
the positive trend, the tendency remain favorable and no negative as the one of Serbs (-
91%) who seems categorically not assent with the changes and new definitions brought 
about by the Ahtisaari Plan.   
Table 4 Personal Level stratified by ethnicity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Serbian 
(14)  
Albanian 
(115)  
Kosovar 
(103)  Other (7)  
 
         
Turk 
(5)  
Bosnian 
(2)  
Total 
Others  
Identification 
with  Kosovo 
State Identity  -36.90%  30,38%  51,94%  70%  +58.33%  66,66%  
                     
Acceptance 
Ahtisaari Plan 
& CNB Process  -91%  9,48%  42,18%  49%  45,45  48,05%  
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Interesting to notice here is the presence of the category of self-defined ‗Kosovar‘, 
which does not exist as such among decision makers, as hitherto observed. In this 
particular case, when asked ‗How do you identify yourself: Kosovar, Albanian, Serbian, 
Other’, 43.09% of the individual adults who participated in the survey have answered 
‗Kosovar‘ while having at hand other possibilities. Nevertheless, the remarkable aspect 
among those who have taken the survey in their hands identifying themselves as 
Kosovar is that in the overall score of their primary identification with Kosova state 
identity, they show a barely 51,94% of positive tendency, while the researcher and the 
reader would logically expect more. This situation may indicate different aspects that 
only can be estimated by a variable per variable analysis. Furthermore, while addressing 
the compliance with the changes brought about by Ahtisaari Plan, ‗Kosovars‘ show a 
positive tendency of 42, 18% being the higher among the three main groups under 
evaluation here.   
 Others minorities under analysis, exemplified here by Turks and Bosnians, show 
higher identification with Kosova state identity (66.66%) than the other groups 
analyzed
28
 and higher compliance and acceptance of the CNB in process (48.05 %) . 
The reasons for such situation may lay in the particular history of those minorities in the 
Kosovo‘s Conflict but further explanation cannot be infer by the data available from the 
survey. 
Definitively Albanians and Kosovar and other minorities than Serbian ones tend 
to be relatively the ones supporting the developments carry out by Ahtisaari, though 
Albanians in less measure. 
5.1.4.3. Analysis of   Primary Identity elements: State vs.  Nation?  
As we observe, ethnic belonging continues impacting the concept of the 
understanding of ‗nation‘ among communities in Kosovo. For instance, Albanians do 
not regard Kosovo as their nation but they do consider it as their state with a positive 
tendency of 83.47%.  In the case of Serb community the tendency is negative against of 
any identification with Kosovo State (-92, 85%) or Nation (-35, 71%) and surprising 
                                                          
28
 Having the Turks  the strongest  identification with Kosova state identity by a 70% positive tendency. 
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enough the negative trend is even more present regarding the identification with Kosovo 
State. This tendency of still associating ethnonational affiliations with the concept of 
Nation is strongly confirmed by those who have identified themselves as Kosovar. 
Among this group, there is a positive tendency (95, 28%) to identify themselves with 
Kosovo State structures and a negative tendency (-20, 28%) against their identification 
with Kosovo state identity (Nation). Turks and Bosnians however, are the only ones 
who have a direct identification with Kosovo State by 100% and a positive tendency of 
28, 57% to regard Kosovo as their national affiliation. 
 
  Albanian  Serbian  Kosovar  O.M  
Identification with State Identity (Nation)  -83,47  -35,71  -20,75  28,57  
I identification with State Structures (State)  83,47  -92,85  95,28  100  
 
 
5.1.4.4. Analysis of the Acceptance of CNB process (Ahtisaari Plan): main 
structural changes. 
Analyzing the degree of acceptance of the structural measures introduced by the 
Ahtisaari Plan, the overall tendency among Albanians is oriented negatively in all cases 
for about a 50-53%.  Serbian community for instance shows a positive tendency of 
about 14,30%  favoring the  Special Protective Zones, despite they confirmed that this 
measure does not make them feel safer (-42.85%). Furthermore, neither Albanians and 
nor the  Other minorities have feel secure because the establishment of this ‗special 
protective zones‘. Kosovars instead remain neutral towards this issue. (0%) (Table 6) 
 
Table 6 Analysis acceptance main structural changes 
Table 5 State vs. Nation? 
Albanian Serbian Kosovar O.M 
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All communities, except Turks and Bosnians whose tendency is positively by a 
14, 28%), consider they have not benefitted by the creation of the new municipalities 
(Albanians -53, Serbs -21, Kosovars -16).  
5.1.4.5 Comparative analysis: changes regarding perception of other 
minorities 
Table 7 Comparative analysis: perception of commonalities with other minorities. 
 
It has purposely asked  twice in the questionnaire whether the individual considers 
to have  commonalities with others ethnic groups; once it was specially addressed in 
references to the period post ID and  in other part of the questionnaire the question was 
general without addressing any particular set of time. This question produced the 
following results:  while Albanians tendency is negative by almost 1%, the question 
which addresses the period post ID presents a positive tendency of about 27,82%. 
Among Kosovars and O.M, the trend is also increasingly positive for the period post-
ID. While for Serbian community the already negative tendency (-7.14) has worsen 
since ID up to a -28.57%. 
    
Do you feel benefited by the creation 
of new municipalities? -53,04 -21,42 -16,03 
14,
28 
Perspective towards the Special 
Protective Zones -53,91 14,28 0,94 
14,
28 
 Do you feel more secure since the 
“special protective zones” were established? -51,3 -42,85 0 
-
14,28 
     
Albanian Serbian Kosovar O. M 
Commonality with other ethnic Groups -0,86 -7,14 35,84 71,42 
Commonalities with other ethnic groups 
since Independence Declaration 27,82 -28,57 47,16 85,71 
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  Figure 8 Commonalities Pre-Post ID 
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On the whole, the respondents of my survey are generally in a positive tendency 
to see themselves in other circumstances – regarding the other minorities- after the ID, 
except for Serbian communities in Kosovo. 
5.1.4.6. Comparative Analysis between  Independence Declaration and 
Ahtisaari Plan  support: 
If compared the support of Independence Declaration (ID) and Ahtisaari Plan 
(AP) among population, the tendency is kept. Those who support the ID do also support 
the AP process (Albanians, Kosovars, and O.M). While in the same negative trend 
population of Serbian origin do support neither the ID nor the AP.  
Two things can be said reading the results of the survey regarding these aspects. 
First, this comparison may challenge the overall findings regarding the relationship 
between Primary Identity tendencies and Acceptance of AP.  
For instance, the positive percentage of acceptance of AP might be related to the 
percentage of support to the ID rather than to the CNB per se.  Particularly, if this data 
is compared with those of the new structures generated by the AP, this argument makes 
more sense. The general tendency towards the support to the new structures introduced 
by AP has been negative. If we take the case of Albanians who in general terms seems 
to support the CBN process, the discrepancy between the support of ID and the one to 
AP is notorious. There is a difference of about 64% that brings our attention to 
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questioning the real support that Albanians conferred to AP. Do they support the AP 
idea of a civic nation or  in fact they consider the AP as they way out of Serbia and the 
final conquered of the goal the fight so much for? The answer to this question may lie in 
the achievement of independence. Nevertheless, and despite of being smaller, the 
tendency towards the acceptance of AP remains. 
 
 
Table  8 Comparison Acceptance ID and AP 
Was the independence 
declaration a positive development? 
Albanian Serbian Kosovar O.M 
73,91 
-
57,14 86,79 85,71 
Acceptance Ahtisaari Plan & 
CNB Process 9,48 
-
50% 42,18% 48,05% 
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Chapter 6 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
My research had explored the scope and limitations of civic nation building 
enterprises as a tool for successful conflict transformation.  With this purpose, the 
present study has analyzed four different dimensions of a conflict: structure, issues, 
decision-makers as well as people affected by the conflict. Thus, this Chapter aims at 
discussing findings, drawing conclusions, arguing policy implication as well as 
analyzing the theoretical and empirical contributions that have arisen out of this 
research. The Chapter assesses the conceptual constructs of civic nation building and 
successful conflict transformation. 
Taking these aims into consideration, this chapter explores answers to the research 
question stated in this study by discussing the hitherto analyzed data and relating it to 
the literature. 
This chapter is composed of seven different sections: the first section discusses 
the findings and their relationship to the literature, the second section summarizes and 
brings  up conclusions of the work,  the third section expounds on the different 
implications of my research, the fourth establishes lines for future research, the fifth 
explains the limitations of this research, the sixth provides some recommendations for 
practitioners and the last section will provide with some concluding remarks. 
6.1. Discussion on Findings 
The discussion on findings proceeds in five different elements: civic nation 
building (CNB) and structural level transformations, CNB and issue level 
transformations, CNB and actor level transformations,  CBN and personal level 
transformations  as well as observance of limitations and scope of civic nation building 
as a tool for conflict transformation. 
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6.1.1. Findings and discussion on CNB and Structural Level transformations 
Few changes at the structural level can be associated particularly with the period 
in which the civic nation building (CNB) started to be implemented. For instance, 
regarding changes in conflicting parties, those KS participating in government 
structures seem to have a more determined stand towards cooperation than before. This 
is specially measured in the fact that they boycotted the independence declaration only 
one month and after that they all decided to come back and try to push forward the new 
agenda as some of them have declared. There is also a transformation among KA 
though not that positive for the successful implementation of any CNB. The KA 
position started to be more associated with KG per se, threatening the mere idea of CNB 
as it may represent a tendency towards an ethnic dominated state rather than  a civic 
one.  
Some other changes among conflicting relationships have also taken place, the 
most relevant being the decrease of the use of violence as a political tool for expressing 
demands and parties‘ position in the conflict. The Serbia-KA conflicting relationship 
has also been transformed, particularly in the position and tools available, for instance 
their difference has been channelized by diplomatic means. Moreover, the Serbia-KA 
relationship was not directly addressed by the AP intervention but through benefits 
offered to KS.  As for KS-KG relationships there is not a large change particularly 
related to this period, despite some KS are a more cooperative actors, the overall 
dynamics between KS-KG did not turn into full cooperation, as not all KS accept the 
new dynamics established by AP between them and the government to which they are 
expected to take part and accept. AP implementation facilitates that KG opened up 
socio-economic opportunities to KS, like job offers, as much as political ones. 
However, it is more likely that KS will accept the former more than the latter. 
Regarding the formerly violent and tense KA-KS relationship, as seen in 1997-1999 or 
2004, it seems to have turned to not open violence dynamics.  
  Regarding the creation of spaces for participation in political life the changes 
have also not been that promising. Despite implementing certain structural 
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interventions, such as the creation of 41 laws, the scheme for the Constitution of 
Kosovo and the civic framework as a whole to which the parties should adjust, after 16 
months of  the implementation process of the AP the structure is not fully transformed 
mostly because the implementation process is rather slow. However there is something 
even more important in this regard, the implementation of these new structures like: the 
division of Mitrovica, and municipalities ethnically dominated has institutionalized 
ethnic difference rather than de-politicizing ethnicity or reducing its salience. 
Furthermore, this set of laws known as ‗Ahtisaari Package‘ has been implemented in a 
top down approach subject to vote for its acceptance or rejection as a whole in the 
assembly but never subject to debate and possible reformulation. 
According to my theoretical construct, if a CNB is able to impact on the conflict 
transformation process at the structural level, it has to forge changes in the conflicting 
parties, the conflicting relationships and the structure in which conflict is embedded. In 
the words of Reinmann (2001:13) it is the status quo on which the conflict arose that 
needs to be changed. The status quo has necessarily been shaken by the implementation 
of AP, as long as it delimited at once the previous role that Serbia had in Kosovo, and 
made clear the stand that Kosovo is a state for its citizens rather than of any of the 
ethnic groups. Wallensteen (1991:130) for instance, recalls the absence of the fear to a 
new war coming out of the conflicting relationship as a change that transforms the 
previous conflictive scenario. A change of this sort seems to be the one happening in 
Kosovo. However this statement leads us to another question: how can we be so sure 
that the impact generating this transformation came from the intervention of a CNB 
process? If as Galtung (1995:51) states, the conflict transformations is a ‗progressing 
perspective‘, how can we differentiate separate impacts in this process of 
transformation? How can we argue that the impact was generated by the CNB and not 
the previous 10 years of steady work of UNMIK in Kosovo? I found this question as 
one of the main obstacles in the argument for a direct causal relationship between CNB 
and successful conflict transformation (SCT). Instead, we can infer certain relationship 
between this type of intervention and change at the structural level as long as it touches 
deep-rooted conflictive relationships; or contributes towards moving the stalemate to a 
different stage of the conflict in which the status quo the parties were acquainted with is 
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broken. Therefore, there might be a chance for the generation of new scenarios, 
relationships and dynamics. The status quo at the same time might be preserved in 
different aspects, as is the case of AP provisions for Kosovo. The bulk of laws trying to 
distribute highly protected power sharing mechanisms such as: the division of 
Mitrovica, or ample decentralized powers to ethnic districts; ended up institutionalizing 
the conflicting relationships instead of overcoming them. If KS will be restricted to only 
certain areas of Kosovo, in which they are ensured the full protection of their rights, 
then the very basic premises of the transformation of the conflict and of the 
implementation of civic nation building would be compromised. 
As a final remark on this discussion I would like to consider the top-down 
approach of the CNB process explored in this study.  Conflict Transformation advocates 
such as Lederach (1997),  Galtung (1995) Vayrynem (1991) Rupensinghe (1995), Miall 
(2001) or even Ropers (2005) in his systemic approach to conflict transformation, have 
extensively remarked on the role of the track III level actors for the transformation of a 
conflict to take place.  This bottom –up approach was missing in the overall negotiation, 
and implementation of Ahtisaari Plan. The scope of this CNB to become a tool for 
transforming the conflict in Kosovo, is therefore expected to be very limited if  any 
bottom-up measure do not start to accompany the process that have been implemented 
top-down.  Multitrack approaches such as those proposed by Diamond or Lederach 
would offer more sustainability to this kind of interventions, as it would open the 
opportunity, for more actors to take ownership of the process.  
6.1.2 Findings and Discussion on CNB and Conflict Transformation at the 
Issue Level 
Since 1989, when Serbia revoked the federal/autonomous status of Kosovo, the 
Kosovo conflict pivoted around four main issues: Territorial Control of Kosovo, 
Political Status of Kosovo, Mutual human, civic and political rights abuses, the 
Protection of Cultural and Religious Heritage. The Ahtisaari Plan (AP) aimed at being a 
solution for all these issues. In this sense, AP developed provisions for an 
internationally supervised Independence for Kosovo that could address the debate 
regarding the long postponed Political status of Kosovo. To balance the pretentions of 
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territorial control, AP implemented a decentralization process with ample autonomy for 
ethnically dominated municipalities, which was offered mostly to Kosovo Serbs. To 
protect the cultural and religious heritage, AP created the law on Special Protective 
Zones that guarantees ethnic management of the areas and extreme security measures 
coordinated with the Serbian Orthodox Church. The issue on Human, political and civic 
rights abuse was not directly addressed but it was expected that the combination of the 
basic 41 Laws of Ahtisaari, the Constitution of Kosovo, the decentralization process, the 
special protective zones and the offer of a internationally supervised Independence there 
would be enough guarantees for these abuses not to happen again. 
However, the issue of territorial control remained frozen, despite the 
independence declaration (ID) and the Decentralization laws, given that parties have not 
changed their main position regarding this issue. Serbia still regards Kosovo as part of 
her mainland and therefore her parallel structures remain in the territory providing 
services to KS. KA remained satisfied considering that justice finally came the day that 
AP and later the ID granted Kosovo with the opportunity of removing Serbia out of 
their area of influence. However, some KS remain loyal to the position of Serbia while a 
small tendency is seen toward the disregard of Serbia and the consideration of the needs 
of the new state of Kosovo. KS, who were already in Kosovo institutions, boycotted 
parliament and the government of Kosovo during the month that followed the ID. 
However, those who left came back again to work for Kosovo became a part of this new 
reality, indirectly accepting it. 
The issue of Political status suffered interesting changes. Kosovo Albanians (KA) 
do not consider it an issue any longer. Serbia channeled her position via diplomatic 
means and disagreements. What it used to be demand as ‗a solution for the final status 
of Kosovo‘, is now re-directed in discussion regarding the implementation of AP, the 
role of UNMIK and EULEX and the legality of Kosovo ID. The main issue remained 
but re-channeled in disagreements of a different sort but through peaceful means. 
However, the issue of the Protection of Cultural and Religious Heritage remained 
a political tool of the main conflicting parties. Although no further mutual accusations 
of abuses have occurred, the conflicting parties still regard to this heritage to claim 
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territorial pretentions of the other party over Kosovo. In this sense, Serbia and KS claim 
the protection of what they considers Serbs‘ main legacy and therefore ask for 
extraterritorial control of this area by the Serbian Orthodox Church. KA disregards the 
claim, arguing common sense of belonging to the same cultural sites and accusing 
Serbia of territorial interest in those sites.   
As defined in Chapter 2, if the CNB intervention contributes to the transformation 
of the issues of the conflict, it should be able to impact the change of position of the 
parties regarding the issue, the reduction of issues‘ salience, or in the generation of new 
ones.  The 16
 
months that followed the ID and the implementation of AP in Kosovo, 
have observed:  the issue of Territorial control remained frozen, the issue of political 
status was reframed in other discussions over different formalities, while the issue of 
cultural and religious sites remained unchanged. There is an impact of the CNB in these 
developments however we are not able to estimate to what degree the changes are the 
exclusive merit of the CNB intervention. The law on Special Protective Zones for 
instance, has not being implemented yet. However this law has been controversial since 
the first day that it was discussed in the negotiation rounds of AP design. (Weller 
2008a) In fact, the mere debate of these laws increased the sensitivity of the parties 
toward this issue. 
It should be noticed that particularly the Laws on decentralization that aimed at 
balancing positions regarding territorial issues, and the Laws on Special Protective 
Zones that aimed at addressing the issues of Cultural Heritage have not transformed the 
issues as theoretically we may expect. However, it is necessary to remark that these 
laws were mostly oriented towards KS compensation; therefore we can interpret certain 
impact originating from them. West (1993:12 cited in Dukes 1999) states that the way 
that people act and live is shaped by the circumstances in which they are embedded. 
From this perspective we may be able to explain why after ID and one month of boycott 
KS have returned to parliamentarian and governmental structures. No doubt that the 
new situation in which Serbia found herself adapting and reacting, taking a different 
position than what it would have been 15 years ago. In a similar sense, the available 
guarantees for KS that these Laws represent may have provided a structure of incentives 
for considering taking part in the system.  
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A similar situation is present in analyzing the absence during this period of the 
former issue of abuses to human, political and civic rights. It is difficult to argue that the 
civic nation building process has been responsible for such a change, but necessarily 
and maybe indirectly it impacts the situation. Years ago, a proposal such as this one 
introduced by AP would probably increase the tensions in the scenario Kosova was 
leaving. In 2008 when the ID occurred and the international effort was focused on 
implementing AP, no relevant act of violence took place. The social reaction – despite 
their happiness or unhappiness with the process- was rather calm. Days before the ID, 
Kosovo streets were full of rumors and calm waiting for the day of declaration. No 
violent reaction took place. Some protests occurred in the north but ended up being 
small spots without any relevant consequences. 
The question remains open: how can we be sure that these changes have been 
related to the CNB under implementation? This answer calls for a deeper evaluation of 
the processes by which CNB generates this impact and about the system of transfer 
between this structural intervention and its reflection at issue level.  There is at least a 
relationship regarding the timing between the changes that occurred at the issue level 
and the implementation of this intervention. 
6.1.3 Findings and Discussion on CNB and Conflict Transformation at Actor 
Level 
As it has been already expressed in Chapter 5, if a relationship is to be found 
between the implementation of a CNB and the successful transformation of the conflict 
at actor level, we may observe a positive tendency towards the acceptance of the 
process and towards the state identity of Kosovo rather than to ethnonational 
affiliations. 
In general terms there is a clear and positive tendency towards the actor 
identification with the Kosovo‘s state identity (71.42%) and a 51.42% positive tendency 
towards the acceptance of the CNB implemented by the AP.  Although the goal of a 
civic nation has been interpreted diversely as a process to support, abide, or agree with, 
the general tendency addresses the Kosovo civic nation as a viable option which most of 
the decision makers interviewed have identified with. 
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The salience of ethnicity also seems to be reduced. When actors were asked 
whether it is possible to construct a civic nation in a Kosovo which presents ethnic 
division with one ethnicity being the majority of the population; the general tendency is 
to agree that this project is possible, and they do so by 64.28%. 
The understanding widens when the tendencies are broken down by ethnicity.  For 
instance, other minorities (OM) (represented by 1 Turk and 1 Bosnian) are clearly 
positive regarding Ahtisaari Plan (50%) , however their stand in Primary Identification 
is neutral regarding Kosovo (0%). Such a situation is possible because they are not 
willing to transform this CNB in a sacrifice to their cultural roots. Then, they are keen 
for the changes brought about by the Ahtisaari Plan and the civic nation building that 
implies as long as their ethnonational identity remains respected and guaranteed by the 
intervention. This also can be explained by their absolute support in different questions 
addressing the implications of this CNB except one: the creation of multi-ethnic parties 
which they reject (-100%) because they consider that this will make them vulnerable to 
the majorities. (They include KA and KS in this understanding). 
Similarly, KS interviewed are also highly positive towards AP (50%); a similar 
positive tendency (100%) regards their identification with the Kosovo state, embracing 
it among their political goal. In fact the lower tendency regarding AP is related to their 
concern towards the difficulties of the implementation of the process than to their 
rejection. Both leaders interviewed have a high level of commitment towards the CNB 
process in Kosovo opening up the space for questions:  what differentiate those KS 
participating and committed with KS and those who are not? 
Considering the answers given by my interviewees I would answer this question 
arguing in favor of the role of individual agency over ethnic group affiliations. Both 
actors interviewed have referred to cost/benefit considerations, socio-economic 
opportunities they could benefit from and the fact that they want to live in Kosovo with 
a good quality of life. No answer refers to former claims of Serbian legacy in the 
territory or any other symbolic feature of their own ethnic group. In this sense, the 
transformation seems significant and relevant for the consideration of civic nation 
building as a tool oriented toward this end.  
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Although it might be too early for the type of questions I asked in my interviews, 
or for the actors to understand what in fact is going on in the field, still Kosovo presents 
similar tendencies among KS leadership to the one found in this study. There is a 
certain positive relationship between the civic nation building and the successful 
transformation of the conflict at actor level. 
The CNB has brought about an adaptation of the actors to the new reality in which 
all ethnic groups have guarantees for equal participation. 
6.1.4 Findings and Discussion on CNB and Conflict Transformation at 
Personal Level 
While observing the impact of CNB on conflict transformations at the personal 
level, the general tendency is positive regarding identification with Kosovo state 
identity  by  36,75%; while the general  compliance with the Ahtisaari process is rather 
lower (20,46%) - though keeping a positive trend. 
Among KS, the tendency is negative regarding identification with the state of 
Kosovo (-36.90), as opposed to those who defined themselves as Albanians and show a 
positive tendency of 30.38%. However, Albanians present an interestingly low level of 
acceptance (9.48) of the CNB process of Ahtisaari. In spite of the low values of the 
positive trend, the tendency remains favorable and not as negative as the one of Serbs (-
50%) who seem categorically to not have assent with the changes and new definitions 
brought about by the Ahtisaari Plan.  Other minorities under analysis, exemplified here 
by Turks and Bosnians, show higher identification with Kosova state identity (66.66%) 
than the other groups analyzed
29
 and higher compliance and acceptance of the CNB in 
process (48.05 %) 
Interesting to notice here is the presence of the category of self-defined ‗Kosovar‘. 
When Kosovo population surveyed was asked: ‗How do you identify yourself: Kosovar, 
Albanian, Serbian, Other’, 43.09% of the individual adults answered ‗Kosovar‘ while 
                                                          
29
 Having the Turks  the strongest  identification with Kosova state identity by a 70% 
positive tendency. 
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having other possibilities available. The significance of this answer is related to its 
implications. For instance, it asserts that the identification in Kosovo might be in the 
process of transformation from ethnonational identities to other sorts of identities that 
interplay with ethnic ones.  It challenges the assumption of partitionist theorists who 
consider ethnic identities are immutable and primary. Regarding the objective of this 
study, it also implies that CNB may have good chances to establish lines of 
transformations at actor level. 
Ethnic belonging continues, however, to mediate the understanding of ‗nation‘ 
among communities in Kosovo. For instance, Albanians do not regard Kosovo as their 
nation but they do consider it as their state with a positive tendency of 83.47%. In the 
case of the Serb community the tendency is negative against of any identification with 
Kosovo State (-92, 85%) or Nation (-35, 71%) and surprising enough the negative trend 
is even more present regarding identification with the Kosovo State. This tendency of 
still associating ethnonational affiliations with the concept of Nation is strongly 
confirmed by those who have identified themselves as Kosovar. Among this group, 
there is a positive tendency (95, 28%) to identify themselves with Kosovo State 
structures and a negative tendency (-20, 28%) against their identification with Kosovo 
state identity (Nation).  
In fact these tendencies might be related to a long tradition of understanding the 
concept of Nation. If we remember the historical background of Kosovo, the 
Constitution of 1974 divided between nations and nationalities, not between nations and 
states as many others societies do. The social construction of the concept ‗nation‘ in 
Kosovo might be driven by this sort of tendencies as the ones expressed here. This 
argument is also confirmed by the answers of Turks and Bosnians .These populations 
have been the  ones with direct identification with the Kosovo State by 100% and a 
positive tendency of 28,57% to regard Kosovo as their national affiliation. These groups 
have been considered as ‗nationalities‘ under the Yugoslavia CN of 1974 while Serbs 
were clearly a ‗nation‘ under the same constitution. Albanians of Kosovo, however, 
were considered in a special status due to their political fight in Yugoslavia for their 
consideration as a ‗nation‘.  
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Due to this differentiated understanding of ‗nation‘ that complicates the 
understanding of a ‗civic‘ concept of nation, I inquired whether there is a new ascription 
to civic elements of nation as Ahtisaari Plan (AP) pretends to construct or if this 
acceptance of the AP is related to something else. In other words, does the acceptance 
of AP really imply that the Civic Nation is beginning in Kosovo or do the ethnonational 
tendencies remain as strong as they have always been?  
My first way of finding an answer to this question was to compare the support 
given to the Ahtisaari Plan with the one given to the Independence Declaration (ID). My 
findings showed that the tendency was kept for both cases in all ethnic groups but a 
discrepancy of 64% was found among Albanians. The research concluded that the 
general orientation among Albanian population might be more oriented to support AP 
for considering it a way out of Serbia. The achievement of independence then was more 
relevant than what the AP and the CNB introduced. The background picture of Adem 
Jasheri in the declaration of independence printed by KG seems to confirm this finding. 
Nevertheless, and despite being smaller, the tendency towards the acceptance of AP 
remains positive giving hopes of further developments. 
As a last aspect to be considered in the impact of CNB over the transformation of 
the conflict in Kosovo, I questioned whether this new project of a civic nation would in 
bring among the population a sense of common belonging regardless of ethnic 
divisions. When the people was asked whether they find more commonalities with other 
ethnic groups since ID, my findings showed that the tendency among Albanians  is 
negative by almost 1%, for the pre-ID period, but positive (27,82%.) for the post-ID 
period. Among Kosovars and other minorities, the trend is also increasingly positive for 
the period post-ID. While for the Serbian community, the already negative tendency (-
7.14) has worsen since the Independence Declaration up to -28.57%. 
The overall analysis show how weak the tendency towards the acceptance of a 
civic nation among Kosovo population is and therefore how embryonary are the steps 
towards overcoming of ethnic divisions. 
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6.1.5 Findings and Discussion on Scope and Limitations of Civic Nation 
Building as tool for Conflict Transformation 
The process of exploring the possible impacts of CNB on the transformation of 
the Kosovo conflict sheds light over the scope and limitations that any civic building 
process may encounter when implemented as a tool for successful conflict 
transformation, they are presented here under five main categories: 1) Slight line 
between achieving independence and constructing a civic nation; 2) The transfer 
between Macro and Micro levels and the role of the Meson level; 3) Missing aspects of 
the Intervention process; 4) Institutionalization of Ethnicity; 5) Civic Nation building as 
an alternative to partitioning 
6.1.5 .1 The Slight line between achieving independence and constructing a civic 
nation 
Different factors have pointed out the risk of confusing Independence Declaration 
(ID) with the construction of a civic nation. Kosovo‘s conflict warns interveners to 
consider this slight line between both processes. When a civic nation building (CNB) 
process is established aiming at bridging ethnically divided societies embedded in a 
conflict about competing nationalistic projects, there is a risk of overestimation of the 
declaration of the independence over the CNB process in itself. This situation may 
challenge and eventually weaken the role of CNB as a tool to handle deep-rooted 
conflicts. 
The ‗Albanian discrepancy‘ between their support for ID and Ahtisaari Plan (AP) 
shows this slight line in the Kosovo conflict. Furthermore, the negative tendencies 
present among the KS population may worsen if the CNB is purely associated with 
independence declaration. 
Nevertheless, while these risks are pointed out, there are also some lines of hope 
for the applicability of CNB as a tool for conflict transformation. Further work is  
needed at the level of intervention to increase positive tendencies as the emergence  of 
this new civic category ‗Kosovar‘ or the ample support offered by other minorities in 
 
 
138 
 
 
the conflict which were not direct parties to the main conflict. The positive reception by 
Turks and Bosnians of the Civic Nation Building offers a line for interveners to explore. 
6.1.5 .2 The transfer between Macro and Micro levels and the role of Meso level  
As it has been discussed, one of the most controversial points that arise from the 
Kosovo case is the debate of transfer from macro level intervention to micro level 
changes. While analyzing actor level and personal level tendencies, we found 
difficulties in concluding to what degree the changes at actor level and personal level 
represent the impact of the structural intervention or individual choices of cost/benefit 
evaluations. Moreover, if we were to assume that the changes at actor or personal level 
relate to the impact of the CNB as structural intervention, then it follows to inquire how 
this transfer has taken place. 
As expected, structural changes are not easily transferred to micro level dynamics. 
There is not a direct link to witness that certain changes at macro level have exclusively 
occurred due to this intervention, however different relationships were observed. 
This situation is similar to one explained by Dukes (1999:160) regarding a marital 
dispute. The basis for the couple‘s dispute may lay in circumstances particular to the 
couple, such as their level of income, number and ages of children. However their 
private circumstances are linked to the overall structure in which they are inserted, for 
instance a drop in the level of income can proceed from the ongoing international crisis. 
Similarly, the conflict behavior of the conflicting parties in Kosovo is embedded in 
structural forces to the conflict. Therefore, a change in the structural forces can logically 
be expected to generate a change in the way that individuals and decision makers 
position themselves over the conflict. The relationship is there theoretically and,  
empirically, although this analysis is still not able to demonstrate causal relationships or 
explain how that change happened. 
Moreover, the analysis of actor level transformations showed that actors can 
escape conflicting relationships and structural constrains by personal decision as 
cost/benefits estimations. However this change was not present among populations of 
similar ethnic groups. This leads us to consider another related point related. Maybe, 
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further theoretical and empirical enterprises needs to explore the Macro-Micro transfers 
in civic nation building by taking into account ‗decision-makers‘ at the Meso-Level  
leading the process of transferring macro level interventions among the population. As 
we observed in the analysis of structural level transformations, KS decision makers 
were excluded from negotiations regarding structural intervention.  Giving more of a 
role to this ‗indigenous‘ elements, as key decision makers of all ethnic groups, could 
bring more successful results. The role of this ‗meso level‘ and its impact, then, require 
further research and empirical explorations. 
6.1.5 .3 Missing aspects of the Intervention process 
6.1.5 .3.1 The Left-out dyad Problem: 
Ahtisaari Plan (AP) addressed different conflict dyads by offering new power and 
resources distribution as a way to guarantee the transformation of the conflict in 
Kosovo. The competing nationalistic projects of Serbia and KA were overcome for a 
proposal of a Civic Nation which facilitated different demands of the parties as an 
exchange of accommodating other sources jealously guarded. KA were granted the 
awaited Independence as an exchange for having the Kosovo Political status 
internationally supervised and ethnically compensated with decentralized spaces for 
minorities, mostly KS. KS obtained ample autonomy in their decentralized 
municipalities and absolute control of their own cultural affairs and religious sites and 
surrounded area. Serbia however, was left with the requirement to give up what she 
considered ‗the heart of Serbia‘ (in Milosevic expression) but no compensation offered 
was granted. The conflicting dyad Serbia-KA was never directly addressed except via 
the privileges to KS. Serbia remained with a lack of arguments for her constituencies 
other than the remark that ‗Kosovo is Serbia‘s territory‘ and, therefore, left in 
permanent denial of a new reality. I call this phenomenon the ‗left-out problem‘ of the 
civic nation building process implemented in Kosovo. 
In terms of the impact of the civic nation building process on the overall conflict 
transformation, the left-out dyad problem represents a limitation for widening the scope 
of the impact that it meant to generate. 
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The left-out dyad problem seems to reflect that the CNB intervention forgot that 
conflict transformation is a long term perspective of an initiated change whose 
repercussions live and reproduce through time. If the identification of KS with K-state 
increases to the point of being fully independent of Serbia and use this fact as a political 
tool, Serbia would remain without any space for intervening in Kosovo. If such a 
situation could come into being, what the options would be for an actor that was not 
offered a way out of its own history of grievances, sufferings, lost, and traumas? 
Ahtisaari missed this point. The entire CNB entitled to overcome the competing 
nationalistic projects missed it too. International community proves she is incapable of 
addressing the KA-Serbia relationship, incapable of handling the burden of parties‘ 
mutual grievances and traumatic past. The KA-Serbia relationship that during 1999-
2008 was frozen for good, in 2008 was forgotten for bad. The ‗walk through history,‘ 
that Montville (1995) recommended for handling conflicts of this sort, has been 
omitted, lost, override and eventually denied. 
The ‗left-out dyad problem‘ that the implementation of AP brought about 
threatens to challenge the capacity of the CNB process to have a positive impact in the 
transformation of the Kosovo conflict. Some argue that the initiation of the accession to 
EU could be a solution for her own loss. Whatever this option may represent for Serbia, 
if seriously addressed, it may symbolize a path for addressing the remaining problem.  
6.1.5 .3.2 Top-down approach without an indigenous component. 
If the objective is to implement a CNB able to generate a transformation in the 
Kosovo conflict, the top-down approach of the intervention needs to be revised. 
Conflict transformation approach by definition implies the involvement of bottom-up 
approaches, with a strong role of Track III actors and not only the Track I and Track II 
that this intervention addressed. 
As it has been argued somewhere else in this chapter and Chapter 5, KS did not 
take part in the overall discussion of the intervention nor did the population of Kosovo. 
Common sense would tell us that we cannot consider as ours a process which we have 
been excluded from. The CNB process in Kosovo requires that the population take 
ownership over it. As long as the process of transforming the conflict remains far from 
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the hands of those who need the process the most, little scope for success is left to the 
CNB. 
Expanding the intervention into multiple tracks as suggested by Mc Donald and 
Diamond might represent a more serious path for the sustainability of the CNB process. 
6.1.5 .4 Institutionalization of Ethnicity  
The analysis of transformations at the structural level leaves us the warning of a 
risk of institutionalizing ethnic differences rather than working for its de-politization 
and reduction of its salience.  
The laws under observation here propose structural changes that somehow 
separate the Kosovo population according to their ethnic ethnicity.  If the aim is the 
construction of a civic nation that overcomes former polarization along ethnic lines, the 
introduction of more division leads to the exacerbation of the existing differences.  An 
example of this exacerbation is Mitrovica. Neither UNMIK nor Ahtisaari Plan (AP) 
could manage to handle the situation in this city in a more constructive way. The de 
facto partitioning of the town has been institutionalized by the AP‗s creation of 
Mitrovica South and North. A walk through the Ibar River Bridge gives, to anybody 
involved in the attempt, the sense that tensions are going to increase if the two sides of 
Mitrovica are entitled to remain separated. Both sides look to me like two different 
worlds already, I wonder how and who could avoid new tensions and conflicts in this 
area. Who could then be able to avoid both sides of Mitrovica turning into barricades if 
the CNB in process of implementation does not reach the expected outcomes? 
The laws on decentralization give rise to similar questions. KS were already 
separated by enclaves. New divisions, now institutionalized, may keep the society in 
similar dynamics of separation and exclusion that they already knew and that have been 
at the deep-roots of the conflict. A CNB process that does not take these dynamics 
properly into consideration, may fail to accomplish its role in transforming the conflict. 
 
6.1.5.5 Civic Nation Building as an alternative to partitioning 
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 Despite all limitations that CNB has encountered in its implementation in 
Kosovo, it still remain as a positive alternative to the options of partitioning presented 
by scholars like Kaufman (2004, 2006), Pape (1997-1998), and Downes (2004, 2006). 
The changes at actor level in all ethnic groups, and the ones at the personal level 
have shown that ethnic identity is not immutable, that there is room for changes to 
develop that empowers the individual agency over group identity actions. 
The findings at the actor level transformation have shown that actors can move 
out of the conflicting relationship by the use of their individual agency. From this 
research, however, we cannot explain how these transformations happened but we can 
show that there is a chance to prove partitionist wrong and to think of civic nation 
building process as an alternative instead of partitioning. 
To conclude, structural interventions in the shape of civic nation building process 
may have chances to transform the conflict into a sustainable shape if the limitations 
mentioned here are properly addressed. If we were to put these elements in a 
framework, for civic nation building as a tool for conflict transformation it may look as 
follows: (Figure 8) 
Figure 8 Framework for Civic Nation Building as tool for Conflict Transformation 
  
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 
  POSITIVE IMPACT NEGATIVE IMPACT 
  
  
  
  
  
 
C
IV
IC
 N
A
TI
O
N
 
B
U
IL
D
IN
G
 M
E
C
H
A
N
IS
M
S
 
Is
su
e
s Provide a solution to overcome the 
issues of the conflict 
Main Issues remain unaddressed 
Achieve a change in the position of 
the parties regarding the issues 
Parties have not changed their position 
regarding the issues 
Parties accept a compromising 
solution 
Parties do not accept compromise over 
their demands 
S
tr
uc
tu
re
 All parties are addressed At least one party is not being 
addressed by the intervention 
All possible conflicting dyads are 
addressed 
At least one conflicting dyad is not 
addressed by the intervention 
It offers a context of equal 
opportunities for all parties in the conflict 
There is no provision for a context of 
equal opportunities for all parties in the conflict 
 
 
143 
 
 
 
 
 
6. 2. Summary and Conclusions 
The research question of this study assays the impact of civic nation building 
considered as a structural intervention on the successful transformation of the Kosovo 
conflict over competing nationalistic projects. With this purpose, it is analyzed if a civic 
framework of the nation building process is able to develop positive transformations at 
structure, issues, actor and personal levels of the conflict. The entire discussion in this 
chapter presents the findings and discusses them theoretically and empirically to 
provide conclusions over the scope and limitations of the use of civic nation building as 
a tool for conflict transformation. 
The discussion over structural level transformation brings as result that the CNB 
has been able to generate a positive impact on conflicting parties and conflicting 
relationships, decreasing the use of violence as a political tool for expressing demands 
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and parties‘ positions in the conflict. However, the structural measures implemented to 
guarantee equal participation in political life have not brought positive transformations 
but rather a concern towards a danger of institutionalizing ethnicity. Moreover, the 
overall analysis of the structural level gives a warning over the top-down approach of 
the intervention and its implication over the sustainability of the CNB process. 
According to the discussion on issue level transformation, civic nation building 
has succeeded in reframing the political status issues channelizing them into diplomatic 
disagreements of low intensity presented only by one side, as the other side regards 
independence declaration and the Ahtisaari Plan as the settlement of the status of 
Kosovo. The absence of the reports on abuse of human, civic and political rights seems 
to also have been a unique situation over the 16 months of implementation of this CNB. 
However, their relationship with CNB is still not clear and requires further exploration. 
The fact that violent reactions were lacking since the CNB may indicate certain lines to 
argue positive relations. Regarding the issues of Territorial control, no positive or 
negative impact has been observed; whereas, the issue of protection of cultural and 
religious heritage continues to remain used as a political tool by the parties. 
Following the findings and discussion on actor level transformations, we can 
argue that the main transformations have taken place at this level. All actors present a 
tendency towards the acceptance of AP. It has therefore opened the scope for further 
transformations at the micro level, challenging those theorists that consider ethnicity as 
immutable. Actors have also shown to make decisions based also on cost/benefits 
evaluations by weighting them as much as considerations of ethnicity. 
Regarding the discussion on personal level transformations, the general result is a 
positive trend towards the transformation of the conflict, measured by the acceptance of 
the AP. However, once the analysis is broken down by ethnicity, the result is a weaker 
tendency and can be considered as embryonic steps in overcoming ethnic divisions. 
The overall discussion positively answers my research questions. Civic nation 
building does have an impact on successful conflict transformation. However, the scope 
of this impact presents certain limitations mostly of a procedural nature related to the 
empirical case analyzed, such as: the risk of institutionalizing ethnicity, the risk of 
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ignoring substantial involvement of people itself due to the top-down approach of the 
intervention, the left-out dyad problem, the risk of confusing ID and CNB, the lack of 
strategies for macro-micro level transfers, and the lack of considering the involvement 
of indigenous actors. As product of the overall analysis, a framework for civic nation 
building as tool for conflict transformation was presented by the conclusions and 
discussion in this whole chapter. 
In general terms, therefore, the analysis of the findings and its discussions 
provides ample support for considering civic nation building as a tool for conflict 
transformation. 
 
6.3. Implications of the Research  
6.3.1. Theoretical Contributions 
This research has successfully achieved its ambition of bringing the theoretical 
construct of civic nation building into conflict resolution field debates. By 
distinguishing state building enterprises from nation building ones, this study provides a 
clearly defined conceptualization for third party intervention processes that have been 
developed in the empirical field but whose understanding has been misled by 
conceptual confusions. 
This research offers an original contribution to the debate on the theoretical 
implications of the civic nation building process implemented as tool for conflict 
transformation and opens lines for further research on this relationship. Further, it 
provides a framework for the analysis of civic nation building processes as a tool for 
conflict transformation while supporting further analysis of interventions of this sort. 
6.3.2. Empirical Contributions 
This research establishes some guidance for international relations and future 
intervention processes in conflicts in multiethnic and divided societies, similar to the 
one considered here. Moreover, this research points out, particularly, the scope and 
limitations of interventions of this kind which aim at constructing a common identity 
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among divided people and aims at advising its considerations in future practical 
experiences. 
In particular, policy recommendations for the Kosovo case are provided out of the 
conclusions drawn in this research, presented in section 6.6. 
6.4. Limitations of this research 
This exploratory research is indeed very limited in scope and goals. The 
exploration of the explanatory capacity of the theoretical relationship between civic 
nation building as structural third party intervention and successful conflict 
transformation demands a more ambitious enterprise. This research, therefore, does not 
conclude on causal relationship between these two variables but rather provide future 
lines for research by introducing possible relationships.  
6.5. Future Research 
Civic nation building has met the goal of being a more precise classification of 
third party intervention. However, there is a long journey to go through in the design of 
theoretical developments covering aspects such as: timing, motives, process. Having 
explored all these elements explored, the evaluation of its effectiveness can be more 
credible. 
In addition, there is a need to integrate the analysis of this sort of structural 
interventions with particularist interventions that participate in the civic nation building 
process. In this line, the debate between the role of external and indigenous actors 
should be further explored. 
For more successful conflict transformation it is necessary to widen the 
understanding of the multilevel and multi-dynamic nature of any transformation 
process. For instance, this research did not address reconciliation processes and 
literature which would provide a more comprehensive perspective of the 
transformations that occurred at the micro level. The socio-economic dynamics and 
variables of development require also deeply understanding and exploring both the 
scope of the civic nation building intervention and of the possibilities for transformation 
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of deep-rooted conflicts. In this context, further analysis enables exploration of how 
socio economic dynamics interplay with the process of building a civic nation with 
ample transformation at the actor and personal levels. 
Another line of research can explore how the different transformations enforce 
each other while analyzing how macro-meso-micro levels interact for the sustainability 
of civic nation building processes of this sort. 
Civic nation building and conflict transformation are not static processes, despite 
that for the purposes of my analysis I have taken it as such. A more ambitious study 
could explore the interaction of both variables while considering both variables with 
dynamic values. 
6.6. Recommendation for Practitioners 
According to the analysis, the Kosovo civic nation building process requires the 
consideration of the following to become a successful/sustainable experience: 
1) Address the left-dyad problem by addressing the conflicting relationship 
between Kosovo Albanians and Serbia. The hindrance of Serbia and the development of 
parallel structures should be stopped by an active policy from the intervener, instead of 
the avoidance and double standard policy that the UN and EULEX are implementing 
towards both, Kosovo Albanians and Serbia. 
2) Equally acknowledge all actors of the conflict without assuming that Kosovo 
Serbs and Serbia are one monolithic entity.  Therefore, Kosovo Serbs should be 
included in all type of process from Track I to Track III level or all other type of multi-
track interventions as are all the other actors of the conflict. 
3) Develop a monolithic voice among the international community operating in 
Kosovo and keep coherence with the policy implemented. Overlapping and 
contradictory actions must be omitted. For instance, the presence of two parallel and 
contradictory processes, one for the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan and another 
for its detriment as is the ‗six points plan‘ may lead to the increase of uncertainty and 
eventually to further space for violence in the region. Double standard policies that 
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support AP and EULEX but vote against an Independence declaration may undermine 
the CNB process under development. 
6.7. Concluding Remark 
The readers may find this research as going beyond Occam's razor and they are 
probably right. Notwithstanding, the author strongly believes in thinking and 
exchanging possible explanations as a way of constructing knowledge. Therefore, the 
author strongly empathizes with Lederach‗s words, which reads, "[w]e believe in the 
knowledge we generate but not in the inherently messy process by which we acquire it" 
(Lederach 2005:78). The author developed this research as an attempt entirely guided 
by absolute trust in her inherent and all messy process of intuiting, observing and 
interpreting the Kosovo‘s conflict in all opportunities she has had in the field. The 
author found that this could be the least contribution that she could make to a field as 
sensitive as Conflict Resolution in which the call for Verstehen is so compelling. 
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APPENDIX A 
Interview Actor Level 
1st Set of Questions referring to primary Identity: 
2. Is the concept of civic nation in Kosovo part of your initial political goals? Or 
Have your perspective changed since 1999? 
 
 
2nd Set of Questions referring to acceptance of Ahtisaari Plan 
 
 
3. The CN has defined Kosovo as civic nation. After 6 months do you think that it 
has contributed to improve the quality of interethnic relations? 
 
4. Given the demography of Kosova with nearly 90% of Albanian inhabitants and 
10% minorities, do you consider that it is possible to construct a civic nation in Kosovo?  
 
5. Which are the main obstacles for the construction of a civic nation in Kosovo?  
 
6. Are you optimistic about integration of Serbs community in Kosovo’s 
institution?  Which one has been your contribution in this respect?  
 
7. Is it possible a civic nation in a Kosovo in which all parties are still ethnically 
based? How do you consider that this situation is going to change?  
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APPENDIX B  
Survey – Personal Level (with Operational Rules added) 
Male/Female.   Age……….                  Place of Residence ………………………………………………….. 
1. How do you identify yourself  (please select only one of the following options) 
a. Kosovar 
b. Albanian 
c. Serbian 
d. Other ………………………………….. 
 
FIRST SET OF QUESTIONS (Independent Variable) 
 
2. Imagine you are abroad and someone asks you: where are you from? What 
would you answer? You are from  (please select only one of the following options) 
a. Kosovo (+1) 
b. Albania (-1) 
c. Serbia (-1) 
d. Other………(0 as it is neutral regarding the two nationalistic projects 
previously discussed) ……………………………………………………………… 
3.  Which one of the following you consider to be your nation? 
a. Kosovo (+1) 
b. Albania (-1) 
c. Serbia (-1) 
d. Other………(0 as it is neutral regarding the two nationalistic projects 
previously discussed) ……………………………………………………………….. 
When they refer to both Kosovo and Albania/Serbia I did the sum of values and 
neutralize it, turning into 0 
 
4. Which one of the following is the state you belong to? 
a. Kosovo (+1) 
b. Albania (-1) 
c. Serbia (+1) 
d. Other…… (0 as it is neutral regarding the two nationalistic projects 
previously discussed) ………………………………………………………………….. 
 
5.  Do the Kosovo’s institutions represent your interest? 
a. Yes  (+1) 
b. Sometimes (0) 
c. No. (-1) 
6.  Do you vote in the official elections hold in Kosovo?   
a. Yes  (+1) 
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b. Sometimes. Please mention which one(s) (0) as the individual may not 
be sure, or he may vote accordingly to convenience and not to national feelings or 
identification)………………………………………………………………………………………… 
c. No (-1) 
7. How much in common you have with members of other ethnic communities? 
a. A lot, we are all Kosovars (+1) 
b. Many things but we will have to work in finding more commonalities 
(+1)  
c. Not much, but in time we may have more (0)  (also not sure here about 
this value) 
d. Not much, and I don’t think situation can improve (-1) 
e. Nothing (-1) 
 
SECOND SET OF QUESTIONS (Dependent Variable) 
 
8. Have you read the Kosovo Constitution?  
a. Yes (+1 
b. Some parts. Please mention which one(s)… (0 refers to a moderate 
acquaintance with the 
KCN)…………………………………………………………………...................... 
c. No (-1) 
9. Do you feel as yours the Kosovo Constitution? 
a. Yes (+1) 
b. No (-1) 
c.  The lack of answer is considered  0 neutral ( however only 2 options 
were given to the citizen) 
10. Do you feel benefited by the creation of new municipalities? 
a. Yes (+1) 
b. No (-1) 
c. I don’t know (0) 
11. Do you consider that Kosovo is the state you belong to? 
a. Yes  (+1) 
b. No. (-1) 
c. The lack of answer is considered  0 neutral ( however only 2 options 
were given to the citizen) 
12. Do you consider that the establishment of “special protective zones” 
surrounding religious and other cultural and historical sites was a good decision? 
a. Yes (+1) 
b. No (-1) 
c. I don’t know (0) 
13.  Do you feel more secure since the “special protective zones” were 
established? 
a. Yes (+1) 
b. No (-1) 
c. I don’t know. (0) 
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14. Do you feel represented by the Kosovo’s Flag? 
a. Yes  (+1) 
b. Yes but I also feel represented by other flag. Please mention which one 
(0 as it is not necessarily denying Kosova Flag but also not entirely link to 
it)………………………………..……….. 
c. No (-1) 
15. Do you consider that it was a good and necessary decision to create a flag for 
Kosovo? 
a. Yes, it was good and necessary (+1) 
b. Yes, was good but not necessary (0) 
c. Yes, was necessary but no good (0)  
d. No, no good and no necessary (-1) 
 
16. Was the independence declaration a positive development? 
a. Yes (+1) 
b. Maybe, but I am yet not sure (0) 
c. No( -1) 
d. I don’t know (0) 
 
17. Since the independence declaration, do you feel you have more things in 
common with people of other ethnic communities? 
a. Yes. (+1) 
b. Yes, but it will take more time to improve (+1) 
c. No, but I hope I will (0) 
d. No (-1) 
e. No, and I feel we have less things in common, now (-1) 
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